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DrPH Integrating Statement 
I recently received a telephone call from a friend who works as the WHO Health System 
Advisor, based at the Kenyan country office. After exchanging our usual pleasantries, our brief 
discussion went as below;    
“…Chief when are you coming to Nairobi next?” “Early next month” – I replied. “Okay. 
Could you let me know when you are around? There are two issues I want us to 
brainstorm about. One as part of our Health Systems Strengthening Project for the 
counties, we are thinking of developing a framework that will be able to track different 
aspects of health governance in the counties over time; and try and link those aspects 
with the overall county health sector performance outcomes; and secondly you know the 
KHSSP (Kenya Health Sector Strategic Plan) is almost due for a mid-term evaluation, I 
want us to start thinking about an evaluation framework”. “Yeah sure – we can link those 
to evaluation processes”, I replied. “Yes, exactly! That’s why I want us to brainstorm on 
how to go about that”. “Ok.” “So you do let me know when you come over to Nairobi 
and we can meet and discuss this over a drink” “Ooh sure, I will definitely look for you 
……” 
After I concluded this telephone call, I sunk on my office seat thinking “this ability to contribute 
to thinking on how to make the health system in Kenya function better is exactly what I was 
aiming for when I chose to pursue the DrPH course”. Reflecting on this telephone discussion 
and my experiences over the past four years gave me a high level of satisfaction with my DrPH 
course intention and experience. 
The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine’s (LSHTM) DrPH degree is described 
as a professional doctorate specifically designed to provide candidates with skills necessary for 
leadership roles in a broad range of public health practice. The course is uniquely organised 
into three components:  a taught component running for one term at the school, an 
Organisational and Policy Analysis (OPA) project running for six to twelve months and a 
research thesis component running for two and a half to three years.  
I undertook my taught component in September 2011. This component comprised of two 
advanced courses; Leadership, Management and Professional Development (LMPD) and 
Evidence Based Public Health Policy and Practice (EBPHP). Having registered for the DrPH 
after having worked as a district health manager in Kenya before, my specific interest for the 
course was to acquire additional leadership and management skills, and obtain skills for 
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accessing, synthesising and applying evidence for planning and overall decision making within 
the health sector. 
The LMPD course not only provided me with unique leadership and management skills 
applicable to health sector organisational settings; but also through well organised coaching 
and mentorship sessions provided me with an opportunity for reflecting on my own thinking 
and approaches to leading and managing people. In addition to providing me with skills for 
accessing, appraising and synthesising research evidence, the EBPHP course also provided me 
with skills for packaging and communicating evidence to different actor audiences in the health 
sector. 
I undertook my OPA in the Policy and Planning Department at the Ministry of Health (MoH) 
headquarters in Kenya, where I was attached for eight months. My OPA project specifically 
focused on examining the level of alignment between technical priority setting and financial 
budgeting within the Annual Operational Planning and budgeting processes in the Kenyan 
health sector. While at the MoH headquarters, I was co-opted into the MoH planning Core 
Team, which was at the time leading the development of a new national health policy and 
strategic plan for the ministry; the Kenya Health Policy (KHP) 2012-30 and the Kenya Health 
Sector Strategic Plan (KHSSP) 2012-2017. My active involvement in the development of these 
two important sector policy documents gave me a first-hand opportunity to influence their 
design and content. In addition, during the process of conducting my OPA, I was tasked to 
review and revise the MoH AOP planning tools and guidelines for sub-national levels. 
I conceived my thesis research question while working with colleagues at the KEMRI-
Wellcome Trust Research programme in Kilifi in a broader study on Health System 
Governance.  This governance research is part of a broader multi-country DfID funded research 
consortium called Resilient and Responsive Health System (RESYST).  My thesis research, 
which builds on my OPA work, aimed at examining how the planned devolution in Kenya was 
going to affect governance and accountability structures and practices for health sector 
planning and budgeting at county level in Kenya.   
In the process of conducting my thesis research, I have been participating in several high level 
health sector policy discussions, particularly regarding heath sector devolution, at both 
National level in Kenya, and in Kilifi County. This policy engagement and involvement has 
provided me with a unique opportunity to facilitate a real-time feedback of my research work 
into shaping the implementation of health sector devolution in Kenya. 
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In terms of scientific productivity, in addition to writing my OPA report and this thesis, I have 
authored and published one, first author peer reviewed paper from my OPA work, and have 
co-authored two other related published papers with the ‘learning site’ colleagues. I currently 
have three other first author draft manuscripts from my thesis research work ready for 
submission to journals. I have also been able to present my work in several high level national 
and international scientific conferences and meetings. In the recent past, I have received 
invitations and requests to be involved in either joint research grant applications, or protocol 
development for several aspects of health systems governance and health policy research work 
across Africa. 
In terms of professional and personal development; in the process of conducting my research 
work, I received formal appointment as a technical advisor and member of the Policy and 
Planning Technical Working Group in the Kenya MoH. More recently, and in recognition of 
the unique skills and experience that I have acquired through the DrPH, the Board of 
Management of the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI), appointed me as Centre 
Director of the KEMRI centre in Kilifi; the largest KEMRI centre in the country and host to 
the internationally renowned KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Research Programme. 
In conclusion, I believe the uniqueness of the three components of the DrPH programme have 
equipped me with the skills and the experience for leadership roles in health research and health 
policy, which is what I desired when I was joining the course.   
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Abstract 
Health sector decentralisation has been a recurring theme in health systems reform discourse 
for several decades, particularly in developing countries.  Decentralisation is promoted for its 
ability to strengthen community participation and accountability, and to enhance technical 
efficiency in the management of limited health sector resources. However, most of the literature 
on health sector decentralisation has been descriptive, reporting outcomes of different 
decentralisation models, with minimal analysis of how contextual factors contribute to the 
observed outcomes. In 2010, Kenya passed a new constitution through a nationwide public 
referendum. A key feature of this constitution was the introduction of 47 semi-autonomous 
devolved county governments. 
This study aimed to describe and analyse the effects of this major political decentralization on 
planning and budgeting in the health sector at the sub-national level, including the goals and 
intended strategies for health sector operational planning and budgeting, and stakeholder 
expectations and experiences of decentralisation.   
I used a case study design, focusing on Kilifi County, guided by a conceptual framework which 
drew on decentralisation and policy analysis theories. I used three tracers: planning and 
budgeting for recurrent expenditures; Human Resources for Health (HRH); and Essential 
Medicines and Medical Supplies (EMMS) management. I collected qualitative data through 
document reviews, key informant interviews, and participant and non-participant observations. 
I found that the Kenyan devolution was largely driven by the need to address political rather 
that technical challenges in public sector management. To this effect, county level functions 
were rapidly transferred without proper structures and capacity to undertake these functions 
leading to major disruption of public services at county level. Within the health sector, the early 
days witnessed perverse re-centralisation of operational financial management roles from 
health facility level to the county level. On HRH, there were major disruptions in staff salary 
payments, political interference with HRH management functions and confusion over certain 
HRH management roles; leading to industrial strikes and mass resignations by health workers. 
On EMMS, there were significant delays in the procurement process leading to long periods of 
stock outs of essential drugs in health facilities. 
With time though, and with the county governments establishing their structures and 
progressively building their capacity, a general improvement in counties’ ability to manage 
devolved functions, including health sector functions has been witnessed and there are 
deliberate efforts to find local level solutions to some of the emerging challenges. 
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In conclusion I argue that the political push for decentralisation is often stronger than the 
technical intentions and implementation processes. There is thus need for health sector policy 
actors to have a broader understanding of the countries’ political context whenever designing 
technical strategies for implementing health sector decentralisation. In addition, I propose that 
the allocation of functions between central level and decentralised units should always be 
guided by considerations around decision space, organisational structure and capacity, and 
accountability arrangements and practices within the health system.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
1.0. Problem statement 
Proponents of public sector decentralisation have promoted it for two broad reasons It has been 
argued that decentralisation allows for community participation in public governance, thus 
promoting public accountability and ownership of public systems [1, 2]; and it is also promoted 
as a way of addressing the problems of institutional inefficiency that are characteristic of the 
public sector [3-5]. 
Within the health sector context, a call for participation and involvement of communities in 
their health matters began from the days of the Alma Ata declaration in 1978 [6]. In the early 
1990s, with the publication of the World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health, the 
World Bank (WB) began advocating for good governance in the health sector through 
decentralisation [5]. Ever since, health systems decentralisation has become a recurring theme 
and an important objective in ongoing health sector reforms, particularly in developing 
countries [7, 8]. 
Even with its growing popularity as a health system ‘bad governance fix’ in many developing 
countries, the experiences and outcomes of health sector decentralisation in most developing 
countries have been quite varied [8], irrespective of the form or mode of decentralisation 
adopted [9]. Intended goals have often not been achieved, and perverse outcomes have often 
been documented [8]. This has led to a common recognition that irrespective of the form and 
mode of health sector decentralisation, its effects and outcomes are highly dependent on many 
contextual factors [3, 4, 8]. 
In the literature many studies of health sector decentralisation have tended to be descriptive; 
often presenting and/or comparing effects, experiences and outcomes of different health system 
tracers as a result of different forms of decentralisation [10]. Although it has been 
acknowledged that the ways in which decentralisation affects the health system have more to 
do with contextual factors than the mode or form of decentralisation adopted [8, 11], few 
studies have analysed how contextual factors external (or ‘extra’) and internal (or ‘intra’) to 
the health sector have interacted to shape and influence how decentralisation policies have been 
experienced and implemented [10].  
In the context of health policy implementation, the complex interaction between existing 
practices and new policies has commonly been acknowledged by health policy analysts as the 
phenomenon that largely explains the ‘gap’ between policy intent and policy implementation 
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[12].  Moreover, there is now an emerging consensus among health policy analysts that studies 
should strive to go further and deeper to explore and seek to explain ‘Why’ and ‘How’ a range 
of contextual factors interact with policy intentions, to produce observed or experienced policy 
outcomes in a given context [13, 14]. This discourse has also advanced the argument for the 
need to place ‘actors’ at the central foci of policy analysis because of their roles in shaping, 
framing and influencing policy implementation processes [14, 15].  These arguments are 
particularly relevant when investigating and analysing decentralisation policies, which largely 
involve shifting of the socially and politically contentious concept of ‘power’ [4]. 
1.1.  Scope of this thesis 
This thesis aims to contribute to the scanty literature that has sought to examine how health 
sector decentralisation is influenced by the broader context in which decentralisation policies 
are placed on the agenda, negotiated, framed, developed and implemented. I thus designed this 
study as a descriptive, exploratory and explanatory inquiry. I employed various 
decentralisation, organisational, accountability and policy analysis theories and frameworks to 
examine and analyse the effects of political decentralisation in Kenya on sub-national level 
health sector planning and budgeting. Specifically, I used planning and budgeting for recurrent 
expenditures, Human Resources for Health (HRH), and Essential Medicines and Medical 
Supplies (EMMS) management as the tracer elements for examining the implementation of 
decentralisation in the health sector. 
This study not only sought to understand the goals and intentions of devolution law and its 
immediate implementation outcomes (the what?), but also the rationale behind its design, and 
influences on implementation processes and outcomes. In addition, the study aimed to identify 
potential strategies to enhance implementation processes and thereby support the achievement 
of devolution goals and intentions within the health sector in Kenya.  Although I conducted the 
data collection in the early days of the implementation of the devolved government system in 
the country, I made a deliberate attempt to explore historical data and information so as to 
enhance the understanding of the intentions that led to the drafting of the devolution laws, and 
the unfolding events during the implementation process. 
1.2.  Definition and description of key terms and concepts 
Considering the relative breadth of the study topic and the occasional overlap of key terms and 
concepts used in this area, in this section I present definitions of some of these common and 
often overlapping terms and concepts, as I applied and used them in this study, and as presented 
in this thesis. 
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1.2.1. Governance 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) broadly defines governance as a set of 
mechanisms that allow for the exercise of political, economic and executive authority and 
obligations over the management of public affairs [16]. ‘Good governance’ has been argued to 
be essential for economic and social growth and development in any society [16, 17], with 
good governance often perceived to include participation of the population for whom decisions 
are made, in a transparent, accountable and responsive manner, as well as the achievement of 
technical and economic efficiency [16].  
1.2.2. Accountability 
Public sector accountability takes a broad range of forms and mechanisms. However, the main 
focus is generally on answerability by those in positions of responsibility to the public over 
decisions they make while in those positions [18]. Accountability of the public system to the 
general public is widely perceived as an essential characteristic of good governance [17, 18].  
1.2.3. Health systems governance 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) recognises ‘health systems governance’ as the central 
core of the six building blocks of the health system [19]. Though acknowledged as an important 
element of the health system because of its central role in holding the other elements together, 
both theoretical and empirical literature on health systems governance is scanty, making it the 
least understood health system building block [17]. 
1.2.4. Decentralisation 
Decentralisation is generally defined as the transfer of power and authority over management 
of public affairs from a central level of government to sub-national levels [20]. Depending on 
the form and model of the decentralisation, the power and authority transferred could be 
regarding revenue generation, planning, budgeting and general public resource management 
and decision making, and the sub-national units can be elected directly by the population, 
appointed by the central level or be private entities [3, 9, 20]. Because decentralisation involves 
shifts of power and authority over public resources, it is inevitably a highly political process 
[4]. 
1.2.5. Health sector planning and budgeting 
Health sector planning can be viewed from two broad perspectives. First, as a continuum of 
the health policy making process, through the formulation of long term strategies such as health 
sector strategic plans and medium term plans. Second, it can be viewed as a management tool 
for implementing the long term strategic plans through short term implementation plans or day-
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to-day operational plans and budgets. The latter is commonly referred to as health sector 
operational planning and budgeting [21-23]. Though often viewed as a technical process 
involving goals, objectives and target setting, health planning is often largely a political process 
that involves balancing the interests of different actors, and making important and complex 
choices between alternatives with different social, economic and political consequences [24].  
Given the very political nature of health planning processes, particularly where there is 
negotiation and allocation of limited resources, ‘good governance’ principles such as 
accountability and community participation are key.  
1.3.  Organisation of this thesis 
This thesis is organised in ten chapters.  
This chapter has presented a general background of the thesis, outlining the scope and 
organisation of the thesis, and key concepts and definitions.  Chapter two is the main literature 
review, presenting theoretical frameworks that have been used to analyse decentralisation, and 
key empirical findings of health sector decentralisation studies in low and middle income 
countries with a focus on the tracers for this study: operational planning and budgeting, human 
resource management and the management of essential medicines and medical supplies.   
Chapter three presents a detailed account of the study setting giving a background of Kenya, 
including highlights in the historical evolution of the decentralisation debate, and an overview 
of the organisation of the health system with a focus on planning and budgeting.   
In chapter four I provide a detailed description of the study, highlighting the study question, 
objectives, conceptual framework, and methodological details.   
Chapters five to eight cover the study findings:  the broader context of devolution in Kenya 
(chapter 5); followed by decentralisation effects on planning and budgeting (chapter 6); health 
workforce management (chapter 7); and management of essential medicines and medical 
supplies (chapter 8).  In chapter nine I discuss the study findings in relation to the study 
conceptual framework and relevant literature, and in chapter ten I provide an overall summary 
of the study and the conclusions and recommendations.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.0  Introduction 
This chapter has three main parts. Part one focusses on the review of literature on theoretical 
and conceptual frameworks specific to analysing decentralization. The second part reviews the 
empirical literature with a focus on the effects of health systems decentralization on operational 
planning and budgeting, Human Resources for Health (HRH) management; and the 
management of Essential Medicines and Medical Supplies (EMMS) in low and middle income 
countries.  Finally, the third part reviews key theoretical and conceptual frameworks of health 
sector governance, and for political, organizational and policy analysis, in the context of health 
sector decentralization.  These frameworks are not specifically designed to examine 
decentralisation but emerged through my review of the empirical studies as of central relevance 
to this study. 
2.1.  Theoretical frameworks for analysing decentralization 
Decentralisation is a complex concept with many different modes and forms [9], with the final 
nature, outcomes and effects of decentralisation the result of many internal and external 
contextual factors [7, 8]. The complex nature of decentralisation has made it a difficult 
phenomenon to measure in the real world setting [4, 11]. The literature on conceptual and 
analytical frameworks for examining decentralisation is very limited with no agreed ‘ideal’ 
framework [11]. Commonly cited frameworks and analytical approaches have their roots in the 
development sector, and include the social capital framework, the local fiscal choice 
framework, the public administration framework; and the principal agent framework. Here I 
describe the social capital and local fiscal choice frameworks briefly as they have not been 
widely used in studies of health sector decentralisation. I then describe in more detail the public 
administration and principal agent frameworks which have been used more often in studying 
health sector decentralisation and which I draw on more heavily in this study. 
2.1.1. Social capital framework 
This framework was first used by Putnam in his studies of decentralisation in Italy. In this 
framework, Putnam tried to explain the reason why some decentralised units in a devolved 
system perform better than others. He observed that in better performing units, there is usually 
a wide range of voluntary and civil organisations which he called ‘social capital’, that serve to 
encourage people to work more closely together [25]. This framework has however had very 
limited application in studies of health system decentralisation [11]. 
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2.1.2. Local fiscal choice framework 
This framework was first described and used by economists Musgrave and Musgrave to analyse 
expenditure choices made by local governments for locally generated revenue, and for 
resources transferred from central government [26]. The framework assumes that local 
governments make choices that are in the best interests of and are most popular with ‘local 
voters’. This framework has been used largely in development studies of federalism in high 
income countries, with its application in developing country contexts limited because revenue 
collection through taxation is usually a responsibility of central government, with minimal local 
revenue generation. In many developing countries, the resources received from central 
government are accompanied by administrative restrictions, limiting the space for local 
decisions and choices [11]. 
2.1.3. Public administration framework 
This framework was first described and used by Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) in their studies 
of decentralisation and public policy in developing countries in the early 1980s [9]. It largely 
focuses on the legal status of the distribution of authority and responsibility over public affairs 
between central level government and the lower level authority. It describes a four-type 
classification of different forms of decentralisation based on the legal status: 
1. Devolution: defined as the transfer of power and authority over public service delivery from 
central level government to elected semi-autonomous sub-national government structures. 
The sub-national level of government shoulders some degree of responsibility and 
accountability directly to the population over the functions assigned to it. 
2. De-concentration: defined as the transfer of certain administrative and implementation 
roles and duties to sub-national government units. These sub-national government units are 
subordinate to the central government. Authority and responsibility over the services 
delivered by these units is retained at the centre. 
3. Delegation: defined as the transfer of some authority and roles of public service delivery 
to semi-autonomous government agencies like boards and parastatals. These semi-
autonomous agencies are usually appointed by, and are accountable to, the central 
government, and the responsibility to the population lies with the central government. 
4. Privatisation: described as the transfer of service delivery responsibility, and at times 
ownership of public institutions, to private entities. 
The public administration framework has been useful in examining decentralisation because it 
provides an obviously observable classification of institutional arrangements under the 
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different decentralisation models [11]. It is however quite limited as an analytical framework 
in that it does not provide for analysing the functions that are decentralised, and the context of 
the decentralisation [4, 11].  Within the health sector, this framework was first applied by Mills 
et al., (1990) to examine health system decentralisation in a World Health Organisation (WHO) 
study that involved ten country case studies [8]. Since then, this framework has been strongly 
promoted by the WHO to examine decentralised health systems.  Though still widely cited 
today, a number of authors [4, 27, 28] have criticised this framework, arguing that de-
concentration and privatisation should not be classified as forms of public sector 
decentralisation.  Their argument is that the former is just a form of field administration of a 
centralised system, while the latter involves private institutions whose nature of business 
engagements is different from public institutions. Other authors have also argued that in 
practical terms, most health systems are made up of a mixture of more than one of these 
decentralisation categories [3, 4].  
2.1.4. Principal agent and decision space frameworks 
This framework was developed by economists Pratt and Zechauser, initially to study the 
choices made by managers of private institutions. The framework describes a principal, who 
could be an individual or institution with a specific objective, and an agent who is tasked by 
the principal to undertake certain activities and tasks to meet the objectives of the principal 
[29].  
Within the health sector, Bossert (1998) used the principles of the principal agent framework 
to develop the decision space framework for analysing health sector decentralisation. In his 
decision space framework, Bossert described the ‘principal’ as a central government entity with 
a health service delivery mandate that it transfers to an ‘agent’, which he describes as a 
peripheral entity. In this framework, Bossert argues that there is always a range of effective 
choices that the ‘agent’ is allowed by the ‘principal’ to make. He furthers argues these choices 
are often defined within laws and guidelines; but often the ‘actual’ choices that the ‘agent’ ends 
up taking often include ‘bending the law’ because of the inability of the ‘principal’ to reinforce 
adherence of the rules. It is this total range of choices that the ‘agent’ ends up taking as outlined 
in the rules, and due to their ability to ‘bend the rules’ that Bossert described as decision space 
[11]. Bossert’s decision space framework can be seen as a more practical adaptation of the 
principal agent approach in that beyond examining the relationship between the ‘principal’ and 
the ‘agent’, it goes further to examine the range and types of choices that the ‘agent’ makes. It 
has been used by Bossert and his colleagues in several studies of health system decentralisation, 
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in a number of countries [11, 27, 30-32]. More recently, Bossert and Mitchell (2011) in a study 
of decentralisation in Pakistan developed a framework that sought to improve the decision 
space framework. In this improved framework, they argue that in decentralised settings, 
organisational structure and capacity, coupled with accountability structures and mechanisms, 
often act together to interact with and influence decision space [30]. 
2.2.  Empirical literature on health sector decentralization  
In this section, I outline and present findings of a detailed literature review that I carried out to 
answer questions that were emerging as important within the implementation of the new 
political decentralization in Kenya, including the effect of decentralization on a) resource 
allocation, recurrent operational planning and budgeting, b) Human Resources for Health 
(HRH) management and c) management of Essential Medicines and Medical Supplies 
(EMMS).  
These questions were partly informed by the findings from an initial review of the broad 
concepts of decentralization and health sector planning; and partly by the initial review of 
documents on the intended goals of decentralization in the health sector in Kenya.  These were 
further refined after initial discussions with key health sector stakeholders on their 
understanding and expectation of the planed decentralisation in Kenya. From the initial 
discussion with key health sector stakeholders, it emerged that the new decentralization in 
Kenya was going to transfer significant health sector priority setting, planning and budgeting 
responsibilities from national to county level. These would include responsibility for: all health 
sector investments including employment, deployment and overall management of health care 
workers; purchase, distribution and overall management of EMMS; infrastructure 
development; and major equipment purchase and distribution.  All of these responsibilities 
were previously undertaken at the national level, suggesting that the planned devolution in 
Kenya would have a major effect on how the health sector undertakes its planning and 
budgeting for recurrent resources, HRH and EMMS management [33-38] . 
2.2.1. Literature search strategy 
I carried out the literature search in Pubmed, Global Health and Google Scholar databases 
between February and March 2014, and updated the search in June 2015. I also undertook a 
manual search for the references of articles identified from the online search. 
I used the concepts and synonyms in Table 1 as search terms, using them either as free text or 
as MeSH terms depending on the database. I used the Boolean operator “OR” to combine 
synonyms and ‘AND’ to combine the different concepts. 
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The search focused only on articles published in peer reviewed journals in English, reporting 
empirical primary findings on the effects of health sector decentralization on resource 
allocation, recurrent/operational planning and budgeting, or on HRH or EMMS management. 
The review also only focused on studies conducted in Low and Middle Income Countries 
(LMIC) between January 1983 and December 2014. 
I accessed a total of 7,589 papers. In the initial screening, I excluded 7,386 papers on the basis 
of their titles, and a further 142 after reading the abstracts. I accessed and reviewed the full 
articles for the remaining 61 papers, leading to the exclusion of a further 32 articles. 29 papers 
were included in the final review.  
Table 1: List of concepts and synonyms used in the literature search 
Concept Synonyms 
Decentralization Decentrali* (Text word) Deconcentrat* (Text word) 
Devol* (Text word) Delegat* (Text word) 
Low and middle countries Low and middle income countries (Text word) Sub-
Saharan Africa (Text word) DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (MeSH Term) AFRICA SOUTH OF 
THE SAHARA (MeSH Term) 
Health workforce Health work* (Text word) Human resources for health 
(Text word) 
Doctors (Text word) Nurses (Text word) HEALTH 
MANPOWER (MeSH Term) 
Essential Medicines and Medical 
Supplies 
Medicin* (Text word) Medical Supplies (Text word) 
PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS (MeSH 
Term) 
Resource allocation, Planning and 
Budgeting 
Operational plan* (Text word) Budget* (Text word) 
Resource allocation (Text word) HEALTH 
PLANNING (MeSH Term) 
 
Annex 1 is a summary of the final 29 papers included in the review. Of these, 15 reported on 
studies conducted in Africa, 6 in Asia, 6 in South America and 2 were multi-country studies 
across regions. A total of 24 studies reported on different aspects of resource allocation, 
recurrent operational planning and budgeting, 14 on HRH management, and 7 on EMMS. All 
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studies were described as ‘case studies’, with cases varying from being regions within a country 
to country level cases.  The studies were predominantly qualitative, employing data collection 
techniques such as record reviews, individual interviews, focus group discussions and 
observations. Two studies employed a mixed-methods design as they undertook some 
quantitative data collection and analysis in addition to the qualitative inquiries [31, 39]. 
2.3.  Summary of findings from empirical studies reviewed 
In this section, I present a summary of the key findings on the range of effects of 
decentralization on the health system at a sub-national level for each of the three tracers. 
2.3.1. Decentralization and resource allocation, operational planning and budgeting 
Resource allocation criteria and practices 
Health sector decentralization had mixed effects on overall country level resource allocation 
and health sector specific resource allocation practices. An increase in equitable resource 
allocation across regions was attributed to the adoption of equity-based resource allocation 
criteria in the Philippines, Pakistan and Colombia [40-42], and to the establishment of an 
equalization fund in Chile [43].  Conversely, Collins et al (2000) reported that Brazil adopted 
a standardized resource allocation formula for all of its municipalities, disadvantaging the most 
needy and exacerbating inequalities [44].   
In terms of sources of funding, most studies reported very low local revenue generating 
capacity in decentralized units, leading to a reliance on centrally allocated sources of funds [27, 
41, 42, 45-47].  In some countries, centrally allocated funds to decentralized units were in the 
form of block grants as reported in Uganda and the Philippines, giving decentralized units more 
discretional powers over internal local resource allocation [42, 45]. However in other countries 
like Tanzania, Ghana, Chile, Bolivia and Brazil, centrally allocated funds were disbursed as 
conditional grants or earmarked funds thus reducing local level decision space [43, 48, 49].  
Some studies also reported the existence of vertical centrally controlled health programmes 
which were largely donor funded, with significant allocative restrictions as was the case in 
Tanzania, Uganda and Ghana [48, 50, 51]. Bossert et al (2003) noted that health sector 
decentralization in Zambia enhanced local level internal health sector resource mobilization 
through allowing districts to make local decisions on user fees [32] . 
Recurrent operational planning and budgeting 
Decentralization was associated with increased health sector financial management 
responsibility and local level and enhanced bottom-up planning processes within the health 
sector in Indonesia and Pakistan [52-54] . However, Maluka et al (2011) and Frumence et al 
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(2013) reported that in Tanzania, restrictive centrally controlled planning guidelines and lack 
of local level planning and budgeting capacity heavily constrained local level planning [47, 
55]. In Uganda, Jeppsson (2001) noted that an increase in discretional authority over local level 
priority setting led to reduced allocations for Primary Health Care (PHC) activities in 
decentralized districts to almost a quarter of previous central government allocation.  Districts 
also tended to allocate most of their resources to curative services as opposed to PHC [45]. 
Okorafor and Thomas (2007) and Mclntyre and Kulgman (2003) noted in South Africa that 
although decentralization increased provincial level financial autonomy, Provinces marginally 
increased allocation for PHC services on an incremental rather than need basis [46, 56].  
2.3.2. Decentralization and HRH management 
Decentralized versus centrally controlled HRH management systems  
The studies reviewed reported different levels of discretion by decentralized units for different 
HRH management functions. In most instances, even within devolved systems, countries 
tended to decentralize limited aspects of HRH management such as staff appraisals and 
disciplining while retaining critical functions of recruitment, deployment and salary payments 
at central level [42, 55, 57-59]. In these countries, it was reported that the retention of critical 
aspects of HRH management functions at central level was an attempt to mitigate against some 
of the challenges that had been anticipated or experienced with total decentralization of HRH 
management functions. In Tanzania for example, after undertaking total decentralization for 
health worker management to the district level, the country faced several challenges including 
inability of rural districts to attract and retain highly skilled staff such as medical specialists, 
leading to unequitable distribution of health workforce [49, 60, 61]. The country therefore re-
centralized some of the HRH management functions to address these challenges [61].  
Attraction, recruitment and retention of health care workers 
The studies reported divergent effects relating to health care worker attraction, recruitment and 
retention. Munga et al (2008) reported that decentralization was associated with better 
rationalization of staff recruitment and actual needs in staff numbers and skills mix, thus 
leading to better linkage between staff recruitment and budgetary allocation for HRH 
management in Tanzania. They also noted that decentralized health worker recruitment led to 
better retention of lower cadre health workers, as most were recruited and deployed within their 
home locality. Attraction and retention of highly skilled technical health workers was however 
a challenge in remote districts, as noted above [61]. The  tendency for better attraction and 
retention of lower cadre staff under decentralization led some countries like the Philippines, 
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Uganda and Chile to limit the decentralized recruitment of health care workers to only primary 
health workers [27, 59].  In Mozambique, Saide and Stewart (2001) reported that staff 
recruitment in decentralized provinces was negatively affected by inadequate financial 
resources and lack of personnel and capacity to properly manage the HRH management 
function at the provincial level [62].  
Health worker salaries, incentives and staff morale 
Decentralization of health worker salary payments was associated with disruption in payments 
of staff salaries in several countries including the Philippines, Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, and 
Zambia [27, 48, 58, 63]. In the Philippines for example, devolved health care workers received 
up to 40% reduced salaries and benefits due to lack of resources in local governments [27, 42], 
while in Uganda, Kyaddondo and Whyte (2003) noted that health workers in some rural 
districts could work for as long as 36 months without salaries [58].  This contributed to several 
countries with decentralized health systems adopting central management of health worker 
staff salaries [43, 57, 59]. In addition to disruption in health worker salary payments, devolved 
districts in Uganda could not afford to pay for continuous in-service training for health care 
workers, thus affecting their career progression [58].  Similarly, Grundy et al (2003) reported 
low morale for health workers in the Philippines as a result of health care worker management 
being undertaken by non-technical political managers who constantly interfered with the 
technical operations of the health workers. This eventually led to resignations by many health 
care workers [63].  
Managing health care workers during the centralization – decentralization transition 
From the studies that reported on the transition from a centralized to a decentralized HRH 
management system, the transition period emerged as critical and facing specific challenges. 
In Nepal for example, as the country adopted a devolved government system, health workers - 
acting out of fear of losing their jobs and concerns about the ability of districts to continue 
paying their salaries - went on strike to resist decentralization thus paralyzing the health sector 
[64]. In Uganda, the decentralization transition saw a confusion in health worker employment 
terms as some health workers were employed by decentralized districts while others were 
retained by national level, with the two groups having different terms of employment including 
salaries [58].  In the Philippines, the decentralization transition was undertaken without prior 
staff sensitization and was characterized by a poor transfer process which led to mass 
resignations of health care workers [63]. In Ghana, recruitment, promotion, and discipline of 
health workers was initially retained centrally but was later delegated to decentralized districts 
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leading to poor staff retention as a result of uncertainties in career progression and poor 
working conditions in the districts [48]. In Trinidad and Tobago, decentralized regions 
recruited new staff while existing staff were given a choice of transfer, secondment or 
remaining centrally employed [57].  
2.3.3. Decentralization and EMMS management 
Most of the studies reporting on EMMS management in a decentralized health system context 
reported that commodity procurement and supply to health facilities was retained as a central 
function, irrespective of the form and type of decentralization adopted [39, 59, 60]. Central 
government largely procured drugs and distributed them to health facilities in decentralized 
units in the form of pre-packaged drug kits, with minimal input from the decentralized units on 
their size and composition [39, 49, 60]. These centralized EMMS management systems were 
however often associated with some facilities receiving an inadequate supply of commodities 
[39]. In Uganda, districts used facility generated revenue in the form of user fees to supplement 
their drug supplies as the centrally distributed drug kits were inadequate [39]. 
In their study of effects of decentralization on logistics system in Ghana and Guatemala, 
Bossert et al (2007) reported that more local level discretion on EMMS management was 
associated with better prioritization and budgeting for drugs and commodities leading to better 
fill rates when commodities are ordered [39]. However, lack of adequate capacity for logistics 
management systems and procurement procedures at local level often resulted in delayed 
procurement of commodities thus resulting in frequent stock-outs in health facilities. This was 
also noted in the Philippines by Grundy et al (2003) who also reported frequent commodity 
stock outs at health facilities due to lack of proper logistics management capacity by local 
municipalities [31] . 
To address the challenge of frequent stock outs of Reproductive Health (RH) commodities in 
Ghana due to the capacity challenges at a district level, Mayhew (2003) reported that a vertical 
RH program, which was largely donor funded, established a vertical RH commodity supply 
system to all health facilities to supplement the locally procured commodities. These 
commodities supplied through the centrally funded programme were delivered in a timelier 
manner to the respective health facilities than those procured by the local districts. It was also 
reported that RH commodities procured by central MoH and distributed to districts were 
acquired at a lower cost than those procured by local districts directly, even for similar 
products. This was largely because the central MoH benefited from economies of scale, due to 
bulk purchases, compared to the local districts [63].  
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2.4.  Discussion of empirical studies’ findings 
This literature review had several limitations. First, the search for literature only published in 
English meant that I did not access literature published in other languages, limiting access to 
experience from LMICs which commonly publish in for example French and Spanish.  In 
addition, the search only focused on literature published in peer reviewed journals. Considering 
the nature of this subject, there is potentially a significant volume of grey literature that I did 
not include. 
In a WHO commissioned study to review health sector decentralisation in ten countries, Mills 
et al (1990) concluded that the outcomes of implementing different forms of health sector 
decentralisation in different countries are highly context specific, and that country level 
experiences and effects are difficult to generalize [8]. From the findings presented in this 
review, it is quite evident that health system decentralisation has been, and continues to be, 
advocated as an important good governance practice for improving the management of certain 
elements of resource allocation planning and budgeting, HRH, and EMMS [1, 49, 65]. 
However, the findings of this review also support Mills et all’s (1990) observation of context 
specific influences on the manner in which health sector decentralisation affects these health 
sector elements.  
The effects of health sector decentralization vary with the mode of decentralization and the 
broader country context, contributing to the complexity of the concept of decentralization and 
its effects on health system governance outcomes [4, 11]. These findings also revealed that 
health sector decentralization outcomes are often determined by whether the decentralization 
implemented is health sector specific, or is part of broader public service decentralization. 
Moreover, these findings revealed that in routine practice, quite often multiple forms or 
typologies of decentralization within the health system, and rarely just one single form, exists 
in any one country at a time [4, 11, 66]. 
This review shows that decentralisation has a myriad of positive and negative effects on the 
functioning of sub-national level health systems. On resource allocation, planning and 
budgeting, decentralisation coupled with deliberate equity policies can bring about equitable 
resource allocation at sub-national level. However, in most instances, there was minimal 
capacity for local revenue generation by decentralised units, necessitating the release of central 
financing for these units. This reliance on central government financing potentially limits the 
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decision space of decentralised units, especially in instances where the resources allocated to 
decentralised units are in the form or earmarked or conditional funds. 
With regards to HRH management, the literature suggests that certain HRH management 
functions including recruitment and distribution of highly specialised staff, in-service training, 
and management of staff salaries are best managed centrally. Other functions like staff 
appraisals, promotions, recruitment and deployment of lower cadre staff are best handled in 
decentralised units. On EMMS management functions, the literature suggests that functions 
like commodity quantification processes are best conducted locally, while the procurement 
function is best undertaken centrally as it provides opportunities for economies of scale. The 
literature further suggests that capacity challenges are the most common hindrance of 
decentralised units’ ability to undertake and perform functions assigned to them. 
2.5. Key, theoretical and conceptual frameworks for health sector 
governance, political, organizational and policy analysis, in the context of 
health sector decentralization  
In this section, I review key theoretical and conceptual frameworks for health sector 
governance, and political, organizational and policy analysis, in the context of health sector 
decentralization. Though they are not specific to decentralisation, their relevance for this study 
emerged during my review of the empirical literature on decentralisation. 
In a review of literature of frameworks for assessing public sector governance, Siddiqi et al., 
(2009) developed a framework for analysis of health systems governance based on ten core 
principles. These principles are strategic vision, participation and consensus orientation, rule 
of law, transparency, responsiveness, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, 
accountability, intelligence and information, and ethics [17].  As noted earlier, proponents of 
‘good governance’ have argued that a number of these principles including participation, 
equity, transparency and accountability can best be achieved through decentralization. Public 
participation and accountability are themselves two broad areas of research in public sector 
service delivery, with health just one sector. Different authors have had different definitions of 
public sector accountability; but what has been common in the different definitions is the issue 
of obligation by individuals or institutions to provide information or justifications for their 
actions to other actors, and the imposition of positive and negative sanctions in case of failure 
to adhere to the obligations [18]  The health sector, like other public service sectors is made of 
internal (within the system) and external (towards consumers and general population) 
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accountability mechanisms [18, 67]. Brinkerhoff (2004) developed a matrix for assessing the 
practice and exercise of accountability by different actors within the health sector. The 
Brinkerhoff accountability framework matrix bases accountability on the ‘supply’ and 
‘demand’ of information by different health sector actors, and the relative strengths by the 
different actors to demand or supply this information. Core to this framework is the concept of 
‘answerability’ and ‘sanctions’ in the exercise of accountability [18].   
Several authors have argued that the ‘political drivers’ and political context that push a country 
to adopting a decentralized governance arrangement have a major bearing on how 
decentralization gets implemented in a given setting. To this end, a political context analysis 
has been argued to be key in interpreting findings of studies examining decentralization policies 
[3, 4, 66]. In their policy analysis triangle, Walt and Gilson (1994) argued that the process of 
policy formulation and implementation is usually affected and influenced by the policy content, 
context and actors involved [68].  Within the context of decentralization, this argument has 
been further advanced by several authors who have stressed that the implementation and 
outcome of a decentralized system in any setting is highly context specific [4, 8]. Leichter 
(1994) proposed a framework for examining policy context at the macro level, where he 
suggested the need to think of structural, situational, cultural and environmental factors when 
analysing the macro level policy context. Leichter’s framework defines structural factors as 
more permanent elements of society, cultural factors as societal values, environmental factors 
as those that are external to the national political system, and situational factors as irregular 
and impermanent events like political crisis [69].   
The organizational capacity by decentralized units, has been argued by several authors to be 
critical if these units are to deliver on their assigned decentralized roles; and hence harness the 
benefits of decentralization [30]. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines 
organizational capacity as the ability of the organization system to perform its mandate 
appropriately, effectively and efficiently. The UNDP (1998) developed criteria for institutional 
capacity assessment that have been widely used for assessing government institutions. This 
(UNDP) capacity assessment criteria assess institutional capacity at three levels. Level one is 
the system level which focuses on the broader systems within which the organization operates 
and includes elements like legal and regulatory environment, broader policy, and processes 
around which the organization operates. Level two is the institutional entity level which focuses 
on institutional mission, strategy, culture and internal processes. Level three is the individual 
level focusing on the individuals within the institution and their skills against their job 
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descriptions [70]. Aragon (2010) proposed a framework to examine organizational capacity. 
This framework has recently been applied by Elloker et al (2013), and is gaining popularity by 
health policy analysts in assessing sub-national level health management units, especially in 
developing country contexts [71-73]. This framework proposes that organizations are made of 
hardware, software tangible, and software intangible capacity elements that are necessary for 
optimal functioning of the organizations.  Hardware elements include infrastructure, 
technology and finances. Tangible software includes organization systems and procedures, and 
management system and procedures. Intangible software elements include communication, 
relationships, norms and values, and power [73]. 
With its intended objective of transferring power from one set of actors (national level 
government) to another (peripheral level government), the nature of the design and 
implementation process of decentralized systems is often marred with power contestations 
[66].  Within the health sector, several health policy analysts have argued that power, which is 
basically defined as the ability to influence other actors, is a key determinant of the processes 
of health policy formulation and implementation [74, 75]. The notion of power in policy 
formulation and implementation is however a complex one to analyse as it often presents in 
many forms, characterized by actions or inactions by different actors in the policy processes 
[75]. VeneKlasen and Miller’s (2002) proposed expression of power theory.  In this theory, the 
authors have argued that during policy and political processes, power is expressed in four main 
forms namely; power over, power to, power with; and power within. Power over views having 
power involving taking it from someone else, and then, using it to dominate and prevent others 
from gaining it, power to views power as a unique potential of every person to shape their life 
and world, power with concerns the ability to find common ground among different interests 
so as to build collective strength, and power within views power as a person’s sense of self-
worth and self-knowledge [76]. 
2.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reviewed the conceptual literature and 29 empirical papers to understand the 
effects of decentralization on the health system at a sub-national level for each of my three 
study tracers. I have also reviewed key theoretical and conceptual frameworks for health sector 
governance, and political, organizational and policy analysis; in the context of health sector 
decentralization. The literature supports, Bossert and Mitchell’s (2011) argument that decision 
space, organisational structure and capacity, and accountability structures and practices are key 
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health system internal contextual factors that collectively or individually influence and affect 
the implementation and outcomes of health system decentralisation [30]. Political drivers or 
reasons for decentralisation within a particular country are also very key among the country 
level contextual factors affecting the implementation of any decentralisation design.  
However relatively few studies have attempted to analyse how and why broader political and 
health sector level contextual factors interact with other factors to influence health systems 
decentralisation outcomes against goals. This study was thus designed with the overall purpose 
of contributing to addressing this gap in the literature. 
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Chapter 3: Study Setting 
3.0  Introduction 
In this chapter I provide a detailed background and description of the study setting to place the 
study in context. I begin with an overview of how the decentralisation debate and 
implementation has evolved in Kenya from independence in 1963 up to the introduction of 
devolved government systems in 2013. For these, I particularly focus on the elements of this 
evolution that has informed the goals, design and possible implementation process of the 
devolved government system in Kenya post 2013. I then present a background description of 
the Kenyan health system and health system planning processes. I conclude the chapter with a 
background introduction and description of Kilifi County, the case study county where the 
study was conducted, and describe the institutional setting where I was residing as I conducted 
this study. 
3.1.  Kenya 
Kenya is a low income country in East Africa. It has an estimated population of 38.6 million 
people, a GDP per capita of 453 US$, and an average life expectancy of 55 years for males and 
59 years for females [77, 78]. At independence in 1963, the country adopted a federal 
government system of a devolution model [11, 79]. This was however short-lived and in 1965 
a unitary government system with deconcentrated administrative units referred to as districts 
was adopted [11, 79, 80]. A new constitution adopted in the country in 2010 ushered in a 
devolved  government system, with 47 devolved units called counties [11, 33].   
3.2.  Evolution of the decentralisation debate and implementation in 
Kenya 
The decentralization debate has persistently dominated the political arena in Kenya since 
independence [79]. Figure 1 illustrates the main decentralization laws and policies that the 
country has adopted over time, with key events that have influenced these policies.  
At independence, the country adopted a constitution with a federal system of government, with 
seven federal regions and the Nairobi area [79, 81]. Each region had an executive mandate and 
authority to provide key public social services particularly in health and education [81]. Each 
region was made up of several units called districts which were organized as administrative 
units for coordinating national government functions [80-82]. However, the country’s two 
major political parties at the time ideologically differed on the government system. The then 
ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which drew its major following from 
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the populous Kikuyu and Luo communities, favored a change to a unitary system of 
government; while the main opposition party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), 
which drew its major following from the Coastal and Rift-Valley communities, favored the 
federal system of government, popularly known as Majimbo [79, 83]. For this reason, the Coast 
and Rift-Valley regions to date are seen as the originator and champion of devolution [79, 84]. 
Several years after independence, the KANU and KADU leadership formed a ‘political 
marriage’ in which they agreed to dissolve KADU and incorporate all the KADU leadership 
into the KANU led government. Through a parliamentary constitutional amendment, they also 
agreed to abolish federalism, adopt a unitary government system, and strengthen the  
coordination role for government services by districts [79]. 
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of key political events that have shaped decentralization 
processes and the devolution debate in Kenya over time 
 
Key 
 Decentralisation laws/policies adopted  
 Overall organisation of the government system  
 Key political events that shaped the decentralisation debate  
 
In the late 1960s, Jomo Kenyatta, the president and leader of KANU, fell out with Jaramogi 
Odinga, his vice president at the time, leading to the latter being expelled from KANU and 
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being sacked as vice president. Odinga moved on, with his regional political following from 
the Luo-Nyanza region, to register an opposition party, the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), which 
became a major critic of the KANU government. Over time the Nyanza region came to be 
labeled as the ‘mother of opposition’ politics in Kenya. KPU criticized the KANU government 
for entrenching tribalism, corruption, and regional imbalances in the distribution of national 
resources and for general maladministration [79, 83]. 
The KANU government continued over time to adopt policies that entrenched government 
marginalization of certain regions. The first post-independence long-term government strategic 
economic development policy document, for example, was seen by the opposition as 
entrenching this marginalization of certain regions.  This policy notably zoned the country into 
high, medium and low economic potential zones based on population density, agricultural 
productivity and proximity to the Mombasa-Nairobi-Kisumu railway-line. Government 
development investment was to be prioritized along the targeted high priority areas [85], 
creating a situation whereby certain regions in the country were neglected [84, 86]. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the KANU government introduced changes that were 
presented as increasing decentralisation and community participation. However, these changes 
served to entrench national government control at local levels. In 1977, a Local Government 
Act was enacted. This established local authorities managed by elected local leaders, with a 
mandate to generate local revenue and provide a limited range of social services including 
aspects of health, education, water and sanitation, and sewerage management services. The 
local authorities established under this act, depending on their level, were headed by chairmen 
or mayors elected by the councilors, who were the elected people’s representatives within the 
local authorities [87]. In 1982, the KANU government abolished the county’s multi-party 
system and in 1983 launched the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) policy. The 
DFRD policy - which was adopted on the pretext of encouraging citizen’s participation in 
public resource management - became a way for the national government and the presidency 
to entrench itself and have control over what happened in all corners of the country [80, 88]. 
The provincial administration structure which was entrenched by the DFRD was itself seen to 
be oppressive of the people rather than empowering [80, 82]. 
In response to what were perceived as oppressive policies there was strong pressure on the 
KANU government to undertake constitutional and political reforms. In the early 1990s, 
KANU partly gave in to this pressure and passed a constitutional amendment in parliament to 
allow for the re-introduction of a multi-party system. However without much change in the 
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electoral laws, and with the opposition parties divided, KANU won the general elections held 
in both 1992 and 1997 [89].  At the height of the subsequent 2002 elections, the opposition 
united to contest the presidential elections under the banner of the National Rainbow Alliance 
(NARC), with Mwai Kibaki as its presidential candidate. The then KANU president Daniel 
Moi, who had served the constitutionally permitted maximum two presidential terms, was not 
eligible to run for the presidency that year. Moi appointed Uhuru Kenyatta, a son of Jomo 
Kenyatta, who was at that time considered by many as a political novice, to be the KANU 
presidential candidate. The choice of Uhuru Kenyatta as KANU’s presidential candidate led to 
sharp divisions within KANU, and resulted to several KANU politicians defecting from the 
party to join the united opposition. NARC’s campaign focused on the promise of 
comprehensive constitutional reforms and it easily won the election that year [90, 91].  The 
NARC government attempted a constitutional review in 2005, but the two main coalition 
partners within NARC differed on the nature of government structure proposed in the then draft 
constitution. This led one wing of the NARC coalition partnership (which presented itself as 
pro-devolution) to campaign against the passing of the draft constitution in 2005. This ‘NO’ 
wing won a national referendum held that year leading to a rejection of the proposed new 
constitution (that was championed by the side perceived to be anti-devolution) [92, 93]. 
The opposing sides of the NARC coalition took separate directions after the 2005 referendum, 
and converted themselves into independent political parties namely the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) for the ‘NO’ side, led by Raila Odinga, son of Jaramogi Odinga, and the 
Party of National Unity (PNU) for the ‘YES’ side led by the then president Mwai Kibaki. These 
two parties went on to become the main opposing parties at the general election of 2007. The 
heightened and divisive campaign period in the run-up of the 2007 general election, coupled 
with claims by the ODM that PNU, which was declared winner, had rigged the election, led to 
widespread violence across the country that lasted for several weeks in 2007-08 [92, 93].  
It took the intervention of the African Union (AU) which constituted a mediation panel led by 
Kofi Annan, to get the two opposing sides to agree to stop the violence. The Kofi Annan led 
mediation focused on four agenda items namely, the immediate cessation of the violence, 
addressing the humanitarian crisis, resolution of the political crisis, and examining and 
addressing the comprehensive constitutional and institutional structures of government, 
poverty, inequality and historical injustices [92, 94, 95]. This led to the signing of a peace 
agreement between the two warring factions, and the enactment of the National Accord for 
Peace and Reconciliation Act 2008. Under this Act, PNU and ODM agreed to form a coalition 
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government with Mwai Kibaki of PNU as president and Raila Odinga of ODM as prime 
minister. The main focus of this coalition government was to immediately address the key 
historical issues identified under the fourth agenda in the mediation talks, key among them 
being undertaking a comprehensive constitutional review in the country that would address 
equity and transparency in public resource allocation, citizens’ participation in public 
governance and other good governance practices [94, 95].  
The coalition government embarked on undertaking the constitutional review and in August 
2010, the draft constitution was subjected to a public referendum with strong government 
support. The referendum ‘YES’ campaign was led by Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, while a 
group of ODM politicians, largely from the Rift Valley led by William Ruto partnered with 
church leaders in the ‘NO’ campaign, opposing some aspects of the draft constitution. The 
constitution was ultimately passed with 67% approval at the referendum [33, 88]. 
The 2010 constitution proposed the creation of 47 semi-autonomous counties to be established 
after the first general election following the constitutional enactment. The respective county 
governments would have a constitutionally prescribed mandate and functions as described in 
the fourth schedule (Annex 2) of the 2010 constitution [33]. 
The county governments were to be established after the general elections held in March 2013. 
However, the transfer of county functions was to happen progressively over a period of three 
years [86, 96].  This new decentralisation effort in Kenya which is of a devolution nature [9] is 
largely driven by larger countrywide political processes [86]. 
3.3.  Overview of the Kenyan health system 
The government, through the Ministry of Health (MoH), has been both the regulator and major 
provider of healthcare in Kenya since independence [97, 98]. The government health sector 
has been undergoing major systems reforms for several decades, including the introduction of 
user fees in public health facilities in 1989, and the establishment of District Health 
Management Teams (DHMTs) and District Health Management Boards (DHMBs) [99]. In 
2009 the MoH introduced the Health Sector Services Fund (HSSF) which is a system where 
the government finances some recurrent costs for primary level health facilities, by directly 
sending monies from National Treasury to health facility bank accounts, without going through 
the traditional disbursement bureaucracy in the health system [100].  All these reforms over 
the years led to more involvement of peripheral level ministry structures, and communities in 
management, planning and coordination of health services [22, 23, 100].  
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The country’s second National Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP2) 2005-2010 defined the 
Kenya Essential Package for Health (KEPH). The KEPH based strategic priorities and service 
delivery for the sector on two pillars. The first pillar was a classification of the citizenry into 
six cohorts namely pregnancy and the new born, early childhood, late childhood, adolescence, 
adult and the elderly. The second pillar was the organization of health service delivery system 
into a six-level pyramidal structure of care (Figure 2) [101].    
Figure 2: The NHSSP2 KEPH organization of the Kenyan health delivery system 
          
  
At a coordination level, the health sector has had three tiers similar to that of the wider 
government arrangement. Until recently after devolution, these coordination tiers have been 
the ministry headquarters at the national level, the Provincial Health Management Teams 
(PHMTs) and the District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) [97-102]. The six levels of 
care, and the coordination levels, were the main sector planning units that undertook 
operational planning for service delivery, and management and coordination respectively [23].  
As part of the coalition government, in 2008 the MoH was split into the Ministry of Medical 
Services (MoMS) and the Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation (MoPHS), each managed 
by one side of the coalition government. MoMS was charged with responsibility for curative 
and rehabilitative health services while MoPHS was charged with preventive health services 
and health promotion [23, 103]. 
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3.4.  Planning in the Kenyan health system 
As with many other Sub-Saharan African countries, post-colonial Kenya operated until the 
mid-90s without a substantive health policy, or strategic or operational plan [21, 97]. The first 
‘Kenya Health Policy Framework (KHPF) 1994-2010’ was published in 1994 [98]. To 
accelerate the realization of the policy vision, the MoH in 1999 published a five-year strategic 
plan; the ‘National Health Sector Strategic Plan 1 (NHSSP1) 1999-2004’, later followed by the 
National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2 (NHSSP2) 2005-2010. Both NHSSP1 and NHSSP2 
emphasized the prioritization of government health investment towards increasing access to 
primary health care for all Kenyans [101, 104]. 
To operationalize the implementation of NHSSP2, the MoH adopted a bottom-up annual 
planning process dubbed the ‘Annual Operational Planning’ (AoP) process [23, 101]. The AoP 
process on paper outlined a decentralized planning process within the sector by allowing for 
priority setting in planning and budgeting to begin from the lowest planning units and 
aggregated upwards all through to the national level [101]. In practice though, the full 
realization of the bottom-up planning has been far from achieved as the process has been 
heavily top-down driven over the years [22, 23, 99]. The AoP planning framework itself only 
provided the lower level planning units with an opportunity to plan and budget for operational 
recurrent expenses for delivering and coordinating health services. Until recently after 
devolution, major budgeting and resource allocation for key sector inputs like employment and 
deployment of health care workers, purchase and distribution of essential medicines and 
medical supplies, infrastructure development and major equipment purchase and distribution 
was retained at national level MoH [23]. 
After the promulgation of the new constitution in 2010, which coincided with the expiry of 
KHPF 1994-2010, the health sector began undertaking the development of a new health policy: 
“The Kenya Health Policy (KHP) 2012-2030”. This new policy laid the framework for both 
strategic and operational planning in the country up to the year 2030. In line with the 
requirements of the constitution, the new policy proposed a merger of MoMS and MoPHS back 
into one MoH, and the creation of a County management and coordination structure for health 
services [37].  
Unlike the previous arrangement, the mandate of the county coordinating unit - in line with the 
provisions of the new constitution - now includes planning and resource allocation for all health 
investments including employment and deployment of health care workers, purchase and 
distribution of essential medicines and medical supplies, infrastructure development and major 
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equipment purchase and distribution, which were previously undertaken at the national level 
[33]. 
3.5.  Kilifi County 
Kilifi County, which is the study case for this study (ref chapter four) is one of the six counties 
that formed the former Coast Province at the Kenyan Coast [105]. The Coastal region of Kenya 
is largely believed to have been the originator of the decentralisation debate in Kenya because 
the leader of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) which championed for the 
Majimbo federal government system was from the Coast [79, 84]. Over the years the region 
has consistently been marginalised by post-independence governments leading to recent 
agitation by some residents for secession from the rest of Kenya [84].   
Kilifi County is comprised of the former Kilifi, Malindi and Kaloleni districts. It is 
headquartered in Kilifi town, with a population of approximately 1.2 million people and covers 
an area of approximately 12,246 km2 [105]. It has seven constituencies and 35 electoral wards 
[77, 105]. 
3.6.  Embedded within a ‘learning site’ 
I conceived and conducted this study within a broader Health Systems Governance (HSG) 
research project being conducted at the Kenya Medical Research Institute – Wellcome Trust 
Research Programme (KEMRI-WTRP) in Kilifi [106], as part of the Department for 
International Development (UKaid) funded Resilient and Responsive Health Systems 
(RESYST) consortium [107]. KEMRI-WTRP is one of seven RESYST members, with the 
consortium’s research organized around three key themes:  health financing, health workforce 
and health systems governance.  
The KEMRI-WTRP which is headquartered in Kilifi town, has been in existence in Kilifi for 
over 25 years, embedded in the main government hospital in the town; the Kilifi County 
Hospital [106]. 
The broader HSG project is a ‘learning site’ which is an approach to research where researchers 
and health managers in a given setting over a long term relationship of continuous interactions 
and reflections develop specific health system governance questions, and work towards 
answering them together [72, 108].  There are two other HSG learning sites within the RESYST 
consortium, both in South Africa [72, 108]. At the time of conducting this study, there were 
two other studies running within the Kenyan learning site; one focusing on internal and external 
accountability practices of frontline primary health facility in-charges, and another on priority 
48 
 
setting practices in hospitals. The learning sites work includes regular reflective practice 
sessions, primarily in Kenya but also across Kenya and South Africa, to deliberate on the data 
being collected, the ‘learning’, and the approach.  The aim of these reflective sessions is to 
enhance the collective learning among the diverse researchers involved, and between those 
researchers and health managers.  In so doing the trustworthiness of the data collected and their 
interpretation is strengthened.  
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Chapter 4: Study Description and Methods 
4.0  Overall research question 
How does political decentralization affect sub-national level health sector planning and 
budgeting? 
4.1.  Purpose and aim of the study 
This was a descriptive exploratory and explanatory study, seeking to examine the goals, design, 
implementation and implications of political decentralization in Kenya on health sector 
planning and budgeting at the sub-national level. 
4.2.  Study objectives 
4.2.1. General objective 
To analyse the goals, design, implementation and implications of political decentralization in 
Kenya on governance and accountability structures and practices for health sector operational 
planning and budgeting at the sub-national level. 
4.2.2. Specific objectives 
1. To describe and analyse the goals, design and early implementation of political 
decentralization for health sector operational planning and budgeting 
2. To describe and analyse stakeholder expectations and experiences of political 
decentralization for health sector operational planning and budgeting  
3. To draw on the empirical data and literature on good governance and accountability to 
identify strategies for enhancing achievement of decentralisation goals within the health 
sector 
4.3.  Conceptual framework 
In this study, I focused mainly on the county level as the focal arena for sub-national level 
planning and budgeting in the Kenyan health sector under the 2010 constitution. However, I 
also examined how this level relates and interacts with the national level (above) and the sub-
county units (below). I adopted a conceptual framework (Figure 3) that placed the health sector 
planning and budgeting activities at the county level at the centre; and which interacts with and 
is influenced by decision space, accountability, organisational structure and capacity in the 
health sector; and the broader devolution context.  Drawing on the literature reviewed (chapter 
2), I expected planning and budgeting at the county to be influenced by the public involvement 
and accountability mechanisms and requirements affecting county health managers, the level 
of discretion or ‘decision space’ [11] these county level health managers have, and the 
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individual and organizational capacity of the county health services management unit.  I 
expected all these factors to interact with each other to influence health sector planning and 
budgeting processes at county level; and to be affected by Kenya’s planned political 
decentralization and its implementation at both national and county level.  
Figure 3: Study conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Figure X: Study conceptual framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
To apply the study conceptual framework, I drew on several frameworks and theories of 
decentralization, and on policy analysis literature. To characterize decentralization before and 
after the implementation of the new constitution, I drew on the original public administration 
framework [9], as applied in the health sector by Mills et al., (1990) [109]. As described earlier 
(chapter 2) the public administration framework describes a four-type classification of 
decentralization models, namely devolution, delegation, de-concentration and privatization. I 
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devolved to the county governments and the ability of the counties to take up the roles 
transferred to them.  
In examining accountability, I was interested in accountability between county health managers 
and the national MoH; between county health managers and local elected leaders; and between 
county health managers and the general population directly. I focused on community 
involvement and participation in the governance of health services, and examined the level of 
‘answerability’ and forms of ‘sanctions’ employed by the different health sector stakeholders 
during planning and budgeting. I utilized the answerability and sanctions elements of the 
accountability matrix developed by Brinkerhoff. This matrix ranks accountability practices 
within the health sector by mapping out health sector actors around their capacity to supply 
information demanded, or sanctions imposed by other actors; against capacity to demand for 
information or impose sanctions against other health sector actors [18].  
To examine and assess the structure and capacity of the county level health system governance 
structures more broadly, I utilized elements of the organizational capacity assessment criteria 
developed by UNDP [70] and the Aragon framework as applied by Elloker et al (2013) [71, 
72]. This framework proposes that organisations are made of hardware, software tangible, and 
software intangible capacity elements that are necessary for optimal functioning of the 
organisations. Hardware elements include infrastructure, technology and finances. Tangible 
software includes organisation systems and procedures, and management system and 
procedures. Intangible software elements include communication, relationships, norms and 
values, and power. I used these criteria to examine the county health sector governance 
institutions along the hardware, tangible software, and intangible software capacity elements 
[72]. 
In examining the broader devolution context I drew from Liechter’s (1994) framework for 
analysing macro level policy context, which focuses on structural, situational, cultural and 
environmental factors [69]; and which is described in greater detail in the literature review and 
discussion chapters. I particularly focused on how these individual elements influenced the 
design, implementation process and early outcomes of devolution in Kenya. To examine the 
goals and intentions of the decentralization (content of the decentralization laws), the process 
of its implementation, and the roles of both national and local level actors I utilized the policy 
analysis framework described by Walt and Gilson (1994) [68]. In this framework the authors 
argued that a comprehensive analysis of a policy subject should include a thorough analysis of 
the content of the policy, the process of its development and/or implementation, and the actors 
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involved and the policy context [68]. I applied this policy analysis framework to examine the 
broader context of the planned political decentralization in the Kenya. 
I used this conceptual framework largely to inform the development of my data collection tools 
and to frame my interpretation of the study findings. Subsequently I used it to organise the 
presentation of my discussion in chapter nine of this thesis. 
   
4.4.  Study Design 
I used a case study design. A case study is an empirical investigation of a contemporary 
phenomenon within a real life context [110]. A case study design is commonly used in 
situations where the researcher cannot manipulate the actions of the actors involved in relation 
to the phenomenon being studied, and where contextual conditions are important for shaping 
the phenomenon [110, 111]. Keen (2006) described case study research designs as being 
particularly useful when examining planned change within a ‘messy’ real world setting, which 
the researcher has no control over [111], which is a common characteristic of many policy 
implementation settings. The main advantage of the case study design is that it allows the 
phenomenon to be examined from multiple lenses at the same time [110, 112]. Under the case 
study design, a ‘case’ becomes the unit for analysis. The case in any particular case study is 
determined by the research questions being explored.  
4.4.1.  Study case 
In this study, the study case was Kilifi county (described in chapter 3). A county is the sub-
national level unit defined by the Constitution of Kenya 2010, to which decentralized functions 
of government were to be transferred. The constitution created 47 counties in the country, with 
Kilifi county being one of them.  Keen (2006) argues that case selection is particularly 
important when undertaking policy analysis. Case selection can be done purposively, where 
cases are typical of the phenomena under investigation, or theoretically, to prove or refute a 
hypothesis. Whichever approach is used for case selection, the cases selected should ideally 
have all the characteristics that are perceived to have an effect on the phenomena being 
investigated [111].  
The decision to use one county was to allow for a deeper exploration of the issues under focus 
within the study. A national level element was also incorporated into the study to identify any 
issues considered particularly unique to Kilifi County. 
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I selected Kilifi County as the case for this study because it was the Kenyan HSG learning site 
for the RESYST consortium, and a county in which I have long term personal experience (see 
positionality section below). Because of the presence of the learning site, work in Kilifi County 
will allow for a longer term tracking of the decentralization effects beyond the period of this 
study. 
4.4.2. Study participants 
Participants for this study were largely actors involved in the translation and implementation 
of the devolved government system within the health sector in Kenya. They were purposively 
drawn from the national, county, and sub-county level units as outlined in more detail below. 
4.4.3. Study tracers 
To allow for an in-depth tracking of the planning and budgeting elements at the county level, I 
selected three tracers of the planning and budgeting process. These tracers were: 
 Overall resource allocation and planning and budgeting for recurrent expenditure 
 Human Resources for Health (HRH) management arrangements;  
 Essential Medicines and Medical Supplies (EMMS) management arrangements; and  
The selection of tracers was informed by findings from an initial document review that showed 
that these were the largest functions within the health sector to be transferred from the national 
to county government under the new constitution, and were used to explore and track the health 
sector planning and budgeting activities at the county level. 
4.5. Data collection procedures 
Data collection procedures included document reviews, key informant interviews, participant 
and non-participant observation, and reflective practice. I triangulated data from all these 
methods. 
4.5.1. Document Reviews 
All documents relating to sub-national operational planning and budgeting were accessed and 
reviewed. These included the Public Finance Management Act 2012, Ministry of Planning and 
Ministry of Health Planning manuals and guidelines, the draft Kenya Health Sector Strategic 
Plan 2013-2018, the draft Kilifi County Integrated Development Plan, the draft Kilifi County 
Health Sector Strategic Plan, and the County Health Sector Annual Work Plan 2013/14. 
All documents relating to the design and implementation of the devolved government system 
generally and within the health sector were also reviewed. These documents included the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010, and all other subsidiary legislation regarding the decentralization 
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including the Transition to County Government Act 2012, the National Budget and Revenue 
Allocation Act 2011, and the Devolution Act 2012. Other documents included the Ministry of 
Health Position Paper for the Implementation of the 2010 Constitution, the Kenya Health 
Policy 2012-2030 and the new Kenya Health Sector Strategic Plan 2013-2018, and the Ministry 
of Health Functional Analysis and Transfer Policy Paper. 
The documents were reviewed and content extracted against the study objectives and the 
conceptual framework. 
4.5.2. Key informant interviews 
A total of 26 key informant interviews were carried out with a range of actors involved in health 
sector planning budgeting and the implementation of the constitution, at national, county and 
sub-county level. A total of 9 interviews were conducted at national level, 8 interviews at 
county level and 9 interviews at the three sub-counties within Kilifi County.  
National level participants were drawn from the national MoH, Development Partners for 
Health Kenya (DPHK), the Constitution Implementation Commission (CIC), the Transition 
Authority (TA), the National Assembly Health Committee, the National Health Workers Union 
Officials, and UN agencies supporting the health sector in Kenya. County level participants 
were drawn from the County Department of Health (CDoH) managers, and the County 
Executive Committee (CEC), Treasury, County Public Services Board (CPSB), Assembly 
Health Committee, and Transition Authority Coordinators. At the sub-county level, 
participants were drawn from the Sub-County Health Management Teams (SCHMT) and the 
County Hospital Management Teams.   
At all three levels, sampling was done purposively with the aim of ensuring wide and varied 
characteristics of participants and viewpoints.  Interviews were conducted using interview 
guides which sought to explore some general issues regarding the intended goals, expectations 
and effects of the decentralization on health sector planning and budgeting at the county level; 
and then focused more specifically on issues around the selected tracers. These issues were 
explored for both before and after the enactment of the 2010 Constitution. 
All interviews were conducted in English, tape recorded, and transcribed verbatim. Annex 3 is 
a copy of the detailed generic interview guides used at the three levels of interviews. 
4.5.3. Participant Observation 
During the period of this study, I was actively involved and provided technical support in the 
development and roll out of several guidelines and manuals for implementing devolution 
within the health sector, both at national level, and within Kilifi County. 
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At the national level, I was co-opted into the MoH Functional Analysis and Competency Team 
(FACT) that was charged with the responsibility for unbundling of health sector functions, 
assigning them to the national and county levels of government, and developing a policy and 
plan for the process of implementation/transfer of functions from national level to county level. 
I was also co-opted as a member of the Health Sector Core Planning Team that was charged 
with responsibility for developing manuals, tools and guidelines to facilitate planning and 
budgeting at the national and county level. Furthermore, the team was charged with the 
responsibility of capacity building county health managers on the county level health sector 
planning processes. 
At Kilifi county level, I was part of the national MoH team that supported Kilifi in the 
development of the County Health Strategic plan and the County Health Sector Annual Work 
Plan for 2013/14. Together with colleague researchers at the HSG learning sites, I was involved 
in regular interactions and engagements with different county and sub-county level health 
managers in both formal and informal meetings. 
I took notes of all my national and county level engagements in the form of a diary. 
4.5.4. Non-Participant Observation  
Throughout the data collection period, I undertook non-participant observation for major 
events and occurrences at the national and county level that were related to, or had an effect 
on, the implementation of decentralization in the country generally, and within the health sector 
and Kilifi County more specifically. I did this by routinely and regularly following up debates 
and discussions in the main national print and electronic media platforms, and by keeping track 
of unfolding discussions on popular social media platforms. 
I maintained a critical events diary for these observations, all through the data collection period. 
4.5.5. Reflective practice and learning 
I carried out regular reflective practice and learning sessions with fellow researchers at the 
Kenya HSG learning site, on several occasions also involving county and sub-county level 
health managers. These reflective practice sessions were conducted in English, tape recorded 
and transcribed verbatim. I used the transcriptions during data analysis. A total of 6 reflective 
practice sessions were carried out at the Kenyan HSG learning site, each lasting between two 
and six hours. 
During the study period, we also held two reflective learning and review meetings with research 
teams from the two South African learning sites. These meetings – each of four days - focused 
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on critical reflections on the learning site approach of study. Meeting notes were also kept, 
which assisted me in the direction of my study and interpretation of my findings. 
4.6.  Data management and analysis 
4.6.1. Data management 
All interviews and reflective practice sessions were tape recorded and stored both as notes and 
on tape during data collection. The tapes were later transcribed verbatim in MS WORD. I made 
summary notes from all document reviews, and maintained observation notes and diary entries 
during the observation period.  I later imported data into NVivo 9 software to support analysis. 
4.6.2. Data analysis 
During data collection I used information generated from document reviews and initial 
interviews to refine subsequent interview guides. This allowed for deeper exploration of 
emerging themes.   
I used a ‘framework analysis approach’ as described by Pope et al. (2007) for data analysis. 
This approach is useful for policy analysis research where there are very clear themes around 
the study objectives and conceptual framework for which data are needed. It is relatively 
structured with clear steps, but also allows for new ideas and themes to emerge over the course 
of the research as is standard with qualitative research approaches [113]. 
Using this approach, I first undertook data familiarisation by reading through the summary 
notes, listening to tapes and going through all the transcripts. I developed an initial thematic 
framework drawing on the study objectives, the conceptual framework and from themes 
emerging organically from the data familiarisation. I then developed an initial coding tree 
which I used for trial coding. I cross-checked and refined the initial coding tree with the HSG 
learning sites colleagues and with some key informants. I subsequently used the refined 
framework to code the entire data set. I later organised and arranged coded sections of the data 
into thematic charts related to key themes in the thematic framework.  Annex 4 is a copy of the 
thematic frame developed during data analysis 
4.7.  Validity and reliability 
All data collection tools were shared and cross-checked with other researchers and colleagues 
across the three learning sites in Kilifi and South Africa.  To enhance the validity and reliability 
of findings during data collection and analysis, a number of techniques recommended by Mays 
and Pope [114] were employed. These included; 
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Triangulation: As noted above, I employed different data collection methods including 
document reviews, interviews and varying forms of observations, with each method having 
particular strengths and contributions. 
Reflexivity: I was constantly reflecting on my personal and epistemological position, critically 
appraising how my own values, beliefs and experiences – as well as the study design and 
conduct of the research – might influence data collection, analysis and interpretation of findings 
(discussed in more detail below). Other researchers at the HSG learning sites supported this 
process in our reflective practice sessions. 
Participant validation: I regularly shared data collected and initial analysis themes both 
formally and informally with different health managers and key informants at both county and 
national level, for their feedback and to gather further information.  This clarified my research 
aims and deepened my understanding. 
Fair dealing: I deliberately and consciously selected a wide and broad range of participants to 
ensure coverage of a wide range of views and perspectives of respondents. 
4.8.  My personal positionality  
It is always important for any researcher undertaking qualitative research work to be cautiously 
aware of their positionality and continuously reflect upon it.  The discussion about ‘insider’ 
and ‘outsider’ positions in qualitative research has been the subject of continuous debate [115, 
116].  Insiders have been argued to have easy and better access to quality data because of the 
tacit knowledge they possess, but it has also been argued that they tend to be inherently biased. 
On the other hand, outsiders lack the tacit knowledge, but have the advantage of curiosity with 
the ‘un-familiar’ [115]. Walt et al (2008) argued that in health policy analysis, the way 
researchers are viewed both as individuals and as the institutions they represent by their 
research participants will have an impact on their research process [75]. This is arguably 
particularly the case when the researcher is required to engage with high level policy elites 
[117]. The researcher’s position in health policy analysis therefore can have an important 
impact on both the way data are collected and the way they are interpreted [75].   
In respect to familiarity with Kenya and the Kenyan health sector, between 2006 and 2009 I 
worked as a District Medical Officer of Health (DMoH) in Kilifi, where I was involved in 
managing and coordinating health sector planning and budgeting at a district level [23]. As part 
of my DrPH training, I conducted my DrPH Organizational and Policy Analysis (OPA) project 
at the Ministry of Health headquarters where I was studying the process and influences of 
health sector operational planning and budgeting at the national level [23]. During my OPA 
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attachment at the planning departments in the MoH headquarters I was actively involved in the 
development of the planning templates and guidelines for the different planning units.  I was 
also involved in other processes and activities that were going on at the time including the 
development of a new health policy and new health sector strategic plan, in line with the new 
constitution. It was because of this involvement with the national MoH that I was co-opted to 
provide technical assistance into the MoH Functional Analysis and Competency Team 
(FACT).  The FACT was charged with the responsibility of unbundling the MoH functions and 
assigning them between the county and national level of governments as envisaged in the 2010 
constitution, and with coming up with an implementation plan for the transfer of the functions 
assigned to the county level. I was also co-opted into the national level MoH Technical 
Working Group (TWG) for policy and planning. At Kilifi county level, I have been providing 
constant technical assistance on planning processes to the county and sub-county health 
managers. 
I believe that my previous experience in the health sector, my current engagement with the 
MoH at county and national level, and my training and  affiliations with the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) and the KEMRI-WRTP in Kenya provided me with 
a unique combination of tacit knowledge about the health system in Kenya, and institutional 
legitimacy, both of which have been argued to be important in policy analysis research [75]. 
However as noted above, I have had to constantly monitor and reflect on my different roles; 
and their influences on the data collection and its interpretation with other colleagues. Overall, 
I believe the close collaboration with colleagues working within the RESYST learning sites 
both in Kenya and in South Africa provided me with an important and unique blend of 
‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ positions in enriching this study.   
4.9.  Ethical considerations 
Ethical review and approval for this work was obtained from both the LSHTM (LSHTM ethics 
re: 6250) and the KEMRI (Ref: KEMRI/Res/7/3/1) ethical review committees (annex 5). There 
were no direct anticipated risks for any participants, apart from time spent during participation 
in the interviews. A comprehensive information sheet highlighting study background and aims 
was given to all potential participants. A formal informed written consent (annex 6) was 
obtained from all participants selected to participate in the interviews. To protect 
confidentiality, all personal identifiers of the participants were removed from the tapes, 
transcripts and analysed reports. 
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4.10. Summary 
In summary, I designed this study as a ‘case study’ for examining the effects of political 
decentralisation in Kenya on sub-national level planning and budgeting. I developed and 
utilised a conceptual framework that borrowed from several decentralisation and policy 
analysis frameworks, and that was informed by initial inquiry form document reviews and 
discussions with key stakeholders. I employed several qualitative data collections methods 
including document reviews, participant and non-participant observations, key informant 
interviews and reflective practice. I used the thematic framework approach for data analysis. 
The study received ethical approval from both the LSHTM and KEMRI ethical review 
committees. 
Finally, guided by my study objectives and the study tracers, I have organised my results into 
four chapters. After an initial chapter reporting on the broader political context of devolution, 
the remaining results are organised by the three study tracers. In the Discussion I return to each 
element of the conceptual framework in turn, drawing on the findings from all three tracers. 
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Chapter 5: Broader Context of Devolution in Kenya 
5.0.   Introduction 
In this chapter I present findings on the broader context of the early days’ implementation of 
devolution in Kenya, which is an important background to the subsequent results chapters 
which focus specifically on the health sector. The chapter largely focuses on the broader 
political context around the early days’ implementation of devolution, after the 2013 general 
elections, how this context links with the country’s political history described in chapter 3; and 
how all this influenced the health sector effects of the early days’ implementation of devolution. 
This chapter draws largely from the content and description of devolution in the 2010 
constitution and other relevant subsidiary legislations; and data gathered on the country’s 
political environment during the early days of implementation of devolution (post 2013). I 
begin with an overview of the overall and health sector goals of devolution, including the 
perceptions and expectations of different stakeholders. I then describe the early implementation 
experiences and outcomes of devolution.  
For this chapter, I have drawn data largely from the document reviews, key informant 
interviews and general observations, as well as from published literature. 
5.1.  Overall and health specific goals of devolution in Kenya 
5.1.1. Stated, expected and perceived devolution goals for the health sector  
The 2010 constitution did not have any stated health sector specific devolution goals. This is 
partly because the constitution review and drafting was influenced by the broader political 
contests over general public resource allocations and management, rather than delivery of 
specific government services [33, 86] and partly because health sector actors did not play a 
very active role in the constitutional review process and the actual drafting of the devolution 
laws. The apparent lack of interest and active participation of health sector actors was perhaps 
surprising, considering that for several decades, health sector reforms in the country had 
deliberately focused on decentralizing certain responsibilities including supervision, planning, 
budgeting and overall coordination of health service delivery to the former district level [23, 
118, 119]. One might have thus expected the health sector to actively embrace the devolution 
debate and concretize the goals and gains of health sector decentralization in the country.  
From the observations during the early days of implementation of the county governments, the 
health sector seemed to be playing a catch-up role in coping with the rapid implementation of 
the devolved government. Together with significant changes to the roles and power balance 
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between national MoH and the counties [33, 86, 120, 121] this led to interviewees reporting 
that the national MoH felt uncomfortable and reluctant to facilitate - and even blocked - the 
smooth transfer of health sector functions to counties.  
[…What is important for the health sector, and I think where they missed the boat was 
during the constitution making process. What is left now is to just simply define what are 
our (national MoH) medium term goals and irrespective of what’s happening in this 
political arena, and we keep an eye on those goals…] KII 004 
[…the health sector itself we had been grown into a particular system of doing things and 
we have to change and the change is so drastic that we have to do things completely 
different, now that is shocking us and that is what is causing all this slow response to 
changes and acceptance for the devolution to take place and in fact we have even closed 
ourselves not even to do it now, we have tuned ourselves to argue that now it (health 
sector devolution) can’t work…] KII N 003 
In the allocation of functions between the two levels of government, however, the constitution 
did state that the national MoH would be allocated health policy and standards development, 
capacity building and national health referral services functions; while all day to day health 
service delivery functions including construction of health facilities, procurement of 
commodities and management of health workers would be devolved to counties (annex 2). As 
in other sectors with devolved functions, the national MoH was to work with the Transition 
Authority (TA) to develop subsidiary legislations, policies and plans to facilitate the 
distribution of health sector functions between national and county government.  Nevertheless, 
from observations and interviews it was clear that senior MoH leaders at the time were not very 
keen to develop these policies and plans, and only started the process once political pressure 
was put on the national government by counties. 
 […they (national MoH) were forced … they were being harassed in the newspapers 
every day. So it was under duress: You think about it, when we were working on the 
FACT (MoH Functional Analysis and Transfer) Policy. ….. It was only Shariff (one of 
the MoH directors) who supported it. The rest of the ministry was saying, ah, those crazy 
people who don’t know what they’re doing, and they ignored the process….] KII 004 
5.1.2. Overall stated, expected and perceived goals of devolution 
Given that there were no health sector specific devolution goals, it is important to understand 
the broader goals of devolution the health sector was expected to be part of, and that strongly 
influenced how devolution was implemented and its effects in the health sector.  The 2010 
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constitution clearly highlighted several key principles and objects of devolution [33, 34]. These 
include: 
 Promotion of democratic and accountable use of state power 
 Fostering national unity by recognising diversity of the Kenyan people 
 Giving power of self-governance to the people of Kenya so as to enhance their participation 
in the exercise of state affairs in decision making 
 Acknowledging and recognising the right of communities to manage their own affairs and 
further their development 
 Protecting and promoting the interests and rights of marginalised communities 
 Promoting social and economic development and the provision of easily accessible public 
services closer to the people 
 Ensuring equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout the country 
 Facilitating the decentralisation of state organs and their services closer to the people 
 Enhancing separation of state powers and to promote checks and balances in the 
management of public affairs 
Beyond what was stated in the constitution, data from my study suggest that key expectations 
of devolution were:  1) inclusion and participation of all communities in public governance 
processes; 2) addressing real and perceived marginalisation of certain areas through more 
equitable public resource allocation; and 3) enhancing bottom-up approaches in priority setting 
and planning for governed resources. 
Regarding the first expectation of devolution, early decentralization models and policies by the 
government including Majimboisim at independence, local authorities from the 1970s, and the 
DRFD in the 1980s did not achieve much towards this effort [80, 86, 122]. Thus citizens 
continued to push for a devolved government system and to entrench community participation 
in public governance within the constitution [86, 123]:  
[….You know, if you look at article 174 and you will see the objectives of devolution. 
but by and large people now wanted to make sure that you know when you say that people 
are on the driver’s seat when it comes to development that it is actually true…..] KII N 
001 
The equity expectation was in response to concerns about past governments’ actions.  The first 
national post-independence long-term government strategic economic development policy 
document zoned the country into high, medium and low economic productive areas based on 
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population density, agricultural productivity and proximity to the country’s only Mombasa-
Nairobi-Kisumu railway-line. Under this strategic plan, government development investment 
was to be prioritized along the targeted high priority areas [85], leading to certain regions in 
the country being neglected from government resource investment, and feelings of 
discrimination and disenfranchisement [86, 121].  
 […..in fact the greatest problems in Kenya are as result of either real or perceived 
inequalities in the society and the therefore discussions around the change of the 
constitution …….it was always about how can more people in Kenya in particular,  how 
can more communities feel like they are also a part of Kenya …..] KII N 005   
Subsequent post-independence central governments continued to adopt policies and patronage 
practices perceived to be oppressive and marginalizing of some communities [86, 120]. 
‘Eating’ - or allocation of resources – was regularly reported to be a preserve of regions and 
communities those in power came from.  Some analysts have argued the strong push for 
devolution actually came from a view that it should be everybody’s turn to ‘eat’ [86, 93]; a 
view also expressed by some interviewees. 
[….Because previously under de-concentration and even more specifically you know Moi’s 
regime, even when you say people are at the driver’s seat of development, if a region was 
seen to be developing faster than others, that was a problem. And if a particular region was, 
did not did not sing to the tune or did not subscribe to the political ideology of the ruling 
class of the day, then it was ignored…..] KII N 001 
[….I think the issue is a lot of Kenyans felt that they were marginalized with the 
centralized policy so they voted for a constitution which empowered them, I think that 
was the main thing…..] KII N 006 
Perceptions of institutionalised marginalisation and discrimination in government resource 
allocation [86, 121] contributed to strong support for the establishment in the constitution of a 
minimum amount of government revenue to be unconditionally allocated to all counties in an 
equitable manner, and an equalisation fund for historically marginalised counties [33, 86, 124]: 
 [….. the clamor for constitution review of Kenya have been mainly driven by the urge to 
ensure equality and equity in distribution of resources, equality and equity of sharing of 
power and the in fact the greatest problems in Kenya are as result of either real or perceived 
inequalities in the society……] KII N 005 
[….You know previously, you had a budget, people at the central level here determined 
how much goes to the districts, but now we have legislation that the constitution requires 
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that at least 15 percent of the national revenue should you know go to the county, this 
has created some equity….] KII N 001 
Regarding the expectation of enhanced bottom up approaches to priority setting and 
planning under devolution, under previous government systems, district planning was 
heavily dictated by central government through prescriptive planning formats and resource 
allocation criteria [23, 80]. Districts did not have much discretion to include local priorities 
into the plans and no flexibility on how to spend the centrally allocated funds [80]. Under 
devolution, the constitution stated that government resources allocated to counties as part of 
the equitable share are discretionary [33, 86]. Central government therefore has minimal 
control over how counties allocate their resources; and counties have full control over the 
prioritization for the use of these funds based on local priority needs. This was echoed by 
several interview participants.  
[…And I think the other difference is that I think under the old system there was very 
little discretionary funding. So you really have a committee that is sitting to decide on 
priorities for money they do not even have. So that’s really the difference. …] KII N 001 
[…..So it leaves the county the freedom to look and say okay, this plan (the National 
health strategic plan) says ABCD but we’re only going for A and C, you know. They’re 
quite free and it gives them a lot of flexibility….] KII N 004 
However some of the interview participants felt that the constitutional unconditional allocation 
to counties was not a good idea as it would be difficult to make county governments adhere to 
national guidelines and allocate resources along universal national priority target areas, and 
that national priorities would be undermined. 
[….The biggest mistake, one of the biggest mistakes of the constitution in my view was 
to create devolved units without conditions. Okay you provide funding without 
conditions. Devolved units grants have to be conditional to ensure adherence to national 
priorities….] KII N 003 
5.2.  Proposed structure and implementation of the county governments  
5.2.1. Establishment of institutions to facilitate transfer of functions to counties 
The constitution envisaged a seven year implementation phase for establishing the County 
governments, running from August 2010 [33, 125]. This was to have a two-year preparatory 
phase for establishing relevant government support structures, a three-year transition period for 
transfer of functions to counties, and a two year period for evaluating the implementation. The 
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initial two year period prior to the general election was for parliament to enact the required 
subsidiary legislations that would allow for the establishment of key institutions that would 
assist in the preparation for the establishment of county governments [34, 125]. Part of the 
subsidiary legislation was to include the Commission of Implementation of the Constitution 
(CIC) Act which created the CIC to oversee the constitutional implementation process [126]. 
Another key legislation was the Transition to Devolved Governments Act 2012, which was 
meant to provide the legal and institutional framework for coordinating the transfer of functions 
to devolved governments while ensuring continued public service provision. This Act provided 
for the formation of the Transition Authority (TA) to oversee this role. 
Once established, the TA was to work with all relevant national government ministries with 
earmarked devolved functions to undertake a functional analysis and allocation between the 
two levels of government; and then develop a transition implementation plan. The MoH for 
example developed a three-year implementation plan for the process of transferring devolved 
health sector functions to county level. The proposed plan was to begin by developing 
guidelines for the structure of a County Health System, and establish and build capacity for the 
structures that support the county health systems before eventual transfer of devolved health 
sector functions [125]. 
5.2.2. Structure of the county governments 
The constitution established a county government to be made of two arms. A County Executive 
arm made of an elected County Governor and Deputy Governor; and a 10 member County 
Executive Committee (CEC) appointed by the governor and approved by the County Assembly 
[33, 34]. The CEC members have overall policy and political responsibility over each of the 
ten County Departments. The County Department of Health (CDoH), headed by the CEC 
Health, is established as one of the 10 county departments under this law. Within each 
department and working under the CEC member is a Chief Officer, also appointed directly by 
the governor with approval from the county Assembly, who has the overall accounting and 
administrative responsibility over the respective department [34].  
The second county government arm legislature is the County Assembly made of elected 
Members of County Assembly (MCAs) representing each electoral ward in the county, as well 
as some MCAs nominated by political parties in the assembly to represent special groups.  
Within the CDoH, the MoH FACT policy document proposed an organization of the senior 
CDoH top management structure, to be known as the County Health Management Team 
(CHMT), under the Chief Officer Health (Figure 4 below). The document also highlighted that 
66 
 
counties further decentralize their functions by establishing Sub-County Health Management 
Teams (SCHMTs) for coordination and management of primary health services, and Hospital 
Management Teams (HMTs) for management of county referral hospitals. The nature and 
number of the units were to be based on county specific needs [127]. 
Figure 4: Proposed CHMT structure of the CDoH 
 
Source MoH FACT Policy page 24 
5.3.  Early implementation experiences, outcomes and their key influences 
This section describes the early implementation process, experiences and outcomes of the 
devolved government system in Kenya and key influences on this process. Data in this section 
are largely drawn from observations and interviews. 
5.3.1. Establishment and functioning of sector working groups 
When it was constituted the TA established sector specific technical working groups referred 
to as Functional Analysis and Competency Teams (FACTs). These teams were comprised of 
TA commissioners and respective ministry staff. The mandates of the FACT teams were to 1) 
undertake a detailed analysis of the ministry functions 2) undertake a skills and competency 
analysis at national and county levels and 3) develop policy strategy for functional assignment 
and transfer of the respective ministry functions.  
As with other ministries, the MoH established a FACT working group in which I was coopted 
as a member. The MoH FACT team developed the MoH FACT Policy document including an 
elaborate 3 year roll-out plan of the health sector devolution. However, some interviewees felt 
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that in the absence of county government representation in the TA and MoH FACT team, some 
county level functions were assigned to the national MoH. 
[…The county governments were not in place when the FACT was established, so when 
the county governments came into place, the national government FACT had already 
unbundled the functions; and unbundled them conservatively and in fact retained a lot of 
functions that had been allocated to the county governments…] KII N 003 
Because both the composition of the TA and the sector specific FACTs was heavily dominated 
by national government representatives, the county governments once established, were very 
sceptical about their proposals, claiming that these entities either deliberately retained some 
constitutionally identified county functions at national level, or proposed a deliberate slow and 
delayed proposes or transferring county level functions.  
5.3.2. Delay in establishing the CIC and TA  
Soon after the promulgation of the new constitution in August 2010, the then PNU and ODM 
coalition government continued to be faced by internal wrangles and disagreements over the 
constitution implementation process. These wrangles significantly delayed the constitutional 
implementation process ahead of the general elections, specifically affecting the time-lines for 
the establishment of key institutions that would be required to prepare the structures and 
capacity for the county governments.  
Notable among these delays was the enactment of several subsidiary legislations and formation 
of constitutional bodies including the CIC and the TA that were needed to oversee the 
constitutional implementation and implementation of the devolved governments system.  
When it was finally established, the TA was comprised of independently appointed 
commissioners, but also co-opted Principal Secretaries of eight national government ministries, 
which had been identified to have most devolved functions [125]. This composition of the TA 
led to it being perceived by county governments as a National Government institution. 
The delay in establishment of the TA coupled with its structural challenges meant that it was 
unable to fully undertake its function of establishing all required county structures, and building 
the required capacity to enable them take up their functions after the elections. This led to 
several key stakeholders accusing it of being deliberately unsupportive of the counties; with 
others, particularly from the counties calling for its disbandment.  
 […I’m one of the proponents of disbanding TA and I have told TA. The reason is one; 
TA is actually an organ of national government. It has not in any way taken on board 
counties. … the only thing they can do is to want to control the counties….] KII C 002 
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5.3.3. Influence of wider political battles 
The delays in establishing legislations and constitutional bodies were related to wider on-going 
political battles. Ahead of the first general election under the new constitution, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) opened a case against six Kenyans perceived to have had overall 
responsibility over the 2007/08 post-election violence in the country [93, 123, 128]. Key among 
the six were Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto. The ICC cases became a turning point in the 
political arena as Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto joined together to form a political 
coalition, dubbed the Jubilee Coalition, which quickly gained popularity especially among the 
populous Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities. These leaders accused their opponents - the 
Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) coalition – of plotting to have them prosecuted 
at the ICC, to prevent them participating in the election [93, 129]. 
From the observation of the election campaign period, the CORD group argued that if Kenyans 
voted for the Jubilee Coalition, the hopes of the constitutional implementation, especially 
regarding devolution, would be lost. This they argued was because, Uhuru Kenyatta, who was 
the Jubilee presidential candidate was for many years in KANU and that KANU had always 
been seen to oppose any reforms. CORD further argued that William Ruto who was Uhuru’s 
running mate had been the leader of the ‘NO’ campaign during the 2010 constitutional 
referendum, and thus could not be trusted to implement a constitution which he had openly 
opposed during the referendum. 
In the general election held in March 2013 the Jubilee coalition won the presidency, and with 
an absolute majority in both the senate and national assembly. The CORD coalition however 
won more governors’ positions giving it a majority representation in the Council of Governors 
(CoG) [93]. Following the perception of the many years of marginalization within the region, 
and the linking of the Jubilee coalition with this marginalization, the Coast region including 
Kilifi County voted predominantly for the CORD coalition [122]. The perception of the 
Jubiliee Coalition being against devolution continued after the election and was expressed by 
some of the participants in the interviews; 
[….. the current (Jubilee) government is of people who were actually in the previous 
governments and it is actually these people that were seen as marginalizing others….] 
KII C 002 
[…I think the people who have really pushed for decentralization are not the ones who 
are currently implementing. Alright, in fact people who are implementing this 
constitution are the very people who opposed it so you can imagine. They are making 
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Kenyans think that they believe in this document when in the first place they opposed 
it…] KII C 007 
CORD protested the outcome of the presidential election by petitioning the results at the 
Supreme Court. The petition was eventually dismissed by the court, but this caused a delay in 
the swearing in of the president and his deputy. However, owing to the presidential election 
petition, the county governors were sworn in and county governments established before the 
president had been sworn in, and national government established.  
[….the elections were in March but you will realize okay the county governments came 
into effect much earlier. The governors were sworn in then the president. Right because 
of the court case and … so some of these governors were sworn in and the president was 
sworn in later on by then of course the cabinet was appointed a little bit later so the issue 
of the delays in everything also delayed the  preparations right…] KII N 006 
From the observations, the early days following the general elections witnessed a lot of political 
activities characterized by ‘political deal-making’ by the different political players as a way of 
arriving at a compromise and consensus over contentious issues in the implementation of 
devolution. Many times these ‘political deals’ went against the prescribed process of which 
devolution was to be implemented.  
Several respondents during the interviews also noted that the political activity going on in the 
country at that time had over-shadowed the envisaged technical implementation process of the 
constitution. Some respondents however argued that devolution is actually a political process 
about power and control of resources and should always be viewed in that light.  
[….everything, the entire process of devolution and transition is political not only 
political because of political parties but even interested parties. For instance …. I don’t 
know whether you are going to ask me a question about the challenges we are facing.  
We are seeing that the institution that is supposed to support the process; the Transition 
Authority, is literary actually obstructing it (the devolution implementation process)…] 
KII N 008 
[…The challenges which we’re facing is that we’re approaching devolution as a technical 
process and yet it’s the political process, that’s the problem which we’re having. It is not 
a technical process; it is about power, the exercise of power that is politics, pure and 
simple. So you’re using technical tools [laughter] to understand the political process, you 
will never understand them…] KII N 004 
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5.3.4. Politically motivated fast tracked transfer of functions 
Considering that they were sworn in first, owing to the ongoing presidential election petition, 
some of the governors began to establish their county government before the president and his 
deputy had established the national government. Soon after, the county governors through their 
CoG began to pile political pressure on the national government for immediate transfer of all 
functions earmarked for county governments. They went ahead to accuse the national 
government of being ‘anti-devolution’. This pressure prompted the president to convene a 
meeting with the CoG under the constitutionally established ‘Summit’, which is a consultative 
structure that brings together the president, his deputy and the CoG. After this first Summit 
meeting in June 2013 the president publicly directed the TA and the national Ministry of 
Planning and Devolution to work with all government ministries and ensure that all functions 
earmarked for counties are devolved immediately. This directive disregarded the planned three 
year phased transfer of functions, and was seen by many stakeholders as one meant to appease 
the political interests at the expense of the technical viability.  
[…there were arguments that the government, is anti-devolution and to be seen not to be 
anti-devolution we said yes, these services must be transferred and that is it. The 
functions were transferred….] KII N 002 
[…But because you realize that politics overrides rationality, a lot of these functions that 
you know, you remember there is a time the governors went to the president and 
demanded for these functions and the president said that these functions should be 
transferred immediately…] KII N 001 
Several stakeholders and commentators had varied views on the presidential directive. Some 
had concerns that the county governments had not yet fully set up their structures and thus did 
not have the required capacity to undertake the functions being transferred, while others felt 
that the president actually agreed to this hurried transfer of functions because he wanted the 
counties to fail and be portrayed in bad light, and in the process frustrate devolution.  
The politically motivated fast-tracked process of transfer of functions caused a lot of fear and 
anxiety among many senior national government technocrats because of the uncertainties it 
presented them. This led to some resistance to transfer, or at times sabotaging the process of 
transfer by not providing adequate support and capacity for the counties to take up the functions 
as envisaged.  
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[….It is (the resistance to transfer functions) deliberate. It’s not ignorance. Because 
you’re coming from a unitary system and the unitary system will fight back any attempt 
to devolve power…] KII N 004 
This hurried transfer of functions led to a significant disruption in government services 
particularly in health, and this was also reported by most of the interview participants, 
particularly at the Sub-County level.  
[….But right now it’s chaos, over 5 dispensaries in (X Sub-County) now don’t have 
water, I don’t know where to get money to get to buy water for them. They don’t have 
money they don’t have water. Initially they used to receive water from the ministry of 
water. Before devolution, ministry of water used to get funds from the drought mitigation 
program  then we just make a call and given them a schedule for every Monday they used 
to supply us water throughout the health facility but now they don’t have that funding 
anymore…] KII SC 006 
5.3.5. Political power battles 
The above situation illustrates that shortly after the general elections, power battles dominated 
the national political debate about devolution. These political debates overshadowed the 
rationality needed to undertake the implementation of the devolved government structures and 
smooth transfer of functions. A case in point was immediately after they had been sworn into 
office the County Governors demanded to use the title ‘His Excellency’ and fly the ‘national 
flag’ on their official vehicles. This triggered an extended national debate on the political power 
pecking order. In what was largely seen as an attempt by parliament to punish the governors, 
the senate enacted a law to define the political pecking order ranking the governors below the 
senators, and went ahead to initiate impeachment process for several governors within the first 
year in office. This the senate did at the expense of focusing on supporting pending legislation 
that required to be enacted to facilitate the implementation of devolution. Figure 5 below 
illustrates the ongoing political power battles at the time as covered by a section of the local 
media in the country. 
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Figure 5: Newspaper articles illustrating the political power battles in the country in 2013 
 
 
In Kilifi County, the county government bought a luxurious multi-million-shilling official 
residence for the county governor shortly after the elections, at a time when the county hadn’t 
fully set up its structures, and was thus having challenges in implementing projects and 
providing essential services. The county further went ahead to buy expensive four-wheel drive 
vehicles for its CECs members. It was also observed and reported that the governor frequently 
used a helicopter to fly to the office from Mombasa where he actually lived, even after buying 
this very expensive house. This attracted wide-spread criticism in the mainstream national 
media and social media, and at some point the governor was summoned and interrogated by 
the Nation Ethics and Anticorruption Commission.  Nevertheless, his decisions did not attract 
as much criticism by the local Kilifi citizens. A section of local citizens in fact defended the 
governor’s move arguing that these type of state privileges had for a long time been a preserve 
for those in power in Nairobi, and thus it was ok for one of their own to also enjoy these [86, 
121]. 
Figure 6 below is an illustration of some of the ongoing media debate on the Kilifi county 
governor decisions at the time. 
 
 
 
73 
 
Figure 6: Illustration of power manifestation in Kilifi County 
 
 
5.3.6. General public involvement and accountability in the governance process 
The new constitution brought about several requirements for public participation and 
accountability in governance processes [33, 35]. An example was in the process of appointment 
of senior public officials in both the national and county governments. As observed at the time, 
the president and his deputy nominated the candidates to senior government offices, including 
cabinet secretaries and principal secretaries. The nominated candidates then went through a 
public vetting process in parliament where members of the public were allowed to present any 
issues they had in support of, or against the nominated individuals, and after considering the 
issues raised, parliament debated and either approved or rejected the nominated candidates. 
The president then only substantively appointed these officials once they had been approved 
by parliament. 
Similarly, from observation at the county level, the governors also nominated candidates for 
senior county government position as required by law. These were later subjected to public 
vetting at the County Assembly before being appointed into office.  Another observed example 
of public involvement was in the deliberate efforts to engage and consult with the public and 
other stakeholders during the development of the first county government budget.  
In addition to such direct community and stakeholder participation, county assemblies were 
established by the constitution as the main formal community representation accountability 
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structures at the county level. In Kilifi, a number of the interview participants felt that the 
County Assembly was unable to appropriately play this role because of lack of skills and 
capacity. 
[…The County Assembly for me is a body which has the will and the power to do things 
right but has no capacity to do it, but they have the power, they have the everything, the 
will and everything but the capacity is very limited because for you to have, to hold me 
accountable, you should be analytical. You should be a person who can understand things 
to a certain level…] KII C 002 
[…Yes…. When they’re (members of county assembly) given these documents, they 
don’t read them. Currently the CIDP (County Integrated Development Plan) in their 
hands, they have not been able to pass it because nobody seems to know how to move it 
because the complexity and they do not understand. They have no idea where to start…] 
KII C 003 
Because of this lack of capacity at the County Assembly level, there was a view that the 
executive could easily buy their way from the Assembly if they need any decision to be made; 
thus weakening public participation and accountability in the governance processes. 
 […. You see. So public participation is very weak, very very weak because when you 
bring that Bill, you bring them here to take them through … you actually invite the 
committee to take them through the Bill. Pay them a sitting allowance; When they get it 
there at the assembly, they will not raise a finger on it….] KII C 002 
5.4. Summary 
In summary, the push and design for devolved government structure in Kenya did not have 
health sector specific goals, but was rather driven by a political goal of ensuring equitable 
distribution of government resources across the different regions in the country, among other 
political goals. To this end, the constitution designed a two-tier government system with a 
national government made up of an executive, legislature and judiciary; and a county 
government comprising of an executive and legislature. Both tiers are directly elected by the 
people and are accountable to the people both directly and through elected representatives, for 
functions allocated to them. 
There was a well laid down plan for the establishment of county government structures and 
phased out transfer of functions from national to county governments.  However, political 
power struggles and mistrust during the early days led to a hurried transfer of functions to 
counties before appropriate structures had been established and their capacity built. This led to 
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major disruption in all government service delivery, and particularly in health.  The process of 
establishment of both national and county government did encourage greater public 
involvement and participation than in the past, in particular through the public vetting of 
nominated senior government officers before they were formerly appointed into office.  In the 
next three chapters, I present findings on how this broader context affected the implementation 
of devolved government systems in Kenya around the three health sector study tracers. 
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Chapter 6: Planning and Budgeting Under Devolution 
6.0.  Introduction 
In this chapter I begin by describing how government resources should officially be allocated 
to counties and health services and how the county level health sector should undertake 
planning, budgeting and financial management for recurrent resources.  I then describe the 
early experiences of these processes in the County Department of Health (CDoH) in Kilifi 
County. I draw on my document review, key informant interviews, and participant and non-
participant observations. 
6.1.  How government resource allocation, planning and budgeting should 
work 
6.1.1. Overall national government planning and budgeting structures and processes 
The 2010 constitution established four mechanisms within which counties get resourced: (i.) 
the equitable unconditional share from national government set at a minimum of fifteen percent 
of all national government revenue; (ii.) an equalisation fund allocated to marginalised counties 
to provide specific social services, set at a minimum of one half percent of national government 
revenue; (iii.) local revenue generated within the county through levying specific county level 
taxes; and (iv.) conditional grants given by national government to counties to address specific 
national strategic priority issues. 
A national Commission for Revenue Allocation (CRA) was established in 2011 to develop a 
Resource Allocation Criteria (RAC) to allocate the equitable share and the equalisation fund to 
counties. A Public Finance Management (PFM) Act elaborates the government budgeting 
process including key events and specific time lines at national and county level (Table 2). 
In brief, the national government once elected is supposed to outline its five year Medium Term 
Plan (MTP), from which Treasury draws the proposed annual government budgets in a 
revolving manner using the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) budgeting 
process.  The Cabinet Secretary for Treasury should present the proposed government budget 
to the Parliamentary Budget Committee by the end of April, including allocations to all the 47 
counties. Thereafter the committee should publish the budget, invite public and stakeholder 
comment, consider those inputs, and then present the budget to parliament for approval by the 
end of June. 
 
77 
 
Table 2: Summary of key events and timelines in the government budget process 
Key event Time line Responsible 
Person/Institution 
Comments 
Elaboration of newly 
elected government five-
year Medium Term Plan 
(MTP) 
End of first 
September after 
the election 
National Treasury New government aligns its campaign 
manifesto with the Kenya Vision 2030 
National long-term strategic 
development plan 
Publishing of budget 
guidelines to all 
government entities 
30th August each 
year 
Treasury Cabinet 
secretary 
Guidelines outline respective year’s 
priorities and sets broad ceilings for 
government entities e.g. ceilings on 
allocations between recurrent and 
development expenses. Guidelines 
will be used by controller of budgets to 
appraise budgets from all government 
entities. 
Submission of Budget 
Review and Outlook 
Paper (BROP) to cabinet 
for approval 
30th September 
each year 
Treasury Cabinet 
secretary 
Outlines government budgetary 
performance for previous financial 
year and presents government 
projected revenue for coming financial 
year, providing indicative allocations 
to all government sectors including 
county governments 
Submission of annual 
budget policy statement 
to parliament for 
approval 
15th February 
each year 
Treasury Cabinet 
secretary 
Policy statement outlines broad 
national strategic priority goals which 
national and county government 
entities should align their budgets to. 
Submission of 
government budget 
estimates to parliament 
budget committee 
30th April each 
year 
Treasury Cabinet 
secretary 
National assembly scrutinises 
allocations to national government 
entities in-line with governed strategic 
priorities.  
Senate scrutinises allocations to 
county governments in-line with 
constitutional requirements and 
overall government strategic priorities 
Parliament approves 
government budget 
estimates 
30th June each 
year 
National Assembly Sets stage for development of 
appropriation bill to allow government 
to draw funds from the consolidated 
fund to implement the budget. 
Source PFM Act 2012 
6.1.2. Overall county government planning and budgeting structures and processes  
Each county government should establish a County Treasury, which facilitates and oversees 
planning and budgeting, and overall management of public finances at the county level. The 
County Treasuries should establish a consolidated County Revenue Fund held in a Central 
Bank account, into which all revenue received from national government or raised locally 
should be held.  Any withdrawals or payments require approval from the office of the 
Comptroller of Budgets at the National Treasury who is charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring that county governments adhere to government wide financial regulations.  Key 
county planning and budgeting events relevant to the CDoH planning process are presented in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3: Summary of the overall county budget process 
Key event Timeline Responsible 
Person/Institution 
Comments 
Development of county 
level sector specific 
Strategic Plans 
End of first 
September 
after the 
election 
Chief Officer of 
respective County 
Department 
CoDH develops its five year Strategic 
plan, aligned to the Kenya Health 
Sector Strategic Plan 
Consolidation of sector 
strategic plan to develop 
the Consolidated County 
Integrated Development 
Plan (CIDP) 
End of first 
September 
after the 
election 
County Treasury County government aligns its CIDP 
with its campaign manifesto and with 
the National government MTP and 
Kenya Vision 2030 
County Budget Review 
and Outlook Paper 
submitted to county 
assembly for approval 
30th 
September 
each year 
County Treasury Outlines county government’s 
budgetary performance for previous 
financial year and presents projected 
revenue for coming financial year, 
providing indicative allocations to all 
sectors and departments in the county 
Resource biding and 
allocation by respective 
county departments 
October – 
December 
each year 
All Departmental 
Chief Officers 
CDoH having undertaken its review of 
previous year’s performance 
undertakes bidding/lobbying for an 
increase or maintenance of budgetary 
allocation 
County fiscal strategy 
paper submitted to 
county assembly for 
approval 
15th February 
each year 
County Treasury Outlines broad county fiscal strategic 
priority goals of which county 
departments should align their budgets 
to 
Submission for review of 
county budget estimates 
to County Assembly 
budget committee 
30th April 
each year 
County Treasury County assembly scrutinizes proposed 
allocations and expenditure to all 
entities. Invites public participation in 
this process 
Approval of county 
budget 
30th June 
every year 
County Assembly Sets stage for development of county 
appropriation bill to allow county 
government to draw funds from the 
consolidated county revenue fund to 
implement the budget 
Source PFM Act 2012 
Within counties, all departments are supposed to develop a strategic plan, which are 
consolidated to form the County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP), aligned to the national 
government MTP. The CIDP should incorporate grassroots public participation, and be 
implemented through Annual Work Plans (AWPs). Resource allocation to all county 
departments should occur through an annual resource bidding process, guided by the 
departmental AWPs. The county departments then develop departmental budgets, which are 
consolidated to form the overall annual county budget.   
The CEC member for finance should then present the consolidated county budget to the full 
CEC for approval before submitting it to the County Assembly by the end of April each year. 
The County Assembly should invite submissions and inputs from members of the public and 
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other stakeholders during its deliberations, with budget approval by end of June each year. 
Within twenty-one days of budget approval, the County Treasury is required by law to publish 
and publicize the budget for general public information.   
As highlighted earlier (chapter 3), under the DFRD arrangement, planning and budgetary 
responsibility for recurrent expenditure had been decentralized to the then district level. This 
had been done by designating the districts as accounting units. To this effect, these entities 
could receive and spend funds for day to day operational recurrent expenses. These funds 
would be sent to these entities by way of Authority to Incur Expenditure (AIEs) delegated by 
the permanent secretary of respective ministries, who had the overall accounting responsibility 
in the ministry. 
6.1.3. County level health sector planning and budgeting structures and processes  
Figure 7 below is an illustration of the CDoH planning and budgeting cycle. It illustrates the 
key events to be carried within the CDoH (green boxes) and how they link with the key events 
in the overall county budget process coordinated by county treasury, highlighted earlier (orange 
circles). 
From the review of documents, the CDoH’s AWP process should ideally begin in September 
with a performance review of the previous year’s AWP and an elaboration of the subsequent 
year’s priorities. It is these priorities that guide the CDoH resource bidding process once the 
county treasury publishes the County Budget Review and Outlook Paper (BROP) which gives 
a detailed outline of the projected county resource basket made of allocations from national 
government, and locally generated revenue; and outlines indicative allocations to county 
departments. Within the CDoH, the AWP planning and budgeting process is overseen by the 
CEC member for health, the County Chief Officer for Health, and the CHMT 
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Figure 7: Illustration of the CDoH AWP planning cycle 
 
The County Treasury, CDoH and the County Assembly all have key roles in ensuring a smooth 
planning and budgeting process for the county health services. The county treasury has overall 
responsibility for the county government planning and budgeting process. It is thus required to 
provide overall guidance on how the planning and budgeting is to be undertaken. 
Once they receive the circular providing the overall guidance, the CDoH is required to develop 
AWP tools and guidelines to facilitate all the planning units within the department to undertake 
their AWPs. The AWP tools should adhere to the overall planning and budgeting guidelines 
released by treasury, and be aligned to the Kenya Health Policy (KHP) 2013-2030 and the 
Kenya Health Sector Strategic Plan (KHSSP) 2013 – 2017 which outline the country’s broader 
health sector strategic agenda. All CDoHs countrywide are thus required to align their 
departmental priorities with the national health policy and strategic agenda. 
Once all the planning units have undertaken the AWP planning, the CHMT should convene a 
meeting with all health stakeholders including implementing and funding partners, and the 
County Assembly Health Committee, to consolidate the work plans and outline the budget. 
The consolidated departmental plans and budget are then submitted to the County Treasury for 
incorporation into the draft county government budget for submission to the CEC and later to 
the County Assembly for approvals.  
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Under the previous government system, the national MoH, in-line with the DFRD policy had 
delegated the planning and budgetary responsibility for recurrent expenditure to the DHMTs 
at district level and HMTs at hospital level. Districts and hospitals were designated as 
accounting units which could receive and spend funds for operational recurrent expenses, with 
funds sent through Authority to Incur Expenditures (AIEs) delegated by the permanent 
secretary national MoH. Within the devolved system, the county government is expected to 
enact subsidiary local legislation to enable the Chief Officer Health to further delegate these 
functions to Sub-County Health Management Teams (SCHMTs) and HMTs. 
6.1.4. Additional funds for county health sectors 
In the early 1990s, through an Act of parliament, the MoH introduced a Facility Improvement 
Fund (FIF) to be financed through the levying of user fees at health facilities [100, 130]. 
Through this law, each health facility opened a bank account to deposit monies. On a quarterly 
basis, the HMTs would budget for the money and request for an AIE from the provincial office 
to use the money to pay for facility recurrent expenses.  At dispensary and health centre level, 
this was implemented through the 10/20 policy which allowed for charging users a blanket fee 
of 20 and 10 Kenya shillings for  health centre and dispensary services respectively [130].    
The national MoH in partnership with the World Bank (WB) country office and the Danish 
Agency for International Development (DANIDA) in 2010, introduced a Health Sector 
Services Fund (HSSF) for financing recurrent expenditure for Primary Health Care (PHC) 
facilities in the country [100]. Under the HSSF structure, national monies were sent directly 
from national treasury to PHC facility bank accounts, eliminating DHMT and district treasury 
bureaucracy. Both WB and DANIDA contributed to this fund alongside the government. 
Health facilities were also required to have Facility Management Committees (FMCs) that 
comprise of some community representatives to play an oversight role in the utilisation of these 
funds. The FMCs were gazetted by the national minister for health, to acquire a legal status to 
carry out this mandate.  With devolution, all the key stakeholders, i.e. national MoH, WB and 
DANIDA were keen to maintain this form of funding for PHC services as a conditional grant 
to counties. However, there was significant confusion and uncertainty over the future of HSSF 
at the roll out of devolution. 
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6.2.  Health sector planning, budgeting and financial management 
experiences in Kilifi County 
6.2.1. Overview of the 2013/14 planning and budgeting process and outcomes in Kilifi 
County 
The Kilifi interim CHMT began a county health strategic plan development process in early 
April 2013.  There was thus no AWP developed within the CDoH by the time the county budget 
process for 2013/14 was being concluded. The County Treasury went ahead to develop draft 
budgets for all departments including the CDoH without their active participation in order to 
avoid delaying the county budgeting process which has legally entrenched timelines.    
There was little community or stakeholder involvement and participation in the health sector 
planning and budgeting process, but once the consolidated county budget was finalised, there 
was an attempt by the County Treasury to subject the budget to stakeholder reviews before it 
was finally presented to and debated by the County Assembly for approval.  However, as 
highlighted earlier in the previous chapter, the County Assembly’s capacity to adequately 
interrogate the county budget and make meaningful inputs and amendments was questionable. 
Overall in this period, there were significant delays in accessing funds by the service units 
which significantly hampered service delivery. In the subsequent section, I present findings on 
the different effects the devolution process had on the planning and budgeting process in Kilifi 
County.   
6.2.2. Delays and disputes in establishing CDoH structures  
A major influence on the planning and budgeting process in Kilifi was the delays and disputes 
in establishing county structures.   The national MoH appointed and seconded interim County 
Health Coordinators to every county a few weeks before the general election in early 2013 with 
the mandate to set up interim county health coordination structures. Across the country, these 
county coordinators changed their titles to ‘County Directors of Health’ and established interim 
County Health Management Teams (CHMTs). In Kilifi, the interim CHMT designated the 
three former District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) within the County as interim Sub-
County Health Management Teams (SCHMTs) and former Hospital Management Teams 
(HMTs) for the three referral hospitals as the interim HMTs. There were however no clear 
terms of reference or guidelines provided by national or county governments for the 
composition, roles and mandates of these structures.  
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This caused considerable challenges and confusion. For example, the membership of the 
interim CHMT kept expanding from an initial 12 members in early 2013, to over 20 members 
by end of 2013 with no clear roles and mandate. This happened because the then County 
Director of Health, who was a powerful provincial level manager of health previously, used 
her position to post some of her friends and allies to Kilifi from elsewhere in Coast region.  
This contributed to some CHMT members undertaking SCHMT roles (such as visiting 
peripheral health facilities to conduct supervision of frontline health workers) without reference 
to the host SCHMTs, leading to cases of both the SCHMTs and the CHMTs sending teams to 
the same facility for supervision on the same day. 
The Chief Officer of Health like other departmental Chief Officers, was not appointed until 
April 2014. A Chief Officer for Finance in the County Treasury was appointed in May 2013 as 
an interim measure therefore had to assume accounting responsibilities for all departments.  
Although the CEC Health was appointed earlier in 2013, there was an observed tense working 
relationship between the newly appointed CEC for health, and the CHMT, which caused the 
stalling of the CDoH the Strategic Plan development process and the AWP development.   
6.2.3. Lack of clarity in CDOH versus national MoH roles  
At the time of the 2013/14 health sector planning and budgeting process, it was also not entirely 
clear what roles the CDoH would undertake vis a vis the national MoH in respect to health 
service provision as the proposed process of transfer of functions had not been agreed upon 
between national and county governments. These observations were also highlighted by some 
of the interview participants. 
[…I think the experience was not a very exciting experience simply because when we 
came in immediately we were to discuss the budget. At this point the budget had already 
been aligned by treasury to what the different departments and within key budget lines 
and more or less the contributions we were to make were minimal…] KII C 001 
 [….I was lucky enough to participate in the budgeting process for the county, so and 
rumour had it that commodity, some people were saying that commodity procurement 
will still be done at the central government. It wasn’t clear by the time we were doing 
this year’s budget. It wasn’t clear…] KII C 004 
6.2.4. Capacity of key actors tasked with planning and budgeting 
Beyond the structural delays and lack of clarity in roles, some interview respondents also felt 
that the individuals and structures tasked with the planning and budgeting responsibility at the 
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county level lacked the basic prerequisite capacity to comprehend and undertake this task, and 
this could have also contributed to the inability to undertake the planning and budgeting within 
the required timelines. 
[…Capacity has been a challenge during the transition, we had the transition officers but 
were not very much adequate, so to me we didn’t have that… we wished we could have 
been better facilitated in terms of capacity, the department needs to be beefed with more 
people, people in the budgeting section and in the planning section…] KII C 003 
[…Then again the capacities of the CECs for example are moving now to developing 
strategic plans and developing sector plans, we have had a problem up to now. We do 
not have up to today sector plans. Sector Strategic plans. Even the AWPs, they’re doing 
work plans….. …..this is a primary school teacher who was picked from the classroom 
and made CEC, and she has no capacity to develop that and you’re telling them today 
develop a strategic plan….] KII C 002 
6.2.5. Role and functioning of the comptroller of budgets 
A particular challenge for the 2013/14 fiscal year was that the comptroller of budgets rejected 
several county budgets, even after they had been approved by their respective County 
Assemblies. The affected counties were asked to revise their budgets to align them with the 
guidelines, in order for them to be allowed to draw money from the government consolidated 
fund:  
 [….when you prepare your budget and you submit to the controller of budget, and as 
works out and realize that your recurrent expenditure is over 70% then they tell you that 
your budget is not properly done, it will not be accepted and funds will not be released 
until when you revise that budget,…] KII C 003 
Though established as a means of accountability by ensuring that counties adhere to 
government wide financial regulations, these regulations and functions of the comptroller of 
budgets were contested by some interviewees who felt that these budget regulatory 
requirements did not serve the interests of the counties. Some contested the interpretation of 
the laws regarding this oversight, while others felt that the regulations were actually preventing 
the counties from economic development. 
[….say for example the office of the comptroller of budget, what they did last time was 
something which is un-procedural because it’s not anchored in any law. If the county 
assembly has approved a budget, alright the controller of budget can only look at that 
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budget and if they feel that they are not happy with some of the things that have been 
contained, they can only hold the release of those funds but not to send it back to us to 
redo the budget you understand. Because even when we were amending the budget, I 
was asking myself, under which law are we doing this ….because the budget process is 
something which is anchored in legislation? On 30th of June, it should have been 
concluded, but now we are doing this things even in November and December….] KII C 
007 
[…Now today you say, you tell us we’re decentralized but all accounts of the county 
government right now are being held by Central Bank. If this money had come into the 
county’s treasury, the county treasury decides to put it in several banks, they would grow 
the economy there, but they’re holding everything at the national level…] KII C 002 
6.2.6. Re-centralization of financial management roles at county level 
The lack of a Chief Officer for the CDoH in the better part of 2013 caused significant delays 
in accessing funds by the service units, thus hampering service delivery.  As an interim measure 
all the financial requests for routine recurrent expenses by service delivery and coordination 
units had to be taken to the County Treasury for approval and financing. These included 
payment of utility bills, purchase of fuel for ambulances, stationery (for all health facilities and 
the SCHMTs) etc.  This effectively caused a re-centralization to county level of what was 
previously decentralized financial management responsibilities at district (now sub-county), 
and hospital level.   
[….right now as Kilifi the only challenge we have is the fact we don’t have a chief officer 
….,… then these people have to come all the way from Malindi, and Mariakani; the 
Malindi ones are …they have to come here, you know…] KII C 002 
The County Treasury owing to the workload of having to deal with the financial management 
for all the departments resolved to only deal with emergency requests. This compounded the 
delay in financial procedures, and led to frustrations by frontline managers particularly at the 
sub-county level.  
[…We took the voucher since before Christmas, to the county treasury, around December 
yes they have not been able to pay the vouchers. So petrol also the same. We have to go 
and kneel down there before the supplier we cry if there is no phone and imagine if you 
don’t have even recurrent money even to buy airtime, it means you have to go physically 
86 
 
if you miss him you have to borrow credit again so we are just running in debts…] KII 
SC 005 
[…at the County treasury. …… At times we are told that the approving officer is not 
around so we will have to wait until that officer returns so that our requests can be 
approved. So we come back here many kilometres away to go there another day. …like 
now we don’t have oxygen in theatre, so we are referring all the patients because of 
oxygen…] KII SC 006 
However even after the appointment of the Chief Officer Health in April 2014, the delegation 
and transfer of financial management responsibilities for recurrent activities at Sub-County and 
health facility level did not happen. Sub-county and health facility managers still had to travel 
long distances to the County headquarters to get approvals and financing for their recurrent 
expenses serviced by the Chief Officer. 
6.2.7. User fee lock-down in hospitals  
Given the challenges and delays in accessing county level funds for service delivery by the 
hospitals, the FIF user fees (which the hospitals continued to collect even after March 2013) 
were a potential alternative source of funds for these facilities.  However, once the County 
Treasury was established in Kilifi, it directed that the FIF fell under what is collectively 
described as ‘County Revenue’ and thus the hospitals should close their respective FIF bank 
accounts and be banking the money in the County Consolidated Fund Account.  
The CDoH was not happy with this directive, and for a whole year the hospitals continued to 
collect the money and banked it in the hospitals’ accounts, but could not spend it because of 
lack of AIEs, even with the existing acute and emergency financial needs in these hospitals at 
the time.  
[…What is happening in Kilifi since there is no consensus between those who are 
involved at the top there, the monies we have been denied to use them. Banking every 
day and banking everything the way the instructions were… six months down the line. 
We are talking about millions yes.  And it is not clear still who is supposed to give the 
instructions to use the money…] KII SC 005. 
[…We are banking 100% according to the policy and… Several millions like here I think 
it’s more than 30 million is inside there, frozen; and yet we have the ambulance…that 
cannot be removed from the fundi (mechanic), imagine…] KII SC 005 
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Owing to the delays in accessing funds for addressing emergency needs from the county 
treasury and the stand-off over the use of the FIF funds, some of the hospital managers decided 
to spend the money they collected from user fees at source so as to address their emergency 
needs without seeking approvals. 
[…now sometimes (XXX hospital) has been forced to spend money at source as I speak 
now they have spent almost 500,000 shillings at source. Yeah because how do you 
survive, we don’t have water, we don’t have electricity you have no supplies, patients 
don’t have food and you have debt of around 2 million just for food alone, and such kind 
of things we are talking about.…] KII SC 007 
6.2.8. Access to HSSF funds and abolition of user fees 
An additional source of funds to support service delivery particularly to primary health 
facilities was the HSSF (described in chapter 3). These were funds put together as a 
contribution by national government and two main donor agencies, DANIDA and the WB and 
would be sent into PHC facilities directly from central level treasury, to cater for recurrent 
expenses in these facilities. However, in the early days of implementation of devolution, there 
were contestations over the roles of national and county government in the management of 
these funds. First the CDoH wanted to be the one to undertake the selection and gazettement 
of the FMCs who were key in the management of these funds at the facility level, arguing that 
managing PHC facilities fell within their mandate.  
Another contention, and which both major HSSF donors i.e. WB and DANIDA were drawn 
into, was regarding the channel and flow of funds. The national MoH wanted the flow of HSSF 
funds to remain as prior to devolution, i.e. move directly from national treasury to facility bank 
accounts. This position was also supported by the WB. The county governments however 
wanted the funds to flow through the County Treasury, a position which was also supported by 
DANIDA. These contestations were also recounted by some of the participants in the 
interviews. 
 […am hearing that there is still a tug of war between the county and national 
government. The county wants to gazette, to do the gazettement because they claim this 
is a county function. The national government also wants to do that…] KII SC 02 
These contestations led to a significant delay in the release of funds. Ultimately when 
consensus was agreed for counties to gazette the FMCs but the funds to go straight to the 
facility accounts, DANIDA was still not happy with the decisions, and thus they withheld their 
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contribution into the HSSF kitty, leading to significant reduction of the total amount to health 
facilities. 
In June 2013, the president issued a directive that all user fees at PHC facilities be abolished 
and all maternity services be provided for free at all public health facilities. Under this directive, 
the national government through the national MoH was going to compensate health facilities 
for the revenue that would be lost through this directive. However, the roll out of the health 
facility compensation was significantly delayed because of contestations between national and 
county government over the mechanism to be used to channel funds for this programme. At 
the same time clients began seeking these free services as per the directive, thus causing further 
straining and challenges for service delivery at facility level; and because of the public 
popularity and political nature of the directive, the county governments did not want to 
contradict this directive publicly for fear of political repercussions. 
Owing to the pressure that this directive put on the health facilities, which were already 
suffering from funding constraints due to lack of structures at county level, sub-county health 
managers advised the PHC facility managers to meet with their respective FMCs and agree to 
re-introduce the user fees till a time when they get reimbursement. 
 […this declaration has impacted on in terms of service delivery at the dispensary. It’s 
been very-very … it’s been very difficult….] KII C 001 
 […So what we’ve decided to do is for the dispensary, the heads there to call a baraza 
(community meeting) with the chiefs around and to communicate with the communities 
to allow them to pay at least 10 shillings for the service…] KII SC 002 
6.3. Summary 
In summary county governments mainly get their resources from national government as part 
of the equitable share, equalization fund for certain counties, or conditional grants; as well as 
– to a lesser extent - from revenue generated locally within the county. During the county 
level budgeting process, the CDoH gets resources allocated through a resource bidding 
process which also includes other county departments. Once it has its resource envelope, the 
CDoH is required to engage all its planning units in a bottom-up process to develop its AWP. 
In the 2013/14 financial year, the CDoH in Kilifi County did not adequately participate in the 
planning and budgeting process at county level. This was largely due to the fast tracked 
transfer of functions described in chapter 5. During the time for the key planning and 
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budgeting activities in the county, the CDoH structure was not fully established with key 
officers not yet appointed. There was also lack of clarity and confusion by the interim team 
over what functions the CDoH should plan for in relation to the national MoH. Subsequently, 
even after the appointment of key officers and establishment of the CDoH structures, there 
was significant lack of capacity by the team over their planning and budgeting roles. 
The delay in setting up CDoH structures, lack of appropriate planning, budgeting and general 
financial management skills, and overall political contestations led to perverse re-
centralization of financial management function at the county level, user fees lock-down in 
hospitals and delays in the release of critical HSSF funds to PHC facilities. All these 
challenges collectively led to difficulties in access to funds by service delivery units, which 
significantly disrupted health service delivery at the county level. 
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Chapter 7: Health Workforce Management under Devolution 
7.0.  Introduction 
In this chapter, I present findings on the structures, processes and early implementation 
experiences of devolution on health workforce management. I begin by outlining the proposed 
national and county level health workforce management structures, and their roles and 
responsibilities under the devolved government system. I then describe how the transfer 
process of the health workforce management function was undertaken, and the early outcomes 
and effects of this transfer. I drew data for this chapter largely from document reviews, key 
informant interviews and the general observations at the time; and the reflective practice 
sessions with other learning site research team members. 
7.1. Proposed structure and process for public servants’ management 
7.1.1. National and county level structures for public servants’ management 
Within the old constitution, a Public Services Commission (PSC) served as the overall 
employer of all government workers, including health workers in the country. The role and 
function of this PSC was to provide overall guidelines and oversight for strategic human 
resource development and management in the public sector, while the routine operational 
human resource management functions including recruitment, appraisal, promotions, 
discipline, in-service training and payment of salaries were delegated to the respective 
government ministries. The national MoH therefore undertook the role of all operational 
routine health workforce management functions for all health care workers in the country.  
Under the devolved government system, the 2010 constitution left the PSC with the main 
mandate of providing employment for national government employees, and an oversight role 
for the entire public service both at national and county level. At the county level, the 
constitution provided for the establishment of County Public Service Boards (CPSBs) that 
would serve as the overall employer of all public servants at the county level. The CPSBs were 
to be established as independent county level institutions, but accountable to both the County 
Executive and the County Assembly. In undertaking their human resource management 
function, the CPSBs are to do so in consultation and coordination with the respective county 
departments.  
7.1.2. Proposed transfer process of the public servants’ management function  
Legislation stipulated that all public servants performing devolved functions at the time of the 
general elections on March 2013 would be seconded to the county governments where they are 
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working, to be formerly deployed or transferred to those county governments once the county 
human resource management structures are established. In the health sector, national MoH in 
liaison with the Transitional Authority (TA) was to undertake a human resource capacity 
assessment for the counties [34, 125]. The TA was to further work to build capacity for all 
CPSBs to enable them undertake the assigned pubic service management function, and then 
work with respective ministries to transfer all staff working in the counties to from the national 
government to the respective county government under the CPSBs.  
[….Any public officer appointed by the Public Service commission in exercise of its 
constitutional powers and functions before the coming to effect of this Act and is serving 
in a county on the date of the constitution of that county government shall be deemed to 
be in the service of the county government on secondment from national government 
with their terms of service as at that date …] County Government Act 2012 Art 138 
7.2. Early implementation experiences and outcomes of health workers’ 
management under devolution 
7.2.1. Lack of clarity over health workforce management roles and functions at county 
level 
At the national level, the PSC had clearly delegated the function of routine operational public 
service management to respective ministries.  However, this did not happen at the county level 
[36]. This led to some confusion on the exact roles and responsibilities of health workforce 
management between the different government structures, and especially between the CPSB 
and CDoH.  
[….But again, those roles have not been shared with us in terms of who is to do what and 
as far as I can tell, I need; for us at least for the department of health we need to be  made 
aware … to fully comprehend what kind of health workforce management roles do we 
have  …] KII C 001 
[…Things were not also very clear with this human resource management issue, it’s not 
clear who is to undertake what role….] KII SC 005 
There was also lack of clarity over what structures and institutions between national and county 
governments would be responsible for specific welfare aspects of health workers including in-
service training and career progression, and how inter-county transfers for health workers 
would be managed.  Confusion over transfers was particularly expressed among Sub-County 
level interviewees: 
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[…Now the movement is still not very clear to us with, I mean now outside the county. 
So today we had a meeting with the director but we didn’t discuss it, we just talked about 
the persons who want to be moved within the county but the question of movement 
outside the county remained un-answered….] KII SC 002 
[…It’s a hazy topic, we don’t know what is going to happen. Now if somebody would 
now start thinking if am working in Tana River for example, now does it mean that all 
my life I will stick there…..]  KII SC 007 
7.2.2. Rushed transfer of health workforce management functions 
As with other devolved functions, the health workforce management function was also 
hurriedly transferred to counties in July 2013, following the presidential directive at the time. 
In Kilifi as elsewhere, this happened at a time when the basic systems required for managing 
the human resources had not been set-up. In the CDoH for example the payroll management 
system had not been set up and thus the county like most others could not process and pay 
health worker salaries at that point. There was a strong feeling by some of the health sector 
participants in the interviews that the county governments were prematurely pushing to take 
up the health workforce management role for political reasons, before working to set up the 
structures to take up that role at the county. 
 […They (governors) would have taken some time for it (health workforce management 
systems) to be established well. So that is the challenge that we are seeing and it’s really 
affecting health workers and most of them are not really comfortable with what is 
happening…] KII SC 007 
[…You know I think the challenge with the … most county governments is having time 
to learn how the system was and how that can be adapted in this needy situation. Because 
the … all the ministries at least had their own system of operating, but now that we have 
devolved, how do we customize that? Now that needs sober minds, all the players to 
ensure by the end of the day we are focusing on service delivery; that is critical…….] 
KII C 006 
7.2.3. Dialogue and consensus building over health workforce management 
Given the rushed transfer and the potential challenges it brought on health workforce 
management in counties at the time, several health sector stakeholders at national level began 
to discuss this health worker management challenge. To try and avert a crisis of counties failing 
to pay salaries for health workers countrywide, the Health Sector Intergovernmental Relations 
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Forum, that brings together national MoH with all the 47 CDoHs, was convened to develop an 
interim solution to address some of these pending crises. 
As a result of this dialogue, consensus was arrived at that the national MoH would continue 
processing and paying salaries for all health workers on behalf of the counties, then invoice the 
county governments for reimbursements for an interim period of July to December 2013. It 
was expected that counties would take that six months’ interim period to set up their systems, 
leading to them taking up the role of health worker salary payments by January 2014.  
[….And I think through you know negotiations with county governments, I think they 
accepted that national government would continue paying salaries of county workers in 
the interim up to December 2013 as they prepare themselves…] KII N 001 
After this agreement between national MoH and CDoH, all counties including Kilifi, decided 
to undertake a head-count of all health workers within their areas to verify if they were being 
invoiced for the right numbers. During this exercise, the health workers were required to 
physically present themselves for the head-count, and provide their personal details including 
details about their tribe, home-county and constituency of origin. This head-count exercise 
generated significant debates and arguments within the health sector at the time. First, the 
health workers were uncomfortable with the requirement to disclose their tribe and ‘home 
county’ during the exercise, for fear of discrimination and victimization. Secondly, most 
counties noted that the actual names and numbers of staff that they were being invoiced by 
national MoH for did not exist within their counties. Counties thus claimed that these were 
‘ghost workers’ and threatened to refuse to re-pay salaries paid to these people by the national 
MoH under the interim agreement. 
It took the convening of another health sector intergovernmental relations forum meeting to 
address these concerns from the counties. At this meeting, the health sector FACT explained 
to the counties that staff movement and transfers within the sector had traditionally been 
conducted manually at district, provincial and national level. It thus took sometimes up to two 
years before a staff transferred from one station to another had their transfer reflected in the 
payroll management systems. This meant that several months after being transferred, a health 
worker will continue to have their pay point reflected as the old station, and would have their 
salaries budgeted for that station. This explanation generally appeared to be accepted by the 
counties when they were made to understand that the salaries budgeted and allocated for health 
workers in the counties in the first year, were for those workers with pay-points within those 
counties and not necessarily those working within the county at that time. However there was 
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also consensus that this health workforce records anomaly needed to be corrected urgently and 
county records to only reflect the health workers working in those counties.  
[…I don’t know whether they are called ghost workers when they are found for instance 
all the provincial hospitals that were actually places for intern doctors training you know 
your salary started there and if you were at the Coast General you were posted outside, 
your payroll points is still Coast General and then that budget is yet counted at the 
Mombasa county but the doctor is no longer there, so this are some of the issues that are 
actually being dealt with….] KII N 008 
[….It needs to be corrected, if it’s been done and there’s consensus about the headcount 
in the whole country, there’s need for the governors’ council of all the counties to sit with 
central ministry and correct the anomaly of the headcount…..] KII C 006 
7.2.4. Public participation and accountability in recruitment of senior public servants  
As was required by law, for the first time in the country’s history, there was an opportunity for 
public participation in the appointment of senior public servants including Cabinet Secretaries 
and Principal Secretaries at National level, and County Executive Committee (CEC) members 
and Chief Officers at County level. The president (at the national level) and governors (at 
county level) nominated individuals for appointment into these positions. The nominated 
individuals’ names were then submitted to respective assembly committees for a public vetting 
exercise. Members of the public were invited to present their views in the form of memoranda 
to the vetting committee, in support of or in contest of the appointment of the nominees. The 
nominees where then appointed after clearance by the vetting committees. However from 
observation at both national and county level, this was seen by many as a public relations 
exercise as many people felt that both the members of the National Assembly at the national 
level, and the members of the County Assemblies at county level did not have the required 
skills and capacity to undertake meaningful assessment and vetting for the public officers they 
were supposed to vet. Secondly there were strong perceptions that both the national and county 
assemblies were regularly compromised by their respective executive arms of government, 
through allowances and other inducements so as to ‘rubber stamp’ executive decisions and 
choices. 
[….You see. So public participation is very weak, very very weak; because when you 
bring a bill, you bring them (Members of the County Assembly) here to take them 
through … you actually invite the committee to take them through the Bill. Pay them a 
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sitting allowance; When they get it there at the assembly, they will not raise a finger on 
it….] KII C 002 
An example of perceived compromises in the process is as follows. During the national vetting 
of cabinet secretaries, the National Assembly vetting committee rejected the nomination of one 
of the proposed cabinet secretaries on the grounds of her qualification for the proposed job. 
[….The Committee rejects the nomination of Mrs. Phyllis Jepkosgei Kipingor-Kandie as 
the Cabinet Secretary for East African Affairs, Commerce & Tourism and recommends 
that the appointing authority submits the name of another person for consideration in 
accordance with the provisions Section 7(10) of the Public Appointments (Parliamentary 
Approval) Act 2011…] National Assembly Committee on Appointments of Public 
Officers, Report on Vetting of Cabinet Secretaries, 14th May 2013 
However once the committee submitted this recommendation to parliament, the executive 
called for a meeting of the members of parliament from the ruling party where it’s alleged 
that they were bribed and coerced to reject the recommendations of the committee when 
they get to the floor of parliament. Subsequently this report was rejected and the nominee 
cleared by parliament.  The president proceeded to appoint her into office.  Both the cabinet 
secretary and principal secretary at National MoH, and the CEC and Chief Officer health at 
the CDoH in Kilifi, were recruited in this manner where there was some initial rejection of 
some of the nominees, but after allegations of bribery and political coercion, these 
individuals were approved for appointment. 
7.2.5. Political interference and discrimination in health workforce management  
Political interference and discrimination in the management of health workforce begun to be 
reported in some counties across the country immediately the devolution process begun. One 
national level interviewee highlighted an example where in mid-2013, the national MoH 
deployed and posted out to counties a group of freshly qualified medical doctors who had 
completed a one-year statutory government internship training as required by law. It was 
however reported that some of the counties rejected the doctors sent to them because they had 
come from different tribes or counties from the ones they had had been posted to.  
[…It’s tricky, because actually that has happened in the health sector few weeks ago, Dr. 
XXX (Senior Officer in national MoH ) posted out some doctors who had either finished 
training or internship and some counties rejected them claiming they didn’t come from 
those counties….] KII SC 007 
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Another incidence is related to the national MoH ‘Economic Stimulus Programme’ (ESP).  
Two years prior to devolution, the national MoH partnered with the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) Capacity Project to recruit health care workers to address 
the nationwide staff shortages that existed. Under this agreement, the GoK through MoH was 
to increase allocation for recruitment of health care workers and the Capacity Project would 
match that allocation with an equivalent amount. In the implementation of this arrangement, 
the GoK carried out a decentralized recruitment process through setting a recruitment quota for 
every constituency which ensured that the staff recruited were largely from the locality 
(constituency) they were recruited from. The recruitment for the staff supported by the 
Capacity Project was however done centrally by national MoH, with the staff then distributed 
equitably across the whole country. This meant that Capacity Project staff were not necessarily 
deployed in their home locality. 
From the general observations over the course of my research, several counties agreed to absorb 
only those health workers who had been recruited locally through the GoK funding, and 
rejected those recruited and deployed through the Capacity Project as they were considered 
‘outsiders’. This led to the USAID Capacity Project in February 2014 giving all the staff 
employed through the project who had been rejected in the counties where they were working 
a notice of termination of contract for end of March 2014. In some counties as highlighted in 
Figure 8 below, some of the nurses affected went to the industrial court to compel their 
respective county governments to absorb them.  
There were 47 health workers in Kilifi County under this category, who were initially affected 
leading to significant disruption of services including total closure of two health facilities which 
were being pre-dominantly served by this category of staff at the time. However, when the new 
Chief Officer Health was appointed, he managed to negotiate with the CPSB to have them 
reinstated.  
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Figure 8: Newspaper article highlighting the plight of the affected ESP nurses in one county 
 
   
Political interference with health workers was also reported at facility levels. During one  
reflective practice session with sub-county managers in Kilifi, it was reported that one 
dispensary within the Kilifi sub-county had been closed because community members led by 
their Area Member of County Assembly (MCA) had demanded to have the only nurse at the 
dispensary transferred because she did not belong to the locality. Sub-county level interviewees 
reported that this growing level of political interference and victimization raised significant 
concerns among health workers.  
[….the concern of health workers you know it’s like we are leaving a lot of decisions to 
remain by the politicians so what happens to technical skills. What happens to for 
example you having becoming a medical officer, you becoming a physician, what 
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happens now? You know it’s now like decision making processes and almost everything 
that you are going to do is going to be dictated by the politics and that might not be such 
a very good [situation] …KII SC 007 
7.2.6. Disruptions, delays, and discrepancies in health workers’ salaries 
From the general observation, county governments went ahead to prepare their payroll 
management systems in readiness for undertaking the role of paying salaries for health care 
workers by January 2014. However, when they eventually took up this role the initial months 
were characterized by several challenges including general delays in salary payments, payroll 
discrepancies and missing allowances; and some staff missing from the payroll altogether. 
When the salaries were eventually paid, it was noted that a number of key allowances had not 
been included for most staff. Figure 9 below is an illustration of some of the existing health 
workforce payroll challenges at the time across counties. 
In Kilifi County, there was a general delay for payments of January and February 2014 salaries 
by over 2 weeks in both months. And in both instances, there were major discrepancies in the 
payroll when the salaries were eventually paid 
Figure 9: Illustration of the wide-spread health workers’ payroll challenges at the time 
 
 
7.2.7. Fears, anxiety, low morale and industrial actions by health workers 
The multiple challenges and uncertainties over the health workforce management highlighted 
above led to significant fear and anxiety among many health care workers at the time. The main 
concerns health care workers had included the uncertainty about career progression, 
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uncertainty about inter-county transfers, the increasing political interference over health 
worker management, and the continued disruptions in salary payments. These concerns were 
also raised by respondents in the interviews. 
[…This grey areas are actually raising up apprehension, apprehension and what do we 
call it; health workers are feeling sort of intimidated or something by the political 
process…] KII SC 007 
These multiple uncertainties over health care worker management issues not only resulted in 
fear and anxiety among health care workers at the time, but also led to observed significant 
levels of demoralization of health care workers. 
[…So that is the challenge that we are seeing and it’s really getting health workers and 
most of them are not really comfortable , ….. the morale is not that good, it’s not that 
good…] KII SC   007 
[….But right now to tell you about the human resource in general within the rural facility, 
within the hospital, people are fatigued because of the amount of work, and the morale 
is very low because of these problems….] KII SC 004 
The fear for political interference and victimization, coupled with the uncertainty over inter-
county transfers generally led to many health workers wanting to be transferred back to their 
home-county of origin. These observations were also raised by respondents in the interviews. 
[….up to August last year, there had been so many transfers. People were requesting to 
move away to go back to their home counties people were in state of panic not sure about 
how the host counties would treat them so they wanted to go back to their homes…..] 
KII C 008 
Owing to these challenges at the time, the national media continued to report on cases of mass 
resignations of health workers countrywide. In late 2013 the three major health worker unions 
in the country called for a nation-wide strike citing these challenges and pressing for re-
centralization of the health service delivery function back to national government. During this 
strike which lasted for several weeks, health care workers countrywide resorted to several 
protest strategies including street demonstrations and social media protests. This happened at 
the time when the country was undertaking the 50th anniversary of the country’s independence.  
The anniversary celebrations lasted for several days in December 2013, and had more than ten 
visiting heads of state from other African country’s attending.  
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To take advantage of the anniversary celebration, health care worker social media protest 
adopted a twitter hash-tag #sick@50 to pile pressure on the national government to come to 
their rescue; however, during the celebration, both the president and his deputy stayed clear of 
the health sector crisis in their addresses to the nation; highlighting the varied and potentially 
politically sensitive nature of this debate at the time. Some views and positions about the health 
workers’ strike were also raised by the respondents in the interviews; 
 [….I think if we look at these, especially events leading to what we have, the current 
crisis situation we have the human resource in the ministry is kind of, things were done 
in a bit hurried, in a hurried manner before setting up the proper structures at the counties, 
because you see at one time we had the governors going to the president’s, ah, to the 
State House and that same day you get, a Gazette Notice saying that you have to devolve 
these functions fully. So you see there was some hurriedness in doing that….] KII C 004 
As the health workers’ strike continued, and the political debate surrounding health devolution 
continued, the national media continued to publish horrifying stories and testimonies about the 
devastating effects of the countrywide health workers strike. Media reports at the time 
estimated that by end of December 2013, over 100 Kenyans had lost their lives in public health 
facilities owing to the strike.  
Figure 10 below is an illustration of the health workers strike, its effects; and raging debate as 
covered by the media at the time. 
In response to this strike action, the Council of Governors (CoG) met in Nairobi and took a 
joint political decision to lay off all striking health workers within their counties. Several 
counties went ahead to actually sack all the striking health workers; and re-advertised their 
positions. Kilifi County did put up an advertisement in the press, in late December 2013 for all 
health worker positions in the county. This action by county governments, together with 
realization that they (health care workers) could not negotiate for a return to work arrangement 
centrally, but instead had to do so with respective county governments, softened the position 
and stand of the health worker unions prompting them to call off the strike in early 2014. Many 
people at the time, queried why well-informed health workers would call for a strike over a 
course they knew they couldn’t win, considering how popular devolution was at the time 
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Figure 10: Media coverage of the 2013 health care workers strike, its effects and the raging 
public debate then 
 
7.2.8. Contestations, power battles and push for recentralization of health services. 
Following the strike and the health care workers’ push for the re-centralization of the health 
care function to national government; the debate attracted the political class pitting the CoG 
against members of National Assembly. The National Assembly Departmental Health 
Committee in mid-2014 did a rapid assessment on the process and effects of devolution in 
the health sector and published a report on its findings largely recommending that the health 
sector devolution be reversed back to national government.  
[…The Committee observed that issues relating to health care workers remain 
contentious post devolution particularly on hiring, training and capacity building of 
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health workers. The Committee also took note of the hostilities faced by Ministry of 
Health personnel seconded to counties…] Parliamentary Health Committee Report on 
Devolution in the Health Sector 2014 – pg. 7 
[…The Committee therefore recommends the reversal of devolved health functions back 
to the National government and further restarting the process in an organized and 
consultative manner as taking into consideration the three-year window as provided by 
the Constitution…]  Parliamentary Health Committee Report on Devolution in the Health 
Sector 2014 – pg. 8 
This report was largely perceived by many critics as having been non-analytical and non-
objective in its recommendations, but rather was seen as an attempt by the National Assembly 
and National government generally to wage war against the county governments by portraying 
them as having failed in their functions. 
This debate of re-centralizing the health service delivery functions in the country generated 
wide public debates with supporters and critics alike. These varied views were also raised by 
the respondents in the interviews. 
[…there is misunderstanding, when doctors say that they will not deliver services they 
don’t want their salary to be paid by counties and that’s why devolution must not happen, 
to me I real would want them to be held accountable to tell us a bit, why they are saying 
so…] KII N 005 
[…. So that is another issue that health workers are raising right now having people who 
are not trained from the medical side are the ones who are making decisions especially 
the politicians, the health workers don’t want that.. …] KII SC 007 
[…the doctors were not prepared psychologically; they only waited for rumours ati 
tunakuwa (we hear we shall be) devolved until that happened ….So national government 
there failed in the sense of buildings capacity of people, preparing them adequately for 
devolution especially sensitive sectors like health…] KII C 002 
The debate was also extensively covered by the national media at the time, and at some point 
the National Assembly committee started developing a bill to enact a law that would force the 
national government to take up the health service delivery function. Figure 11 is an illustration 
of the media coverage of this debate at the time. 
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Figure 11: Newspaper articles covering the debate on the push to reverse devolution of the 
health sector 
 
 
As the debate raged the county governments maintained a hard-stand and were keen to retain 
all the devolved functions including health service delivery as per the constitution. The national 
government, which at the time was being largely perceived as anti-devolution, was incapable 
at the time of meaningfully intervening in the healthcare worker crisis. Consequently, there 
was minimal action by stakeholders to address the ‘real issues’ of concern regarding health 
devolution, and particularly the management of health workers. Observation of this debate at 
the national level at the time noted that it was largely political, with different political 
stakeholders opting for political compromises, at the expense of dealing with the technical 
concerns that had been raised by the health workers. This served to reinforce the view that the 
push for decentralization in the country was largely political. 
7.3. Summary 
In summary, the 2010 constitution created CPSBs at county level - which are similar to the 
PSC at national level – to be overall in charge of public servant management at county level. 
Unlike the PSC which had delegated the entire HRH management function to the MoH at the 
national level prior to devolution, the CPSBs did not delegate these functions to CDoHs, 
leading to confusion and conflict over HRH management responsibilities at county level. 
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The transfer of the HRH management functions, similar to other county functions, was 
hurriedly implemented in 2013 before proper structures for taking up these functions had been 
set up at county level. This led to fears, anxiety and low morale among health care workers, 
resulting in mass resignations and strikes. 
The early days of devolution were characterised by political interference in HRH management 
and victimisation of health workers, leading to some health care workers wanting to be 
transferred to their home counties.  Given the emerging crisis in health care worker 
management, and particularly inability by counties to pay salaries, an interim arrangement was 
agreed following dialogue between counties and national MoH, for national MoH to continue 
paying staff salaries for an initial period of six months. In early 2014, county governments took 
over the payments of health worker salaries – a process that was characterised by several 
challenges including missing names in the payroll, missing allowances and salary 
discrepancies. 
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Chapter 8: Essential Medicines and Medical Supplies Management 
under Devolution  
8.0.  Introduction 
In this chapter, I present findings of how the Essential Medicines and Medical Supplies 
(EMMS) management was supposed to be carried out within the health sector under 
devolution, and how it was affected by the early days of devolution. I begin by describing the 
composition, roles and capacity of EMMS management structures, and the process of 
devolution and transfer of the EMMS management role to counties. I conclude the chapter by 
highlighting early outcomes of the devolution of EMMS management. 
8.1. Organization and process of EMMS management under devolution 
8.1.1. Composition, role and position of the Kenya Medical Supplies Agency 
Prior to the roll-out of the devolved government system in the country the Kenya Medical 
Supplies Agency (KEMSA) - established through an act of parliament as a state corporation 
under the national MoH - had the statutory mandate for procurement, warehousing and 
distribution of all medicines and medical supplies to all government health facilities within the 
country. It was constituted as a national government entity governed by a board of management 
and a Chief Executive Officer, both appointed by the national Minister for Health.  In 
partnership with KEMSA, the national MoH adopted a ‘pull’ system for EMMS management 
and supply for public health facilities. Under this system the national MoH would allocate the 
quota of its annual budget meant for EMMS to KEMSA. This allocation would then be 
subdivided and allocated to all gazetted government health facilities in the country based on a 
resource allocation criteria developed by the national MoH.  The resource allocation criteria 
factored in several issues including facility type, facility work-load and the district where the 
facility was located. Based on the facility allocation for EMMS, KEMSA would then establish 
an account for each facility known as ‘drawing rights’ to run every financial year. Health 
facilities would then make orders (‘pull’) from their drawing rights at KEMSA on a quarterly 
basis and KEMSA would service the facility orders while crediting the facility allocation.  
However, this pre-devolution pull system faced significant challenges, and health facilities 
often reported prolonged delays in servicing their quarterly orders by KEMSA, and very low 
refill rates, leading to long periods without essential supplies. 
In its analysis of the EMMS supply situation in the country at the time, the MoH FACT team 
in their policy report acknowledged that there were challenges with KEMSA, but attributed 
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these challenges largely to an inadequate EMMS allocation made to KEMSA by the MoH. The 
report also stated that data used to undertake the facility EMMS quota allocations were often 
inaccurate.  
[…Currently routine Essential Medicines and Medical Supplies are procured with 
inadequate financing (<50% of needs) on the basis of annual quantification using 
incomplete or inaccurate data, on behalf of the Ministries of Health by KEMSA…] MoH 
FACT Policy page 29 
8.1.2. Proposed arrangements and stakeholder expectations for EMMS management 
structures and processes under devolution 
In early 2013, a few weeks before the general election, the KEMSA board of management 
working with parliament lobbied and managed to obtain an amendment to the KEMSA Act to 
expand the mandate of KEMSA to conduct business with county governments once they were 
established. This is because, under the proposed devolution structure and the functions outlined 
in schedule four of the constitution (Annex 2) EMMS procurement was categorised under 
health service delivery, which was part of the broader mandate of county governments. County 
governments would thus be the ones to allocate resources for and procure drugs and other 
medical supplies for government health facilities within their areas. 
Given many years of perceived inefficiency in KEMSA, county health managers welcomed the 
proposals of devolution for allocating drugs and commodity supplies resources to counties, 
reporting that this would give counties greater bargaining power to demand for more efficient 
supply service from KEMSA. They also felt that if KEMSA is unable to meet their needs, they 
would be in control and in a position to decide to source out for alternative suppliers. 
[….I would say devolution is a good thing because we’ve consistently been complaining 
about KEMSA and now that we have this is actual money. It’s no longer drawing a virtual 
imaginary figure. This is actual money, then we expect better supply, we expect better 
supplies for our facilities in terms of quantities and also in terms of variety of the 
medicines… most of the items from KEMSA we will procure from them, then what is 
not available at KEMSA especially for the hospitals, we’ve asked them to prepare a 
separate list of items not on the KEMSA commodity list and for that we will float a 
quotation……] KII C 004 
[…Yes exactly, it will give us better Fill rates. It is a better thing…] KII SC 004 
Several institutions have a role in the EMMS management function under devolution [33-35]. 
The process begins from the health facility level, where the facility in-charge undertakes 
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EMMS stock management, undertakes quantifications and submits projected facility 
requirements to the county pharmacist. At the county level, the county pharmacist within the 
County Health Management Team (CHMT), is charged with the responsibility of providing 
technical assistance to facility managers on quantifications. The county pharmacist then 
analyses and consolidates all the orders from health facilities, prepares purchase orders and 
submits them to the county treasury. The procurement department at the county treasury is 
charged with the responsibility for the tendering process for the required commodities. This 
was also explained by county level interviewees:  
[….So the technical components will be done by the county pharmacist in terms of 
quantification … and they have just finished … they’ve refined what the needs for all 
health facilities at all levels are, what kinds of drugs that they’ll need. ] KII C 001 
[…So we’ll take the orders when they come from the facilities, they have to do, we have 
to do the LPO (Local Purchase Order) and then take to the County Procurement 
Department at county treasury. The procurement office for them to float tenders…..] KII 
C 004 
Community involvement and participation in EMMS management is supposed to occur at 
several levels. First during the priority setting, planning and budgeting process health facility 
managers are supposed to sit and consult with the health Facility Management Committees 
(FMCs) made up of community representatives. The facility in-charge is further supposed to 
consult with the FMCs during the commodity quantification and ordering process. Finally once 
the orders have been supplied, the FMCs should be involved in ascertaining that the right orders 
have been delivered before payments are made to the suppliers.  
 [……community involvement especially with the new dispensation, it is very important. 
We need to sensitize our communities even when the drugs, the commodities are supplied 
to the facilities, they should be told that we have received this consignment and in this 
quantities ……. delivery notes, they have to be signed by 3 people. The facility in-charge 
the facility committee chairperson and another person from the facility management 
committee …] KII C 004 
During the transition phase, the national MoH had proposed that the funding and supply 
management role for EMMS be retained at national level for a period of one year as counties 
prepare their structures and capacity to take up this function. This proposal was highlighted in 
the MoH FACT Policy. 
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[….due to existing programme and financing commitments together with economies of 
scale and quality assurance considerations, the status quo is maintained in terms of 
funding mechanisms and supply cycle management responsibilities but with continuing 
improvements to systems, procedures and processes and fully consultative preparation 
of all required guidelines for effective county commodity supply management and 
utilization….] MoH FACT Policy page 29 
8.2. Early implementation experiences and outcomes of devolution on 
EMMS management 
8.2.1. Rushed transfer, confusion and county level capacity for EMMS management  
As with the other devolved functions, the EMMS management function stood devolved with 
the presidential directive of June 2013.  This happened when there was still lack of clarity and 
confusion over who would be in-charge over the EMMS management roles, and whether 
EMMS funds had been allocated to county or national government:  
[….I was lucky enough to participate in the budgeting process for the county, but and 
rumour had it that commodity supply,…some people were saying that commodity 
procurement will still be done at the central government. It wasn’t clear by the time we 
were doing this year’s budget. It wasn’t clear. So lucky enough for us we had budgeted 
for commodities both pharmaceuticals and non- pharmaceuticals….] KII C 004 
There were also significant challenges for the health facility managers in undertaking the 
required quantification of needs for drugs and other commodities for their facilities.  To 
compound this capacity gap there was only one county pharmacist at the CHMT level who had 
been trained to provide the technical support to all the over one hundred health facilities with 
the commodities quantification process. 
The EMMS budgetary allocation was sent to counties following the presidential directive to 
transfer all county level functions in June 2013. However, at the time, there was a strong push 
by national MoH to try and compel counties to procure all their drugs and other commodities 
from KEMSA. This push was strongly resisted by the county governments, and the 
Commission for Constitutional Implementation (CIC) declared the push by the national MoH 
at the time as unconstitutional. The county governments argued that if KEMSA wanted them 
to procure commodities from it, then the composition of KEMSA should be reconstituted to 
include county representation in the board of management.  
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[….. they (national MoH) wanted initially through legislation, to require counties to make 
KEMSA be the first point of call for buying commodities, but that was very unpopular 
and you know CIC also said that was unconstitutional because procurement since you 
know it is service delivery function so it’s a role of counties, ….] KII N 001 
[…..  KEMSA sets itself up as the national government agency but the national 
government agency takes resources that belong to counties. So we advised as CIC; as 
currently constituted KEMSA is unconstitutional. So KEMSA either needs to be changed 
into an inter -governmental parastatal or it can be used as national then it can only procure 
for Kenyatta and Moi (national Hospitals) but if it should procure for the counties there 
must be an intergovernmental agreement whereas the counties agree to delegate their 
right to procure to the national government agency ….] KII N 005 
As this debate went on, there was a reported widespread drug shortage in public health facilities 
across the country. In its routine field visits to assess the progress and county preparedness to 
undertake the devolved health functions, the National Assembly Health Committee at the time 
noted and raised concerns over the problem of drug shortages in counties across the country. 
Noteworthy at the time the committee visited Kilifi County, the Interim County Director for 
Health in Kilifi was also cited to have acknowledged that Kilfi County was facing significant 
drug shortages, and she requested the national government to intervene on this problem. This 
illustrated lack of clarity even amongst senior level county managers over who between 
national and county government had responsibility for EMMS management. Figure 12 below 
is a newspaper article highlighting the problem of drug shortage in health facilities in the 
country, and quoting the Kilifi County Director for Health requesting the national government 
to intervene. 
Figure 12: Newspaper article highlighting the problem of drug shortage in the country 
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8.2.2. Dialogue, consensus building and interim arrangements for EMMS management 
As the debate on EMMS procurement roles, process and composition of KEMSA raged on, 
a health sector Intergovernmental Relations Forum was convened to facilitate dialogue and 
consensus around these issues and to develop an interim action plan to address the drug 
shortage crisis that was being experienced in government health facilities across the country. 
During this dialogue process, the national MoH with support from health sector 
development partners, particularly the World Bank country office, provided funds to 
procure a six months EMMS buffer stock for all government health facilities countrywide. 
This was done to allow the county government to set up their structures and systems to take 
up this procurement role. 
[…. they (county facilities) actually got some free supplies from KEMSA worth of like 
6 months’ supply. These were provided by national government through the partners, 
World Bank etc, yes, because KEMSA also still had some of money for, old stock still 
pending and yet the issue of getting the supplies through the drawing rights had elapsed  
….….] KII N 002 
[….Yes that actually it did happened. They called it a one-off supply so and actually from 
the circular that came from the ministry it was that, that stock was supposed to last 
facilities up to December to this (2013) December which is into the second quarter …….] 
KII C 004 
In the meantime an agreement was reached following negotiation at the health sector 
intergovernmental relations forum, and counties agreed to procure their commodities from 
KEMSA to gain economies of scale and commodity quality assurance. The counties and 
KEMSA agreed on a ‘service agreement’ where KEMSA would service the orders from 
counties within two weeks of receiving them, and counties would pay for these commodities 
upon delivery by KEMSA: 
[…The commodities (agreement) is almost by and large done because they (county 
governments) somehow unanimously agreed because of economies of scale they will be 
procuring from KEMSA and they had a meeting to agree on the service agreement and 
all that…..] KII N 004 
8.2.3. Early outcomes of EMMS procurement and distribution process at county level 
The County Department of Health (CDoH) in Kilifi embarked on undertaking quantifications 
and ordering process for EMMS as from end of 2013 amidst several challenges. Some of the 
challenges faced at the time included the lack of appropriate technical and infrastructural 
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capacity at facility and county level to undertake the actual needs quantifications for the 
commodities, the lack of a Chief Officer in the CDoH who is the accounting officer in the 
department which meant that all facility level orders had to be taken to treasury for processing, 
and lack of clarity by health facilities on what form of supporting documents would be needed 
when making the orders. Because of these challenges, some of the managers at sub-county 
level felt that the process had become overly bureaucratic and this significantly delayed the 
ordering process. 
[…And capacity in terms of technology, the IT, I’m currently using, my personal 
computer to do this quantification work for all the facilities….] KII C 004 
[….a lot of bureaucracy like for example now I have gone to the county office more than 
six times they keep on telling me go and attach this other one I come back to Malindi go 
and attach this other one I come back to Malindi…..] KII SC 005 
By December 2013, the county had made its first commodity orders to KEMSA for all the 
hospitals. However, given technical capacity challenges at the CHMT level to support the lower 
level facilities in placing their commodity orders in time, the supplies to health centres and 
dispensaries were delayed for several months. This meant that these facilities continued to 
operate for several months without any drug supplies after exhausting the buffer stock supplied 
by national MoH. This led to growing concerns and complaints by members of the public over 
the lack of drugs in the lower level public health facilities. 
Eventually, the first tranche of hospital supplies procured by the county were delivered in 
February 2014. Hospital managers were much happier with the level of order servicing from 
KEMSA and they reported a higher order-fill rate on the supplies compared to the previous 
orders serviced by KEMSA in the old ‘pull’ system. 
[…They (KEMSA) have now supplied so generally we are not badly off as a hospital. 
the refill rate almost to 95%. We did the quantifications that this is what we want and 
then we raised an LPO and actually they supplied most of the things we needed…, at the 
moment to me the challenges might be our speed of doing that work. But the structure 
itself can survive or can work for us….] KII SC 003 
Though the supplies to lower level facilities were delayed, when they eventually arrived there 
too was a feeling by facility managers that the order servicing by KEMSA was better. In 
addition, the county government was able to procure drugs for all government health facilities 
that were operational within the county irrespective of their legal registration status. This was 
different from the old pull system where only facilities which had been legally gazetted were 
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allocated drawing rights for commodities by KEMSA. Considering that the gazettement of 
health facilities used to be undertaken by national MoH, which would take up to several years 
from the time a facility is operational, many times health facilities used to exist without drawing 
rights allocations for drugs and other commodities. With the decision and choice on which 
facilities to include in the commodities allocation now happening at the counties, the process 
managed to address this long-standing bureaucratic problem. 
The observed community involvement and participation in the whole process of EMMS 
management at the time was poor owing to poor capacity of most FMCs and facility managers 
over this highly technical process of commodity management. 
 […So something that needs to be done as the health sector, we’ve always enclosed 
ourselves and worked within ourselves but we need to strengthen that community 
involvement from the facility management committee …] KII C 004 
8.2.4. Politicization of EMMS management choices and processes in the counties 
As the counties took up the EMMS management function, there was a visible attempt by 
several counties countrywide to achieve political visibility over this role. First several counties 
in their initial days opted to procure ambulances which were perceived to be politically more 
visible in the eyes of the public and voters; at the expense of procuring essential drugs for their 
health facilities. One county for example was reported to have bought 70 ambulances (one for 
each of its electoral wards) at the time. This ambulance procurement craze by many counties 
was extensively covered by the national media at the time (Figure 13). 
Subsequently, when the counties begun to procure drugs, from the general observations at the 
time, it became increasingly fashionable for governors in respective county governments to 
organize public rallies every time the KEMSA trucks carrying drugs for health facilities 
arrived, with a claim of officially ‘flagging off’ the drug supply. This subsequently turned what 
used to be a routine exercise of drug distribution to health facilities into a major political fun-
fair in the counties under devolution (Figure 14) 
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Figure 13: Media coverage of counties procuring ambulances at the time 
 
 
Figure 14: Media coverage of governors ‘flagging off’ drug distributions 
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Similarly, in Kilifi County, when drug supplies for primary facilities eventually arrived in the 
county, the county government hurriedly organized a public rally for the governor to flag-off 
the commodity distribution. At the same time the county also procured several ambulances to 
be based in every electoral constituency in the county. Figure 15 below are images from the 
governor’s drug flagging off event.  
Figure 15: Images of the Kilifi County governor flagging off drug distribution; and the Kilifi 
county ambulances 
 
 
8.3. Summary 
In summary, prior to devolution, KEMSA was responsible for procurement, warehousing and 
distribution of EMMS to all government health facilities. The 2010 constitution classified all 
EMMS managed functions (including those initially carried out by KEMSA) to be county level 
functions. Counties thus has the choice regarding what commodities to procure and where 
from. However, with the rapid transfer of the EMMS management function before appropriate 
capacity to undertake it had been built in counties, county governments were faced with a 
significant challenge in procuring EMMS resulting in health facilities suffering prolonged 
periods of time without these supplies. 
By the time counties were in a position to procure EMMS, most focused on visible equipment 
like new ambulances. When drugs were procured, it became common for governors to be seen 
flagging off drug distribution to health facilities, illustrating the politicisation of what was a 
routine exercise. Nevertheless, sub-county managers reported a better order refill rate for 
115 
 
commodities procured by the county governments compared to the former pull system by 
KEMSA. In addition, county governments were able to procure and distribute drugs to all 
operational facilities irrespective of their gazettement status. This was an improvement from 
the old KEMSA system which required only gazetted health facilities to draw commodities 
from KEMSA. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion  
9.0.  Introduction 
In this chapter, I present a general discussion and interpretation of the study findings. Using 
the thematic elements of my conceptual framework, and drawing from several theoretical 
frameworks, I demonstrate how the study findings relate to the elements of the conceptual 
framework and to the broader literature on health system decentralisation. I have organised this 
chapter in several sections. I begin by highlighting the study strengths and limitations; then 
progress to present an overview summary of the findings, followed by a discussion on how the 
broader political context in the country before, during and after the drafting of the 2010 
constitution affected the implementation process of devolution in the health sector. I then 
discuss how decision space, organisational structure and capacity, and accountability - on paper 
and in practice - interacted with each other to influence the implementation and outcome of 
devolution within the health sector. I conclude the chapter by discussing how the concept of 
power - that emerged as an important theme all through the findings - stood out in influencing 
the implementation and outcome of devolution within the health sector. 
9.1. Study strengths and limitations 
As highlighted earlier (chapter 4) I had multiple positions prior to and during the 
implementation of this study. Prior to conducting this study, I had a long history of ‘insider’ 
roles and involvement with the MoH both in Kilifi and at the national level. During the process 
of conducting this study, I was also co-opted into the MoH FACT team at national level that 
was charged with the responsibility of assigning and coordinating the transfer of functions to 
CDoH. In Kilifi, I continued to provide technical support to the CDoH in developing the 
County Health Sector Strategic Plan, and the CDoH AWPs in subsequent years. This very 
strong ‘insider’ role potentially shaped people’s responses to me during data collection, and 
informed my interpretation of the data. However as explained in chapter four, I employed 
several strategies to understand and minimise potential bias, including the use of triangulation 
from multiple data sources, and regular self and group reflections with colleagues in the 
RESYST Learning Site [107, 116]. 
The embedded nature of this study, owing to my ‘insider’ position both at the national MoH 
and Kilifi County levels, and the nesting of the study within the Kenyan Learning site, 
facilitated access to individuals and in-depth learning, and enhanced the opportunity for the 
study findings to be regularly shared with relevant decision makers. This strengthened the 
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immediate policy relevance of the study, as the findings could be used to enhance the 
implementation of health sector devolution in Kenya in real time and in appropriate ways, 
contributing to meeting specific objective 3 (see section 9.8). 
However, this study was not without limitations. First the timing of the data collection, during 
the early days of devolution implementation, meant that a lot of the effects were still unfolding. 
The findings therefore only relate to the early health system effects of devolution in Kenya, 
and not how devolution generally affected the health sector over time. For example, a major 
finding of the study was the transfer of health sector functions to county level before 
establishment of county level structures. By the second and third year of the existence of the 
county governments however, some of the essential county level structures had been 
established. Nevertheless, the study findings are still important and useful because 
understanding the effects on and functioning of the health system during such radical change 
will have important lessons for other health systems planning devolution or other large scale 
changes. Moreover, the changes observed during these early days of devolution point to 
important issues that may persist in to the medium term and require further attention e.g. 
whether there will be recentralisation of financial control, or what the consequences will be for 
the nursing and medical professions in terms of recruitment, retention and job progression. 
Finally, it would be naïve to consider that health systems are ever static – in fact they are usually 
undergoing some form of change, albeit rarely as radical as this. This means that as researchers 
we have to grapple with the issue of studying systems that are constantly changing [74].  
Secondly there was lack of pre and post-devolution quantitative data for comparing and 
triangulating the observed and perceived effects of devolution in the health sector. Quantitative 
data on e.g. health services utilisation, commodity stock-outs and health worker retention, both 
before and after the implementation of devolution would have been useful to quantitatively 
assess the effects of devolution on the health sector. However, the health system did not 
maintain reliable quality data on these aspects prior to devolution; and this study being 
conducted in the first year of implementation of devolution, meant that the less than one-year 
post devolution time span was not sufficient to have collected meaningful quantitative data on 
these indicators, which could be linked to the devolution process. 
The focus on only one county could be considered a third limitation of the study. However, the 
decision to use one county was deliberate, as it allowed for a deeper exploration of the issues 
under focus within the study, by involving a broad range of stakeholders. Kilifi County is also 
part of the health systems governance learning sites for the RESYST consortium, within which 
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this study was nested. This will allow for a longer term tracking of the decentralization effects 
in this sites beyond the time period of this study 
9.2.  Summary of key findings 
In August 2010, the country through a popular public referendum voted to adopt a devolved 
government structure with semi-autonomous elected county governments directly accountable 
to the electorate. The coalition government at the time was to embark on a two-year preparation 
for devolution by establishing the required county level structures. The government was also 
to establish and build capacity of different institutions that would be necessary for the 
establishment of county governments, and a smooth transfer of county level functions from the 
national government. However, the coalition government was going through a period of 
political wrangles and squabbles over several issues around the constitutional implementation. 
These wrangles caused a significant delay in the setting up of structures necessary for 
facilitating devolution. This meant that by March 2013 when the county governments were 
elected into office, most county structures and national level institutions required to facilitate 
the induction of the county governments and smooth transfer of functions were not in place. 
The election results of March 2013 saw the Jubilee coalition (which during the campaign 
period had been portrayed as anti-devolution) win the presidency and the majority of seats in 
both houses of parliament. The Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) coalition on the 
other hand which had branded and marketed itself as pro-devolution won the majority of the 
governors seats across the country. Given this situation, when the governors came into office, 
they demanded that the national government hand over immediately all functions designated 
for the county governments. With the increasing political pressure from the governors, the 
president in June 2013 directed that all county functions be transferred immediately to county 
governments and budgets there-in allocated to them. 
This presidential directive happened at a time when most county governments had not set up 
their structures.  They were thus unable to adequately handle these functions, leading to major 
disruption in most government functions and services, and particularly health services. In the 
health sector at the county level, this rapid transfer of functions caused major challenges in 
overall health sector planning, budgeting and financial management, the management of HRH, 
and the management of EMMS. 
On overall planning and budgeting, the national government allocated the county governments 
their non-conditional allocations from the equitable share of revenue and the equalisation fund. 
In Kilifi County, the lack of definitive structures and non-clarity of roles within the County 
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Department of Health (CDoH) meant that the department was unable to participate fully in the 
planning and budgeting process in the 2013/14 fiscal year. This forced the county treasury in 
Kilifi to conclude the budget process by allocating the CDoH an amount based on historical 
records of allocation and expenditure. The early days also experienced other problems 
including perverse re-centralisation of financial management roles from the sub-county and 
health-facility levels to the county level, and hospitals being unable to utilise the user fees 
which they were collecting due to the lack of an appropriate legal framework to enable this.  
There were also persistent disagreements and contestations between the county government 
and the national government over mechanisms for channelling health sector related conditional 
grants.  
On HRH management, the rapid transfer of functions before counties had established their 
HRH management structures meant that they could not undertake key HRH management roles, 
notably payment of salaries. An interim agreement was arrived at where national MoH 
continued to pay staff salaries up to December 2013, and invoiced county governments for 
reimbursements. When the counties eventually took up this role, payment of staff salaries was 
often delayed, with numerous pay-roll inconsistencies and discrepancies; some staff were 
totally missing from the payroll. There were also some reported cases of political interference 
in HRH management across the country. Overall, the health sector faced significant lack of 
clarity over key HRH management roles including management of inter-county transfers, in-
service training and career progression for health care workers. All these challenges led to 
observed and reported mass resignations of health care workers across the country, and a health 
workers’ long protracted strike that crippled the health sector country-wide in late 2013. 
Similarly, the EMMS management function was affected by the rapid transfer of functions 
from national to county governments. In the early days after devolution, there were arguments 
and contestations between national MoH and CDoH country-wide on the role and composition 
of KEMSA. In the interim phase, national MoH supplied six months’ worth of buffer stock of 
drugs for all public health care facilities countrywide. When the county governments eventually 
took up this role, there was widespread politicisation of the drug and commodities procurement 
and distribution within the health sector. Nevertheless, health facilities reported better fill rates 
whenever drugs were supplied. 
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9.3. The broader Kenyan context and its implications for the design and 
implementation of devolution  
Walt and Gilson (1994) argued that the understanding of context is an essential element in 
policy analysis [15].  Within the context of decentralisation, this argument has been further 
advanced by several authors who have stressed that the implementation and outcome of a 
decentralised system in any setting is highly context specific [4, 8, 11]. Omar (2002) argued 
that the ‘political drivers’ and political context that push a country to adopting a decentralised 
governance arrangement have a major bearing on how decentralisation gets implemented in a 
given setting [4]. Omar’s (2002) assertion is particularly plausible because decentralisation 
involves the shifting of power and control from the centre to the periphery, making it a highly 
political process in its own right [10].   
With regards to the design and content of the decentralisation model as presented in the 
constitution of Kenya 2010, the decentralisation journey in the country has been a long and 
tortuous one. This journey saw the country adopt a federal system of government at 
independence, revert to a unitary government system two years later in 1965, introduce local 
authorities in 1977, strengthen the district system in early 1980s, and then finally adopt a 
devolved government system in a public referendum which introduced county governments 
from early 2013 [33, 79, 80, 86, 87, 96, 122]. All through this journey, the strongest push for 
decentralisation in the country has been an internal ‘bottom-up’ pressure from the general 
population particularly from certain regions of the country that have been clamouring for 
equity, fairness and inclusion in the distribution of national resources and management of 
public affairs [86, 96, 131]. The adoption of a strong devolution model, with significant county 
level autonomy and discretion in decision making for resource allocation can thus be 
understood from the background of the need and push for an equitable regional balance in the 
allocation and use of public resources. In their analysis of Kenya’s devolution, D'Acry and 
Cornell (2015) argue that the government’s historical marginalisation of certain communities 
and regions in the allocation of public resources, coupled with a high level corruption culture 
in government, gave rise to a push for an ‘everyone’s turn to eat’ model of government within 
the 2010 constitution [86]. 
With regards to the understanding of context for the implementation of the devolved 
government system, Odhiambo (2013) argued that for one to understand the ongoing political 
unfolding around the implementation of devolution in Kenya, one ought to understand the 
country’s political history [132]. The political history and context of Kenya is comprehensively 
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covered in chapter 3 of this thesis; and important elements of this history which underlie the 
overall goals of devolution are covered in chapter 5. In summary, key features of this historical 
background include the political heritage of the main political parties and key political actors 
in the country over time, the perceived injustices and inequalities across different tribal and 
geographical populations, and the experience of political violence especially after the 2007 
general election. 
Leichter’s (1994) framework [69], can be used here to provide a better understanding of the 
political context in Kenya within which the devolution was designed and implemented. 
Structurally, Kenya has had different forms of decentralised government systems since 
independence ranging from a federal system, to local authorities and deconcentrated districts 
units [33, 82, 87, 132]. However these decentralisation efforts did not serve to address the needs 
for inclusivity in public resource sharing, and peoples’ participation in public governance, 
hence the continued push and subsequent adoption of devolved governments with a significant 
level of local autonomy in 2010 [86, 96]. The continued perceived authoritarian and 
discriminatory KANU regime, the promise for a new constitution by NARC in 2002, and the 
divisive election and subsequent violence of 2007 all created political situational factors that 
served to fuel the sustained push and demand for a devolved system of government and its 
subsequent adoption in the 2010 constitution [86, 92, 123, 133]. Culturally, the country has had 
deep rooted tribal inclined political ideologies [83]. This tribal political inclination for example 
saw the populous Kikuyu community partner with an equally populous Kalenjin community to 
form the Jubilee coalition which went on to win the presidential election in 2013 [88, 134]. The 
country has also been characterised by corrupt practices of the government system over the 
years [86]. The tribal political culture and corrupt government practices, though seen as 
negative traits, indeed did serve to sustain the demand and push for a devolved government 
system [86]. Finally on Leichter’s environmental factors; the continued external pressure on 
the Government of Kenya (GoK) particularly from external development partners to adopt 
better forms and practices of governance; coupled with the Pan-African mediated peace and 
reconciliation talks to end the post-election violence of 2007/08 also served to add onto the 
push and subsequent adoption of devolved government system in Kenya [86, 133]. In 
summary, Kenya’s political history serves to explain why and how the country resolved to 
adopt a devolved government system in 2010 and also partly provides an understanding of how 
and why the early implementation processes of the devolved government system happened. 
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As regards to the role of key actors in influencing the design and early implementation process; 
there are key individuals, groups of individuals and institutions who have shaped the 
decentralisation debate in Kenya over time. The Kenyatta family for example represented in 
the country’s political memoirs by Jommo Kenyatta and Uhuru Kenyatta; and which has been 
in power for many years, has been seen and perceived to have a capitalistic ideology which 
served to entrench government marginalisation of other communities and regions, and hence 
was seen to be anti-devolution. Meanwhile the Odinga family, represented by Jaramogi 
Odinga and Raila Odinga have historically been perceived to be socialistic and pro-devolution 
[83, 86, 132]. During the 2013 election campaign the CORD coalition, led by Raila Odinga, 
which styled itself as pro-devolution, branded the Jubilee Coalition as anti-devolution simply 
because Uhuru Kenyatta who was the leader of the Jubilee was a son of Jommo Kenyatta who 
was seen to have engineered the many years of KANU led marginalisation [86, 88, 134]. CORD 
also argued that William Ruto, who was Uhuru’s presidential running mate on the Jubilee 
ticket, had opposed the constitution in 2010 and was thus an enemy of devolution [86]. This 
meant that even though they won the presidential election together with an outright majority in 
both the National Assembly and Senate; the Jubilee coalition suffered a legitimacy image 
problem as far as its commitment to implement devolution was concerned [86, 134]. This 
legitimacy challenge of the Jubilee leadership partly explains why, when the county governors 
(the majority of whom were from CORD) demanded for the immediate transfer of county 
functions just after the election, the president was quick to agree even before county structures 
were established; he feared his government would be branded anti-devolution, and was keen 
to regain legitimacy [86]. The Transition Authority (TA) was a key institution to the smooth 
implementation of devolution [125]. However, because of the mistrust between political actors, 
the TA was constituted late, and was thus unable to adequately carry out its mandate of 
establishing and building capacity for county government structures. 
With regards to the implementation process of the devolved government system, the complex 
interplay of key political actors and institutions in a context of political mistrust and power 
struggles led to a fast-tracked transfer of county level functions, way before all the necessary 
county government structures had been established [86]. This fast-tracked transfer to a great 
extent explains the early outcomes and effects of devolution, particularly within the health 
sector. 
In conclusion, it is quite evident that the broader political context of Kenya, largely affected 
and influenced the design and implementation of devolution in the country generally and within 
123 
 
the health sector specifically. This finding largely agrees with Omar’s (2002) assertion that 
decentralisation is always a political rather than a technical managerial process and its design, 
implementation, and outcomes should always be understood in that context [4]. 
9.4. Government organisational structure and capacity under devolution 
An understanding of the structure and organisation of the government system is critical in the 
analysis and understanding of the decentralised system [11, 30]. Applying the public 
administration framework as described by Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) to examine the 
government structure in Kenya, we see that prior to the enactment of the 2010 constitution, the 
country had a unitary government system with deconcentrated units [9, 80, 87]. These units at 
provincial and district level were composed of government bureaucrats, in-charge of respective 
sectors and appointed by the national government in Nairobi. They mainly served to manage 
and coordinate the implementation of government services within their jurisdiction [82]. 
The country’s 2010 constitution introduced a devolved government system with national and 
county level governments both directly elected by the people [33, 86]. The national government 
comprises of three arms. An executive arm is headed by an elected president and deputy 
president, with an appointed cabinet. A legislative arm comprises the Senate and the National 
Assembly, both of which include members elected directly by the people, or nominated by 
political parties to represent special interest groups based on party strengths. The third arm is 
the judiciary headed by the chief justice, which comprises the supreme-court, the high court of 
appeal and all other lower level courts [33].  
The county government is made up of two arms. First is the executive headed by an elected 
governor, his deputy, and a ten-member County Executive Committee (CEC). The other arm 
is the legislature which comprises of Members of County Assemblies (MCAs) either elected 
directly by the people from each electoral ward, or nominated by political parties to represent 
special interest groups [33, 34]. Each CEC member is in-charge of a county department. One 
such county department is the County Department of Health (CDoH) which is responsible for 
undertaking all the county level health sector functions [34]. 
Pratt and Zechauser (1991) described the principal agent framework (discussed in chapter 2) 
which they subsequently used to assess choices made by private sector managers [29]. This 
framework has been used for studies of decentralisation aimed at assessing the range of 
decisions that a principal (central entity) transfers to an agent (peripheral entity) [3, 27]. Bossert 
(1998) subsequently adapted this framework to develop the decision space theory, which 
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further seeks to assess and understand the choices made by managers in decentralised health 
systems within their mandate as outlined in legal and regulatory frameworks.   
In applying the principal agent framework to understand the organisation and functioning of 
the evolving health system structure in Kenya, one can see that under the old system there 
existed one ‘principal’, the national Ministry of Health (MoH). The ‘agents’ were the PHMTs 
at provincial level or DHMTs at district level. The ‘principal’ (national MoH) appointed and 
assigned roles to the ‘agents’ (PHMTs and DHMTs) and held them accountable for these roles. 
The DHMTs were largely responsible for the day-to-day management and coordination of 
health service delivery within the district [99, 101].  Under the devolved government system, 
however, the CDoH (the ‘agent’ responsible for the actual management of health service 
delivery at county level) now has multiple ‘principals’: 1) the national government MoH, to 
which it is accountable for ensuring adherence to national health policies and overall strategic 
objectives;  2) the county government executive and county assembly to which it is accountable 
for the use of resources and local county level policies and priorities including political interests 
and; 3) communities for ensuring availability of essential health services [9, 34, 38].   
In his analysis of frameworks for studying health system decentralisation in developing 
countries, Bossert (1998) argued that health system decentralisation of the devolved type, 
where there are multiple principals, can lead to conflicts.  Local health system managers often 
find themselves having to balance the interests of the local level principals with those at the 
national level; the two of which are often in conflict [11]. The findings of this study largely 
agree with this assertion. From the study findings, in preparation for the transfer of health 
delivery functions to counties, the national MoH through the Functional Assignment and 
Transfer (FACT) policy gave a recommendation of a generic structure for CDoHs, and also 
recommended and outlined a three year plan for phased transfer of the health delivery 
coordination functions [38]. Most counties though due to local county political interests largely 
ignored the recommended CDoH organisation structure. Secondly, the county executives 
through the Council of Governors (CoG) demanded for the immediate transfer of all county 
level functions including the health functions; thus making the CDoHs take up functions for 
priority setting planning and budgeting, HRH and EMMS management functions, even when 
they were not adequately prepared to do so. On health sector resource allocation for example, 
the national government (represented by national MoH) disagreed with county governments 
on the mechanisms for channelling HSSF funds to primary health facilities thus significantly 
delaying the release of these funds and affecting the operations of the CDoH. On HRH 
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management, we see that some counties rejected doctors posted to them by the national MoH. 
Similarly, on EMMS management, we see that county governments resisted initial attempts by 
national MoH to have all their EMMS supplies procured from KEMSA. 
Several authors have argued that the ability of decentralised health units to deliver on their 
assigned roles - and hence harness the benefits of decentralisation even in the face of multiple 
principles - largely relies on their organisational capacity [1, 8, 11, 30].  
I used the UNDP capacity assessment criteria to assess the early outcome of devolution of 
health service delivery functions, in Kilifi County.   On capacity level one (system level), the 
CDoH had the legal mandate to undertake the health service delivery at county level [33, 34]. 
From a technical policy perspective, the Kenya Health Policy (KHP) 2012-30 and the Kenya 
Health Sector Strategic Plan (KHSSP) 2012-2017 provided the broader technical policy 
guidelines for undertaking the health service delivery roles. These included guidelines for 
organisation of CDoH coordinating structures, planning and budgeting guidelines for the 
county health services and the organisation of county health service delivery levels of care 
including care referral guidelines [37]. I also found that other county level institutions and 
organs like the County Public Services Board (CPSB), and the County Treasury and County 
Assembly, that were meant to facilitate the CDoH planning process, lacked the capacity to do 
so. 
On the UNDP capacity level two (institutional level), we find that during the 2013/14 fiscal 
year planning and budgeting process, the CDoH did not have a clearly defined mission and 
strategy. It also lacked a clearly defined organisational structure and clear mandates for the 
different interim structures within it. There was also lack of clarity between the roles of county 
treasury vis a vis the CDoH in the planning and budgeting process. This was largely occasioned 
by the delay in the appointment of senior statutory department managers and by the CDoH not 
having developed its five year strategic plan by the start of the planning cycle. This partly 
explains the lack of involvement and participation by the CDoH in the budgeting process 
during that financial year. 
On capacity level three (individual level), the results reveal a significant lack of capacity for 
planning and budgeting roles of most individuals within the County Health Management Team 
(CHMT). This was because the interim CHMT members were largely appointed from the 
former PHMT and DHMT structures which did not have a strategic planning and budgeting 
role for most key functions including HRH and EMMS management. There was also lack of 
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clear job descriptions for the CHMT members and no formal induction for their new roles at 
the county level.  
Other county level structures that were meant to facilitate and complement the CDoH were 
also weak in capacity level 3. The CPSB for example had just been appointed and lacked the 
staffing and other infrastructure needed to undertake the human resource management function 
at the county level.  The County Treasury was understaffed and as a result we see a significant 
delay in financial management processes and procedures, including procurement process at the 
county treasury, affecting the operations of the CDoH. The MCAs lacked the basic education 
and knowledge required to comprehend and understand their oversight and provide a 
community voice role in the planning and budgeting process, thus they were stuck with the 
plans and budget proposals sent to them for approval by the executive, without knowing how 
to proceed with them. As a result the county executive resorted to giving incentives to the 
MCAs such as calling them for meetings and paying them allowances so as to induce them to 
approve the executive’s proposals on budgets and financial plans without questions. 
A complementary framework to examine organisational capacity was proposed by Aragon 
(2010) [71]. This framework has recently been used by Elloker et al (2013), and is gaining 
popularity by health policy analysts in assessing sub-national level health management units, 
especially in developing country contexts [72, 73, 108].  
In applying the Aragon framework as an additional lens to consider the capacity of the Kilifi 
CDoH, we find that the department had good hardware elements including physical 
infrastructure for delivering health services and a good financial resource allocation in 2013/14. 
However, during that year, the department’s tangible software elements were significantly 
lacking. There was no clear organisational structure with clear mandates and roles, and only a 
few interim CHMT members had the knowledge and skills required for the strategic planning 
and budgeting roles in the CDoH. In addition, by the time of the 2013/14 fiscal year resource 
bidding process at the county level, the CDoH did not have a sector strategic plan and an 
Annual Work Plan (AWP), both of which are essential tangible software elements required to 
influence and facilitate the resource allocation at county level [72]. 
In terms of intangible software, we find that the CDoH lacked the necessary power, appropriate 
relationships and communication capacity to influence the process of transfer of health service 
delivery functions to the county level. This resulted in the political players especially at the 
county level pushing for and demanding the transfer of the functions to the CDoH even before 
it had the proper structures and capacity to take up these functions. Within the CDoH however, 
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we find that amidst the chaotic transition to county government process, the sub-county level 
managers played a crucial role in providing reassurance and hope for the facility level 
managers, even during a time of disruption in flow of resources to health facilities [73]. This 
role played by the sub-county managers is as a result of their well-established intangible 
software elements such as communication skills, the type and quality of relationships that they 
had established over time with frontline facility managers; and their routine work norms 
including facilitative supervision visits and regular review/feedback meetings with facility in-
charges which supported resilience among facility in-charges. This supported the continued 
opening of facilities even during the most chaotic times of transition, and illustrated health 
system capacity and resilience to cope with externally exerted stress as has been observed in 
other settings [72].  
In conclusion, these findings support Omar’s (2002) assertion that health system 
decentralisation always brings additional responsibilities including of planning and resource 
allocation to local decision makers, yet their capacity for undertaking these responsibilities is 
often lacking, and often ignored during the design of decentralised systems [1, 3, 4].  
9.5.  Decision space over resource management under devolution 
Over the years, some have argued that decentralisation enhances public sector management 
efficiency through ensuring decisions about resources are made closer to where the needs are, 
which in turn addresses the challenges of centralised health sector resource allocation and 
planning [8, 9, 11, 20]. This argument views ideal health system decentralisation as one that 
provides more decision autonomy to the peripheral units over health sector resource allocation 
[11, 30]. However, other commentators have argued that the health delivery function is highly 
technical and that excessive transfer of autonomy to peripheral units can easily reverse gains, 
or digress from national health priority goals [1, 3, 28]. 
The principles of the original principal-agent framework and Bossert’s decision space 
framework (discussed in chapter two and mentioned earlier in sections 9.4 of this chapter) can 
be applied to help understand the mandates and choices made by different players in Kenya 
over health sector resource allocation, planning and budgeting in the 2013/14 fiscal year. In 
summary and as discussed in chapter 6, in relation to general resource generation and 
allocation, the national government has the responsibility to generate national revenue and 
allocate some of it to county governments [33, 35, 124]. The national government allocation to 
counties is in the form of the non-conditional (block-grants) allocation from the equitable share, 
and the equalisation fund share for marginalised counties. Additionally, there can be 
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conditional grants for certain nationally identified priority sector projects including health, 
whose execution mandate is that of the national government. The conditional grants can only 
be allocated over and above the non-conditional allocation [33, 124]. From the findings of this 
study, we see that in the 2013/14 fiscal year the national government, in addition to the block 
grant to counties, allocated additional funds for financing health services at county level 
targeting the implementation of the presidential directive on free primary health and maternity 
services in all public health facilities.   
At the county level, the county government has the mandate of levying certain county level 
taxes which together with the county allocation from national government is managed as the 
total county revenue [34, 35]. During the county planning and budgeting process, the different 
county departments, including the CDoH are supposed to use their annual priorities as indicated 
in their Annual Work Plans (AWPs) to compete for this county revenue in a bidding process 
that is coordinated by the county treasury [35]. From the findings of this study we see that 
during the 2013/14 fiscal year the CDoH did not participate in the resource bidding process at 
the county level. This forced the county treasury to allocate the CDoH resources based on 
historical allocation and expenditure records. The reasons for the CDoH non-participation in 
the resource bidding process were due to lack of significant tangible software capacity elements 
including lack of a clear organisational structure, and key offices required within the structures 
required to facilitate the department’s budgeting process, and lack of a strategic plan and AWP 
to guide the annual sector priorities. This lack of appropriate capacity reduced the CDoH’s 
ability to influence the amount of resources allocated to the health sector, thus reducing its 
decision space over resource allocation [11]. These findings are consistent with an argument 
advanced by Bossert and Mitchell (2011), who from their findings in a study to examine 
peripheral level decision space over resource allocation in Pakistan, found that the 
organisational structure and capacity of decentralised health units always affected the decision 
space of these units [30]. 
Within the CDoH, the CEC member for health and the Chief Officer for the department 
working with the CHMT have the mandate of identifying annual sector and departmental 
priorities during the development process of the AWP. It is envisaged that the budgetary 
allocation to the department would be further distributed along budgetary line items in 
accordance with these priorities. It is during the development of the AWP that the CDoH 
determines the amounts to be allocated along the expenditure line items including allocations 
for HRH, EMMS and for other development and recurrent costs within the department [23, 
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35]. In line with the spirit of decentralisation within the 2010 constitution, county departments 
are mandated to further decentralise decision making particularly of planning, budgeting, and 
co-ordination and including financial management related to day-to-day service delivery to 
sub-county management entities [34].  
From the study findings (chapter 6), first the lack of participation of the CDoH in the resource 
bidding process for the 2013/14 fiscal not only reduced the ability of the CDoH to influence 
the total amount of resources allocated to the department, but also the allocation along line 
items.  This reduced the CDoH decision space over the resources allocated to them. Even after 
the budget had been allocated, the CDoH was unable to immediately take up certain 
decentralised mandates like payment of health worker salaries and procurement of EMMS 
(chapters 7 and 8). This forced the national MoH, through the health sector inter-governmental 
relations forum, to put in place interim arrangements for managing both health workers’ 
salaries and procurement of EMMS. Furthermore, the lack of appropriate structure within the 
CDoH meant that the department could not further decentralise its coordination and operational 
management roles to sub-county units including the hospital and sub-county management 
units. Subsequently all the hospital and sub-county management teams had to send in all of 
their requests for any purchases and expenditures to the Chief Officer at the county 
headquarters, causing a significant delay in implementation of planned activities. This 
happened even though before the implementation of county governments, district and hospital 
management units had a delegated accounting mandate and managed their local budgets for 
operational recurrent expenditures. 
However, as described in chapter 8, the findings of this study present some early positive 
effects of increased county level decision space over EMMS management functions. The 
findings report the observed ability of county government to procure supplies for all operating 
facilities irrespective of their gazettement status, hence increasing access to health services. 
There were also reports of better fill rates for supplies by facility level and sub-county 
managers. 
These observations highlight the necessity for proper and appropriate structures and capacity 
at peripheral level in decentralised health systems, if they are to succeed in taking up the 
functions mandated to them (as discussed in section 9.4). These findings are consistent with 
the arguments advanced by Bossert and Mitchell (2011), and Omar (2002), who stressed the 
need for appropriate capacity of decentralised health units, if the increased decision space for 
health system decentralisation is to be meaningful [4, 30].   
130 
 
9.6.  Accountability structures and practices under devolution  
One of the most common reasons for the promotion of public sector decentralisation is the 
belief that it enhances accountability largely through supporting community participation in 
decision making [18, 20]. Public participation in public sector governance can be exercised 
directly by the people, or through their representatives [67]. Brinkerhoff (2004) developed a 
framework for assessing health system accountability that defines accountability in the health 
system as a form of answerability or sanctions, and that distinguishes between financial, 
performance and political forms of accountability [18].  
Brinkerhoff’s accountability assessment framework can be applied to provide a better 
understanding of the proposed public accountability structures under devolution in Kenya, and 
how they functioned within the 2013/14 fiscal year. At the national level, parliament (National 
Assembly and the Senate) is the main accountability organ. The National Assembly has the 
mandate of holding the national government executive accountable over all its financial, 
performance or technical decisions. The Senate on the other hand has the mandate of holding 
the national government accountable over financial and political decisions it makes that have 
a direct effect on county governments. The Senate also has an additional mandate of holding 
county governments accountable over the use of their financial resources [33]. In addition any 
citizen has a right and opportunity to directly participate in government decisions through 
organised public forums as with the public hearings during the annual budget making process 
[33, 35].  Citizens can also directly question government decisions by petitioning through 
parliament or the judiciary [33]. 
From the results of this study, we see that in the 2013/14 financial year, as required by law, 
parliament had to approve the proposed national budget once it had been approved by the 
cabinet. Similarly, during the appointment of senior government officers, the president 
nominated them, and they had to be vetted by the National Assembly before being appointed. 
In both instances parliament invited direct public participation in both the budgetary making 
and the vetting process. However, these accountability procedures, and especially the vetting 
process, was viewed by many as largely a public relations exercise; MPs were not perceived to 
have the required capacity to appropriately vet the nominated senior public officers.   
At the county level, the County Assembly is the main organ that offers financial and political 
accountability oversight of the broader county government [34]. As with National level, the 
County Assembly is mandated to approve the broader county budget once it has been 
developed by the county executive, as well as vet senior county government officers before 
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they are appointed by the governor [34, 35]. The national treasury through the office of the 
comptroller of budgets also has a financial accountability oversight role for all accounting units 
including county governments. In this role, the comptroller of budgets is charged with the 
responsibility of ensuring that accounting units adhere to budgetary guidelines issued by 
treasury every year [35].  
MCAs in Kilifi County were perceived to lack the technical skills and knowhow to adequately 
interrogate the budget before discussing and approving the County Integrated Development 
Plan (CIDP). In this situation, MCAs were unable to exercise their accountability role, 
undermining the functioning of the accountability mechanism. However, we also see the 
national treasury’s comptroller of budgets refusing to approve county budgets because of their 
non-adherence to budgetary guidelines on the percentage allocation between recurrent and 
development expenditure. The national treasury budget guidelines restrictions for accounting 
units including county governments, to an extent restricted the budgetary decision space for 
county governments. In both these examples, we see how a public accountability mechanism 
interacts with, and is affected or affects, organisational capacity and decision space. These 
interactions are consistent with the study conceptual framework, and agree with the findings of 
Bossert and Mitchell (2011) in their Pakistan study [30]. 
The CDoH in its mandate for strategic visioning, planning, budgeting and ultimate delivery of 
health services at county level is in theory supposed to be accountable to: 1) the national MoH 
for technical policy matters, 2) the broader county executive and County Assembly for 
performance, financial and political matters, and 3) directly to the communities for availability 
of essential health servicer [34, 37, 38]. In practice however, we see that the national MoH had 
a very weak capacity to demand for information and hold the respective CDoHs accountable 
in adhering to national MoH policy guidelines. The CDoH would often adhere to the broader 
county government’s accountability demands over the national MoH as the broader county 
government had more power and stronger capacity to demand for information and hold the 
CDoH accountable [18]. This emphasizes the existence of multiple ‘principals’ acting on the 
CDoH as an ‘agent’ as earlier discussed in section 9.4. For example, we see that though the 
national MoH FACT policy did have clear guidelines for the preparation to be undertaken by 
the CDoH before the transfer of functions, when the county governments demanded for the 
immediate transfer of functions, the CDoH had to take up the health sector functions before 
they were ready to do so. Another example is when the national MoH posted out to counties 
newly-qualified doctors based on needs, some counties rejected these doctors on account that 
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they were not indigenous to those counties. In both these examples, the national MoH did not 
have strong capacity to apply sanctions on the CDoH. 
From these study findings, we see that a key effect that devolution had on the health sector is 
that of increasing of political accountability at different levels, more than 
technical/performance and/or financial accountability [18]. At the national level, we see the 
president in a bid to maintain political legitimacy, succumbed to political pressure from the 
Council of Governors (CoG) and directed that all government functions, including health 
services earmarked for counties in the constitution, be devolved. This directive was executed 
with total disregard of the FACT policy guidelines that sought to guide establishment of CDoH 
structures, and build their capacity before transferring the functions [38]. At the county level 
the early days of devolution witnessed counties prioritising politically visible projects like mass 
procurement of ambulances at the expense of technically viable but less visible interventions, 
particularly Primary Health Care (PHC) services. This observation of counties prioritising 
visibly curative services, at the expense of PHC services, is consistent with observations made 
in Uganda and in The Philippines [42, 45]. The emphasis of political accountability by different 
health sector actors, at the expense of technical and financial accountability underpins the 
assertion by several authors that decentralisation is more of a political process than a technical 
management process, and its outcomes and effects in the health sector should always be 
understood in that light [4, 8, 135]. 
9.7.  Power, contestations and actor relations under devolution 
Within the health sector, several health policy analysts have argued that power, which is 
basically defined as the ability to influence other actors, is a key determinant of the processes 
of health policy formulation and implementation [12, 68]. The notion of power in policy 
formulation and implementation is however a complex one to analyse as it often presents in 
many forms, characterised by actions or inactions by different actors in the policy processes 
[136]. Across this study, power and contestation emerged as a common theme. Analysing these 
power dynamics thus provides an additional lens for understanding the early outcomes and 
effects on the health sector of Kenyan devolution. In this subsection, I draw selected examples 
from the different tracers to illustrate how power dynamics shaped the devolution 
implementation process in Kenya.  To do so I draw on VeneKlasen and Miller’s (2002) 
expression of power theory.  These authors have argued that during policy and political 
processes, power is expressed in four main forms namely; power over, power to, power with; 
and power within. Power over views having power involving taking it from someone else, and 
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then, using it to dominate and prevent others from gaining it, power to views power as a  unique 
potential of every person to shape their life and world, power with concerns the ability to find 
common ground among different interests so as to build collective strength, and power within 
views power as a person’s sense of self-worth and self-knowledge [76]. 
In terms of the broader context highlighted in chapter 5, once the new governors had been 
elected and sworn-in, they started accusing the national government and the Transition 
Authority (TA) of deliberately delaying and slowing down the process of facilitating the 
transfer of functions meant for counties. To this end the governors acted together to exert their 
power with, under the umbrella of the CoG, to influence and control public opinion and 
perceptions on the perceived threat to devolution being imposed by national government and 
the TA [76, 136]. The governors also in a bid to symbolically demonstrate their 
political/positional power within, demanded to use the title ‘Excellency’ and fly the national 
flag on their official vehicles. This move triggered a series of political power battles between 
the governors and other political players and led parliament to enact a political pecking order 
law that ranked the governors below the senators. The senate used its power over, in an attempt 
to impeach one governor in his first year in office for an alleged misuse of public resources in 
his county, but this move was seen by many political commentators at the time to be a malicious 
act of expression of power by the senate rather than an act of accountability. 
On resource allocation, planning and budgeting at county level, the study findings reveal how 
the county treasury in Kilifi, exercising its power over and power to, directed the relatively 
powerless CDoH to close down the individual hospital bank accounts for user fees and deposit 
all the user fees collected in these facilities into the consolidated county revenue account. 
Although the CDoH did not agree with this directive and did not close the accounts, they still 
could not access and use the money from the account, as they would have needed permission 
to do so from the county treasury which had power over the CDoH on finance management 
matters. Another illustration of power dynamics over resource allocation, planning and 
budgeting is where the national treasury through the office of the comptroller of budgets 
exercises its power within and power over to avoid approving county government budgets in 
order to compel them to adhere to general budgetary policies and guidelines set by the national 
treasury. 
On HRH management, we see the health care professionals who had traditionally always 
exerted their technical power within to shape major policy decision making within the sector, 
lose power to influence the implementation process of health sector devolution to the political 
actors [8].  We also see that when the health workers eventually went on strike to contest the 
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implementation of health devolution, their action did not obtain any public support, as the 
general public’s thoughts and perception of devolution had already been shaped by the county 
governments [136]. Moreover, several county governments used their power over to threaten 
the striking health workers, including sacking some.  Health workers subsequently called off 
their strike. This observation of healthcare worker loss of power during the implementation of 
health sector decentralisation and their reactions including strike actions is consistent with 
observations made in Nepal, the Philippines and in Uganda [42, 58, 63]. 
On EMMS management, the findings reveal that in exercising their new power within on 
EMMS management, counties decided to procure supplies for all public operating health 
facilities within their jurisdiction irrespective of their gazettement status thus increasing access 
to service delivery within their areas. Furthermore, the counties also managed to negotiate with, 
and compel commodity suppliers, and particularly KEMSA to send them supplies as per 
demand. This led to a reported increase in order fill rates in health facilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
Chapter 10: Study Practical Applications and Policy Implications  
10.0. Introduction 
In this overall conclusion chapter, I begin by making a specific note to highlight how the design 
and conduct of this study contributed to enhancing the implementation of devolution laws 
within the Kenyan health sector. I later revisit the health sector decentralisation debate, and 
provide insights for policy considerations whenever discussions about what health sector 
functions should be decentralised and which ones should not. I then summarise the overall 
study conclusions, before highlighting how this study achieved its intended aims and 
objectives; and finally conclude the chapter by drawing specific recommendations for policy 
makers, and suggestions for further research. 
10.1. Contribution into enhancing the implementation of devolution within 
the Kenyan health sector 
Having been developed with a specific objective to draw on the empirical data and literature 
on good governance and accountability to identify strategies for enhancing achievement of 
decentralisation goals within the health sector, this study was specifically designed and 
executed with the intent of providing positive real-time contributions to the implementation of 
devolution within the Kenyan health sector. 
First, this study was deliberately embedded within the MoH (at national level) and CDoH (at 
county level). Annex 7 provides an illustration of my personal, and that of other learning site 
researchers’ embedded positions within the Kenyan health sector environment. This 
embeddedness, thus facilitated the ability for the study findings to significantly contribute to; 
and provide a broader understanding of the political context in Kenya, and assisting with the 
implementation of the decentralisation laws within the health sector at both national and county 
levels. At the national level for example this study was embedded in the devolution process 
through my co-option into several national MoH technical working groups, key among them 
being the MoH policy and planning Technical Working Group (TWG), and the MoH 
Functional Assignment and Competence Team (FACT) that was unbundling the health sector 
functions for both national and county level and facilitating the smooth transfer of functions to 
county level.  This position provided me with an opportunity to feedback my study findings in 
real time to these key health sector technical teams and thus enhancing the implementation 
process for health sector decentralisation (annex 7). 
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Within Kilifi County, this study was embedded in the CDoH by being nested within the health 
systems governance ‘learning site’. This study approach ensured regular and continued 
engagements with county level decision makers to share study findings, and learn from the 
findings to institute measures to strengthen the functioning of the CDoH [72, 108] (annex 7).  
The embeddedness of the study facilitated its ability to improve and strengthen the 
implementation of devolution processes in the health sector at county level around the specific 
study tracers.  On resource availability and financial management for example; with the 
continued feedback and support to both the Kilifi CDoH and County Treasury, during the 
2014/15 fiscal years, the CDoH managed to develop its AWP on time and thus had a better 
participation in the general county planning and budgeting activities for the 2014/15 fiscal year 
compared to the 2013/14 fiscal year. In addition, after sharing the plight and challenges facing 
the management of user fees in hospitals with several county level stakeholders including the 
CDoH, County Treasury and MCAs; they all came together and embarked on developing a 
county level legislation, dubbed the Kilifi County Facility Improvement Bill 2015, that sought 
to establish a county specific ‘Hospital Improvement Fund’ within which the user fees would 
be deposited and to allow the CDoH to utilise these funds without having to sort for further 
permission from the County Treasury [137].  
On HRH management, a case in point was when the county governments raised concern over 
the number of health workers they were being invoiced for by the national MoH during the six-
month interim phase, claiming that they were being made to pay for ‘ghost workers’ who were 
not physically present within their counties. At this point, I managed to share my health sector 
contextual analysis findings at the Health Sector Inter-Governmental Relations Forum, which 
showed that there was an inherent delay between the times a health worker is posted/ 
transferred from one station to another, and the date the place of pay is changed. This assisted 
counties to understand that the discrepancies in actual numbers of staff in their counties were 
occasioned by this delay. As a result, the counties agreed to reimburse the national government 
their monies for staff salaries as invoiced 
In conclusion, the embedded research approach for this study can thus be used for continued 
strengthening of the implementation of devolution within the health sector in Kenya, and could 
also be used for a similar purpose in other LMICs 
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10.2. To decentralise the health sector or not? – Considerations for policy 
Decentralisation has been and continues to be a recurring debate dominating general public 
sector and health sector specific reforms, particularly in developing countries [1, 7, 8]. There 
is also a growing acknowledgement that decentralisation is largely a political, rather than 
technical process [4, 11]. In acknowledging this rather political nature of the decentralisation 
debate particularly in the health sector, Mitchell and Bossert (2010) argued that the views (the 
stand) of different health sector actors around this debate will always be influenced by where 
they are positioned and their role (where they sit) within the health system [59]. The findings 
of this study largely agree with this assertion. 
From the empirical literature reviewed and presented earlier (Chapter 2), it is evident that 
though health sector decentralisation is a common recommend health sector reform strategy, 
the experiences for different forms of health sector decentralisation in many LMICs have been, 
and continue to be mixed both in different countries, and also across different health sector 
functions within the same country. These decentralisation outcomes have however tended to 
be influenced by the primary reasons for decentralisations in the country or within the health 
sector, the form and level of decentralised decision making, and the capacity of the different 
types of local level decision makers in relation to the decentralised functions [8, 11, 27]. 
Similarly, the findings of this study (chapters 5,6 and 7) though reporting on early day’s 
experience, also illustarte that there is a relationship between these highlighted factors, and the 
observed outcomes of the early days of health sector decentralisations in Kenya. 
With this observations one wouldn’t stop to ask questions like “what is the ideal form of health 
sector decentralisation?” and “what is the ideal balance in the allocation of functions and 
accountability roles between the centre and the periphery in a decentralised health system?” It 
is with these observations from the empirical literature findings; and drawing on the findings 
from this study that I revisit the conceptual framework described in chapter 4 to propose 
practical considerations, to inform the continued discussion on the balance between allocation 
of functions and accountability roles and responsibilities between the centre and the periphery 
within the health sector. These considerations would not only assist in informing and shaping 
the decentralisation debates in the Kenyan health sector, but they would also be relevant in 
other LMIC settings.  
As observed in the literature reviewed; even with the acknowledgement of the very political 
nature of the decentralisation debate, there are very few empirical studies on health sector 
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decentralisation that have also attempted to undertake an analysis of the broader political 
context so as to aid in putting into perspective the varied outcomes of health sector 
decentralisation in developing countries [30, 66, 138].  This study has thus specifically 
attempted to address that gap in literature. The study’s conceptual framework deliberately 
placed a review and analysis of the broader political context in Kenya at the base of the 
interactions between the other elements of the framework.i.e. decision space, organisational 
structure and capacity, and accountability (refer to study conceptual framework chapter 4). 
This was in acknowledgment that the interaction between these elements of the conceptual 
framework within the health sector would significantly be affected by the broader political 
context during the designing and implementation of the decentralisation laws in the country. 
Consequently, I have summarized the key historical political events in the country (chapter 3) 
and specifically drawn lessons of how these informed and affected the overall goals, the design 
and subsequent implementation process of the devolution laws in the country (chapter 5). In 
section 9.3 of this chapter, using the policy triangle framework proposed by Walt and Gilson 
(1994) and Leitcher’s policy framework for analysing political context [15, 69], I have analysed 
and discussed how this broader political context influenced the design and implementation of 
the devolution goals in Kenya. From the study findings for example, though the health sector 
through the MoH FACT developed a well-outlined technical plan for implementation of the 
devolution laws within the health sector, the final implementation process of devolution was 
driven by political rather than technical considerations, thus putting the health sector in an 
unprecedented crisis. From the study findings, we also note that certain prompt interventions 
by key actors and stakeholders helped in averting or addressing some of this crises. For 
example, the intervention by WB to procure six months’ buffer EMMS supplies for all health 
facilities helped to alleviate a pending major stock out of EMMS in health facilities due to 
counties un-readiness to take up the EMMS procurement function by the time it had been 
transferred. Similarly, the national MoH agreed to undertake an interim function of paying 
health works salaries for a transition period of six months to allow for counties to develop their 
payroll management capacity. 
The analysis of the broader political context a good understating of the boarder context; thus 
presenting a better understanding of the health sector effects and outcomes of the early days of 
implementation of the devolution laws in Kenya. From this analysis, it is evident that the 
political push for decentralisation is often stronger than the technical implementation process, 
so there is need for health sector policy actors to have a broader understanding of the countries’ 
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political context whenever designing technical strategies for implementing health sector 
decentralisation, so as to make their technical implementation strategies responsive to the 
political contexts. From the findings, I also suggest that it would be important for health sector 
development partners in LMICs to develop flexible support policies so as to be able to promptly 
intervene in helping health sectors in LMICs during times of major crisis.  
In chapter 9 (section 9.4) I have described and analysed the overall government, and health 
sector specific organisational structures, and their respective roles and functions in Kenya 
under the devolved government systems as outlined in the devolution laws in theory. I then 
further proceeded to analyse the actual different institutional and individual level capacity to 
carry out respective roles and functions under the devolved system. From my analysis, I have 
approached capacity as the ability to undertake the allocated function, of which is based on 
both organisational and institutional arrangements; and on individual knowledge and skills for 
the individuals within the respective institutions [30]. In addition I considered institutional and 
individual capacity dimensions around hardware, software tangible, and software intangible 
elements [71, 72]. 
From the study findings for example, it is evident that the inability of the CDoH to adequately 
participate in the 2013/14 fiscal year planning and budgeting process at county level, its 
inability to appropriately manage staff salaries leading to payroll discrepancies and missing 
salaries, and inability to appropriately and manage the procurement of EMMS in a timely 
manner leading to commodity stock outs, was all largely due to lack of appropriate structures 
and relevant individual capacity to undertake these functions. Once the appropriate structures 
were established and the individual’s capacity progressively improved, there was both an 
observed and reported improvement in the performance of these functions at the county level. 
We also note from the findings that there was poor community awareness of their direct 
community participation role in the county budgeting process; and that MCAs also lacked the 
appropriate technical skills to participate in the development and appraisal the CIDP and the 
subsequent 2013/14 county government budget.  
From an intervention and policy perspective, there is need to constantly asses the institutional 
and individual capacity for the different actors in decentralised health system, in respected to 
their allocated roles and functions. This should subsequently be followed by progressively 
undertaking relevant capacity building interventions so as to enhance the intended goals of 
health sector decentralisation. As discussed in chapter 9 (section 9.4) for this study, I utilised 
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the UNDP capacity assessment criteria and the Aragon framework for undertaking 
organisational and individual capacity assessment for the different structures and actors 
involved in implementing health sector devolution, against their roles and functions as outlined 
in the devolution laws in Kenya. These two are appropriate tools for health sector capacity 
assessment in decentralised health systems as they have the ability to asses both organisational 
and institutional arrangements; and knowledge and skills for the individuals within the 
respective institutions.  
From the capacity assessment findings as discussed in section 9.4; as a way of intervention, the 
CDoH managers in Kilifi County would benefit from technical capacity building initiatives 
particular around their new roles in county level priority setting, planning and budgeting, HRH 
management and in the management of EMMS. As highlighted by Doherty and Gilson (2015), 
this type of technical skills building for health managers would best be delivered through a 
combination of short-course formal training and on the job training [139]. Similarly, the MCAs 
in Kilifi would also benefit from formal technical skills strengthening around their oversite 
roles in the county government planning and budgeting process. This could best be done 
through formal short-course training initiatives. Finally, community level awareness and 
capacity strengthening could be undertaken through community barazas and community 
dialogue forums. 
As I highlighted before, several authors have argued that decentralisation debates and decisions 
around allocation of functions between the centre and the periphery are often political rather 
than technical [3, 4, 66]. This thus calls for stronger intangible software skills including 
communication, relationship building and negotiation skills among health sector actors keen 
on influencing the design and implementation of decentralisation policies [98, 103]. From these 
study findings for example, we see that though the MoH FACT had developed a technically 
informed implementation plan for the transfer of functions national to county level, the 
eventual implementation was driven by a push by political actors; and the health sector actors 
lacked the appropriate skills to engage with the political actors so as to influence this process 
of transfer of health sector devolved functions. Similarly, we see that when the healthcare 
workers were unhappy about them being transferred to county level, they resolved to undertake 
a country-wide strike to force the county governments to allow them to be managed by national 
MoH. However, this resolve to use hard-line tactics rather than soft negotiation skills by the 
healthcare workers was met by an equally hard-line stand by the county government leading to 
a prolonged strike, and some counties sacking some of the striking health care workers, and 
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some withholding their salaries. In the long run, the health workers hard to eventually call off 
the strike without achieving what they had wanted. 
Elloker et al (2010) stressed on the central role of intangible software skills for health managers 
in their roles of managing day to day crises and routines, which are normal characteristics of 
the health system [72]. This conviction has more recently also been made by Lehmann and 
Gilson (2014), and Nyikuri et al (2015) [73, 108]. Worth noting though is that these particular 
skills element are often missing in the curricular for formal training of most health sector 
managers [139]. There is thus need for deliberately building on specific interventions aimed at 
increasing health sector managers’ intangible software skills. Doherty and Gilson (2015) have 
argued that this form of skills building could be done through short training courses followed 
by long term coaching and mentorship follow-up on the job [139].       
On accountability structures and practices in decentralised health system, as I highlighted in 
section 9.6; I utilised in this study elements of the Brinkerhoff accountability framework which 
proposes that accountability arrangements should focus on the ability by health sector actors to 
provide information or respond to sanctions from other actors; and their ability to demand for 
information or impose sanctions on other actors [18]. From my analysis as presented in section 
9.6, we see that lack of capacity can negatively undermine accountability structures in a 
decentralised setting. For example, it was reported in the findings that the MCAs were unable 
to meaningfully review and approve the CIDP and the 2013/14 county budget due to their lack 
of appropriate technical skills to do this, thus undermining an important accountability 
mechanism in the county level planning and budgeting process. This finding underpins the 
conceptual framework preposition that in the health sector planning and budgeting function at 
county level, organisational structure and capacity continuously interacts with and affects 
accountability processes and practices, thus affecting the decision space of the different actors.  
These study findings also agree with those of Bossert and Mitchell (2011), who in studying 
health sector decentralisation in Pakistan also found that decision space around health sector 
functions within a decentralised setting will always be influenced and affected by the 
organisational structure and capacity; and the accountability structures and practices [30] From 
a policy perspective therefore, continued capacity assessment; with the aim of designing 
appropriate capacity strengthening interventions would serve to improve the functioning of 
accountability processes within the health sector. 
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In conclusion based on the review of empirical literature of health sector decentralisation in 
LMICs and the findings of this study, it is evident that health sector decentralisation outcomes 
are affected by several factors. Key among these factors are the functions or decisions allocated 
to the decentralised units, the organisational structures and capacity of decentralised units, the 
accountability structures and practices and the broader political context within which the 
decentralisation laws are designed and implemented. From this revelation I argue that even 
with its perceived benefits, health sector decentralisation policies and strategies, particularly in 
LMICs cannot be designed from a common ‘one-size fit all’ prescriptive type approach; but 
need to be undertaken with the background of analysis of these factors. Subsequently I revisit 
the conceptual framework discussed in chapter 4 and propose that discussion around which 
health sector functions ought to be decentralised or which ones should remain under central 
control (decision space), should always be considered in the context of the capacity to 
undertake these functions at whichever layer of government they are allocated to, and the 
accountability arrangements around the performance of the said functions by the allocated 
layer of government. 
Figure 16 below is drawn from the conceptual framework described in chapter 4, but 
specifically goes ahead to summarize key important sub-elements of the conceptual framework 
that emerged from the study findings and discussed in chapter 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
Figure 16: Framework to consider in analysing health sector decentralisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
10.3. Overall study conclusion 
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This led to major disruption of public services at county level. Within the health sector, the 
early days witnessed poor participation of the CDoH in county level planning and budgeting, 
perverse re-centralisation of operational financial management roles from health facility level 
to the county level, and poor financial flows for addressing recurrent expenses. On HRH, the 
early days witnessed major disruptions in staff salary payments, political interference with 
HRH management functions and confusion over certain HRH management roles. This led to 
strikes and mass resignations by health care workers. On EMMS, although there were 
significant delays in the procurement process leading to long periods of stock outs of essential 
drugs in health facilities, once the counties managed to procure, health facilities reported a 
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better order fill rate of medical supplies compared to the period prior to devolution. County 
governments also managed to procure commodities for all publicly owned health facilities 
within their area, irrespective of their gazettement status. 
With time though, and with the county governments establishing their structures and 
progressively building their capacity, a general improvement in counties’ ability to manage 
devolved functions has been witnessed, including deliberate efforts to find local level solutions 
to some of the emerging challenges. This has enabled counties to progressively work towards 
meeting the overall public goals and expectations of devolution. The political will to strengthen 
the functioning and performance of county governments has also been consistently high. Worth 
noting especially is the fact that public support for devolution has constantly remained very 
high even during the transition period associated with major service disruptions [138] . 
Based on the findings of this study, I argue that the political push for decentralisation is often 
stronger than the technical intentions and implementation processes. There is thus need for 
health sector policy actors to have a broader understanding of the countries’ political context 
whenever designing technical strategies for implementing health sector decentralisation. In 
addition, I propose that the allocation of functions between central level and decentralised units 
should always be guided by considerations around the interaction between decision space, 
organisational structure and capacity, and accountability arrangements and practices within the 
health system.  
10.4. How well did the study meet its objectives? 
This study sought to explore, describe and explain the implications of political decentralization 
in Kenya on governance and accountability structures and practices for health sector 
operational planning and budgeting at the sub-national level. The study had three specific 
objectives namely; (i) describing and analysing the goals and intended strategies of political 
decentralization for health sector operational planning and budgeting, (ii) describing and 
analysing stakeholder expectations and experiences of political decentralization for health 
sector operational planning and budgeting; and (iii) drawing on the empirical data and literature 
on good governance and accountability to identify strategies for enhancing achievement of 
decentralisation goals within the health sector. By using a conceptual framework developed 
from review of relevant literature, the study adequately covered the first and second objectives. 
In addition, by applying a creative and flexible methodological approach within included both 
participant and non-participant observations within the context of a health systems governance 
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learning site (described in details in chapter 4), the study managed to adequately meet its third 
objective. 
10.5. Study recommendations 
In light of the findings of this study, I would wish to make the following recommendations; 
For the Kenyan health sector actors and stakeholders 
 There is need to speed-up the establishment of all the necessary structures required for the 
efficient handling of the devolved health sector functions in all counties; and to clearly 
clarify the roles for each of these structures to avoid duplication and overlaps that may lead 
to constant wrangles amongst actors. 
 There is need to constantly evaluate the capacity of the structures charged with 
responsibility for different health sector functions, and continuously enhance their capacity 
so as to maximise of the benefits of devolution. Capacity building efforts also need to 
deliberately include intangible soft skills. 
For health sector policy elites in other developing countries  
 The political push for decentralisation is often stronger than the technical implementation 
process, so there is need for health sector policy actors to have a broader understanding of 
the countries’ political context whenever designing technical strategies for implementing 
health sector decentralisation. 
 Assignment of functions (decision space) between the centre and the periphery should be 
done with the considerations of the necessary capacity to carry out the functions, and 
accountability structures and practices 
For research 
 Empirical studies on health sector decentralisation need to deliberately undertake analysis 
of broader country level political context so as to provide a better understanding of the 
outcomes of health sector decentralisation in a particular context 
 There is need for more research to establish the critical capacity elements for the optimal 
functioning for CDoH in the decentralised context in Kenya 
 There is a need for a more long-term tracking of the health sector effects of decentralisation 
in Kenya, with an aim of providing an understanding of the critical governance practices 
that enhance and strengthen the health sector performance in decentralised settings. 
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12.0. Annexes: 
12.1. Annex 1: Summary papers included in the literature review 
 Study Country Study Characteristics Tracer 
Elements 
Featured 
Summary of Key Findings 
1 Bossert T. et all 
2007. 
Is decentralization 
good for logistics 
system? Evidence 
on essential 
medicine logistics 
in Ghana and 
Guatemala 
Ghana and 
Guatemala 
 Cross country surveys of 
decision space about EMMS in 
the 2 countries 
 Qualitative assessment of 
decision space 
EMMS  Less local level choice was associated with better 
performance for EMMS inventory control and 
logistics information system 
 More local level choice was associated with better 
performance of EMMS planning and budgeting 
2 Mayhew S, 2003. 
The impact of 
decentralization on 
reproductive 
health services in 
Ghana 
Ghana  Multiple level qualitative case 
study – involving participants at 
national, regional and district 
levels of government 
Operational 
Planning & 
Budgeting, 
EMMS and 
HRH 
 Two modes of funding for operations; decentralized 
funds through SWAP and centrally controlled 
earmarked funds 
 Maintained two parallel RH commodities supplies 
systems. One donor funded central control, and a 
public funded decentralized systems 
 Commodities bought centrally were cheaper than 
those bought by districts due to economies of scale 
 Recruitment, promotion, and discipline of RH staff 
was initially retained centrally at the head of public 
service; then later delegated to regions leading to 
poor staff retention due to uncertainties in career 
155 
 
progression and poor working conditions in the 
districts 
 Districts and regions were allowed to offer incentives 
in-kind, like trainings and vehicles to staff, but not to 
increase salaries 
 Several remote districts became underserved as they 
could not attract/retain staff due to poor living 
conditions, lack of communication facilities and lack 
of schools for children in those areas. 
3 Grundy J et al, 
2003. 
Overview of 
devolution of 
health services in 
the Philippines 
Philipines  Review of literature 
 Appraisal of the health system in 
two provinces in the country 
using observations, interviews 
and FGDs at the regional level 
 National level review of 
documents and reports reporting 
on health sector performance 
HRH, 
Planning 
and 
budgeting; 
and EMMS  
 HW were assigned to the management of non-HW 
locally elected politicians and their bureaucracies 
 No prior sensitisation of HWs on their new roles and 
management structure under devolution 
 Poor staff morale due to poor transfer process of 
health workers to the management of locally elected 
political leaders 
 Mass resignations by key personnel 
 Decreased funding by Local Govt leading to low 
staffing, un-maintained infrastructure, and un-
repaired equipment. 
 Loss of managerial and fiscal control of hospitals by 
hospital managers – Taken up by regional managerial 
units 
 Untimely or decreased procurement of drugs, 
medicines and supplies by LGU officials 
4 Munga M. et al, 
2008. 
The 
decentralization-
centralization 
Tanzania  Qualitative exploratory study at 
national level and across five 
districts in the country 
HRH  Health worker recruited under decentralization its 
was closely linked with budgeting process. 
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dilemma: 
recruitment and 
distribution of 
health workers in 
remote districts in 
Tanzania 
 Recruitment in decentralized districts was based on 
actual staff needs in numbers and skills, compared to 
centralized recruitment 
 Health worker recruitment in decentralized districts 
was interfered by influential local politicians 
 Recruitment of highly skilled health workers under 
decentralization was difficult and expensive 
 Centralized recruitment was perceived to be more 
effective in recruitment and balancing the distribution 
of highly skilled staff 
 Management of health personnel at local level was 
overridden by several central government organs 
with a stake on public servants management 
 Decentralized recruitment was effective in improving 
retention of lower cadre staff 
 Decentralisation aggravated imbalances in the 
distribution of health workers across districts 
5 Kyaddondo D and 
Whyte S, 2003. 
Working in a 
decentralized 
system: a threat to 
health workers’ 
respect and 
survival in Uganda 
Uganda  A qualitative case study in 2 
districts – 2 health facilities per 
district 
 Involved interviews-respondents 
from the health facilities, sub-
county and district managers: 
observations: and document 
reviews-Minutes of meetings, 
letters and memos 
HRH  Decentralization caused confusion in HW 
employment terms as some HW were employed by 
decentralized districts while others retained by 
national level and the 2 groups had different terms of 
employment 
 Decentralisation caused confusion and loss of career 
progression including confirmation and promotion of 
some HWs 
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 Decentralisation led to delayed salary payment with 
some HWs in the study districts staying as long as 
36months without receiving payment 
  Decentralised districts could not afford to pay for in-
service training for HWs, thus decentralization had a 
negative effect on HW s career progression 
 Decentralisation weakened HWs positions as 
professionals in society, as they were managed by 
Facility Committees with no technical skills. This  
interfered with HWs facility-based survival strategies 
like exempting their relatives from user fees 
payments 
 HW resulted in establishing supplementary sources 
of income like opening private clinics and drug shops 
outside the formal government healthcare system 
6 Mouzinho A and 
Stewart D, 2001. 
Decentralisation 
and human 
resource 
management in the 
health sector: a 
case study (1996-
1998) from Napula 
province, 
Mozambique 
Mozambiq
ue 
 Qualitative case study involving 
one province in the country 
 Data collected through 
interviews with provincial 
managers; and secondary data 
from provincial and national 
reports 
HRH  Decentralisation did not improve HR deployment 
efficiency due to too much bureaucracy at the 
provincial level 
  Some positive aspects including improvements with 
administration of retirement process was noted, and 
better personnel information system 
 HR management at provincial level was affected by 
lack of qualified personnel and proper administrative 
process to manage the HR function. 
 Recruitment of HW was poor due to financial 
constraints at provincial level 
 HW performance evaluation was never carried out at 
provincial  level due to lack of capacity 
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 There were no formal rewards and incentives for HW 
at the provincial level 
7 Lakshminarayanan 
R, 2003. 
Decentralisation 
and its implication 
of reproductive 
health: The 
Philippine 
experience 
Philippines Case study analyzing national level 
effects of decentralization on RH 
services at country level 
Operational 
Planning & 
Budgeting; 
HRH 
 Non-earmarked transfer of funds to local level 
 Resource allocation not based on revenue generating 
capacity of local level 
 Curative care bias of local government spending on 
health 
 Decentralization led to underfunding of preventive 
services like family planning 
 Decentralization did not improve the general 
efficiency, equity of the health delivery system 
 Devolved health workers received up to 40% reduced 
benefits due to lack of resources at the local 
governments 
 Devolved health workers made to provide integrated 
services rather that the initial vertical programmatic 
service provision – thus increased workload 
8 Bossert & 
Beauvais 2002. 
Decentralisation of 
health systems in 
Ghana, Zambia, 
Uganda and the 
Philippines: a 
comparative 
analysis of 
decision space 
Ghana, 
Zambia, 
Uganda 
and the 
Philipines 
A four country comparative case 
study of decentralisation, analyzing 
the effect of different forms of 
decentralisation on the health sector 
in each of these countries 
  Ghana and Zambia had deconcentrated system, while 
Uganda and Philippines had devolved system 
 Uganda completely devolved health sector budget 
through a block grant to districts, with exception to 
personnel salaries 
 Philippines also entirely devolved health sector 
budget 
 In Ghana, percentage public sector financing for 
health increased with decentralisation 
 In Zambia, the share of public resources to primary 
health also increased 
159 
 
 In both the devolved and decocentrated countries, 
local resources generation was low, and they heavily 
relied on central level allocation 
 Ghana and Zambia had deconcentrated HRH 
management with more central level control 
 Uganda and Philipines had devolved HRH 
management system;, however central level imposed 
salary 
 Hospital workers in both Uganda and Philipines were 
not decentralised and were more likely to receive 
their salaries in time compared to devolved primary 
care staff 
 Decentralisation brought a significant deterioration of 
employment conditions for health workers in 
Philipines, and salaries for devolved staff decreased 
9 Frumence G et al 
2013. 
Challenges to the 
implementation of 
health sector 
decentralization in 
Tanzania: 
experience from 
Kongwa district 
council 
Tanzania  A qualitative case study of one 
district in central Tanzania 
 Data collected through 
interviews at local and national 
levels; and through document 
review 
Operational 
Planning 
and 
Budgeting, 
HRH 
 Increased autonomy in local resource mobilization 
and utilisation 
 Enhanced bottom-up planning approach 
 Inadequate planning skills and capacity at local level 
 Reduced financial management bureaucratic 
procedure 
 Enhanced health worker accountability 
 Salaries determined by national civil service 
 Increased political interference at local level 
1
0 
Bossert T et al 
2000. 
Chile and 
Bolivia 
 National level comparative case 
studies in the two countries. 
 Collected data from nationally 
available country level reports 
Operational 
Planning 
and 
Budgeting, 
HRH 
 Decentralisation Increased equitable resource 
distribution to regions through establishment of 
equalisation fund 
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Decentralisation of 
health systems in 
Latin America 
 There was Limited local level choices on different 
aspects of HR management including recruitment and 
salaries 
1
1 
Collins C D et all, 
2002. 
Decentralisation, 
health care and 
policy process in 
Punjab, Pakistan 
in the 1990s 
Pakistan  Case study of one province in 
Pakistan 
Operational 
Planning 
and 
Budgeting 
 Health is a co-current function of both federal and 
devolved governments 
 Decentralisation Increased  financial management 
responsibilities of planning and budgeting to districts 
1
2 
Bossert et al, 1991. 
‘Bottom-up’ 
planning in 
Indonesia: 
decentralization in 
the ministry of 
health 
Indonesia  Country level case study 
 Utilises data from available 
national reports 
Operational 
Planning 
and 
Budgeting 
 Decentralization enhanced bottom-up planning and 
budgeting particularly for HW on-job training and for 
drugs prioritisation 
1
3 
Green A et al, 
2000. 
Resource 
allocation and 
budgetary 
mechanisms for 
decentralized 
health systems: 
experiences from 
Balochistan, 
Pakistan 
Pakistan  Country level case study 
comparing the two countries 
 Utilises data from available 
national reports 
Operational 
Planning 
and 
Budgeting 
 Decentralisation increase equitable resource 
allocation across regions within each country; but did 
not enhance utilisation efficiency of resources 
allocated 
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1
4 
Anders Jeppsson, 
2001. 
Financial 
priorities under 
decentralization in 
Uganda 
 
Uganda  Country level case study 
involving all districts in the 
country 
 Utilized document review-
review of district health sector 
budgets; and Key informant 
interviews at selected districts 
and national level 
Operational 
Planning 
and 
Budgeting 
 Decentralisation led to districts significantly reducing 
budget allocations to PHC activities to almost a 
quarter of previous centralised allocation 
 Districts rationale for this included insufficient local 
revenue, lack of sufficient funds from central govt, 
high health expenses, and that other sectors 
contribute to health  
 Conditional funding introduced later enhanced 
resource utilisation at district level, and increased 
public health sector funding 
1
5 
Bossert T et al 
2003 
Decentralization in 
Zambia: resource 
allocation and 
district 
performance 
Zambia  Country level case study 
 Utilises data from available 
national reports 
Operational 
Planning 
and 
Budgeting 
 Decentralisation enhanced local internal health sector 
resource allocation; and user fee levels and utilisation 
1
6 
Bossert T et al 
2003. 
Decentralization 
and equity of 
resource 
allocation: 
evidence from 
Colombia and 
Chile 
Colombia 
and Chile 
 Comparative analysis of the two 
countries using the decision 
space approach 
Operational 
Planning 
and 
Budgeting 
 Decentralisation achieved equitable levels of per 
capita resource allocation in both countries through 
use of allocative formulae 
1
7 
Mclntyre D and 
Kulgman B, 2003. 
South 
Africa 
 Country level case study 
analysing decentralisation 
Operational 
Planning 
 Decentralisation introduced financial autonomy at 
provincial and district level 
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The Human Face 
of Decentralisation 
and Integration of 
Health Services; 
Experiences from 
South Africa 
 Data collected through 
interviews at national, regional 
and district levels 
and 
Budgeting 
 Did not increase available resource to health sector at 
local level leading to frustrations of local health 
managers 
1
8 
Bossert T and 
Mitchell A. 
Decentralisation, 
Governance and 
Health System 
Performance: 
‘Where You Stand 
Depends on Where 
You Sit’ 
Bolivia, 
India, 
Uganda, 
Chile, the 
Philipines  
and 
Pakistan 
 Case study of Comparative 
analysis of the six countries 
using decision space framework 
 Data collected through analysis 
of literature including published 
literature, and country level 
reports and grey literature 
HRH 
EMMS, 
and 
;Planning 
and 
Budgeting 
 All six countries had a devolved form of government 
structure 
 There was a high variation of decision space across 
countries over similar functions; and within countries 
over different health sector functions 
 Across all countries, HW salaries were centrally 
restricted. In Bolivia HW were not devolved. Chile 
HW management discretion was limited to primary 
care staff only. 
 Bolivia, India and Pakistan had most EMMS 
elements e.g. Essential drug lists, prices etc.. 
centralised a national level, Chile had more local 
choice for using public or private drug suppliers; 
while Philipines had numerous local EMMS 
procurement systems 
 India, Pakistan and Uganda – had comparatively high 
central level conditionality for resource allocation on 
centrally transferred funds. Bolivia, Chile and 
Philipines – had low conditionalities on central 
transferred resources 
1
9 
Shayo E et al 2013. 
Stakeholders’ 
participation in 
planning and 
Tanzania  Qualitative case study of one 
district in Tanzania examining 
priority setting and budgeting for 
Resource 
allocation, 
planning 
 Donor conditions and central level 
restrictions/directives restricted any meaningful local 
level priorities in the final district level PMTCT plans 
and budgets 
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priority setting in 
the context of a 
decentralized 
health care system: 
the case of 
prevention of 
mother to child 
transmission of 
HIV programme in 
Tanzania 
PMTCT services within a 
devolved context 
 Data collection undertaken 
through interviews with district 
and regional managers, and 
through FGDs 
 
and 
budgeting 
2
0 
Kapipiri L et al 
2003. 
Public 
participation in 
health planning 
and priority setting 
at the district level 
in Uganda 
Uganda  Exploratory qualitative case 
study 
 Data collection through national, 
district and community level 
interviews, supplemented by 
community FGDs 
Planning 
and 
Budgeting 
 Districts have power to plan and pass their budgets 
independent of national ministry 
 District level planning largely dominated by local 
elected political leaders and technical personnel and ; 
and hardly any public participation 
 District level planning units were happy about not 
having to consult central ministry for plans and 
budgets approvals 
 
2
1 
Dhakal R et al 
2009. 
Addressing the 
challenges of 
health sector 
decentralization in 
Nepal: an inquiry 
into the policy and 
implementation 
process 
Nepal  Qualitative case study – focusing 
on national level and one district 
in the country 
 Primary data collection through 
interviews at national level and 
district. Secondary data through 
analysis of documents and 
reports 
Planning 
and 
Budgeting; 
HRH 
 The planning process remained heavily centralized 
with minimal ability to make adjustments to budgets 
allocated 
 The budget allocated was not based on district needs , 
funding was inadequate – an health facilities had lost 
revenue through a new government policy of 
abolishing user fees for PHC services and free 
maternity services 
 HWs expressed their reservations on being 
decentralised and went on strike to resist the 
decentralisation 
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 HWs, feared losing their jobs and were worried about 
the ability of districts to pay their salaries 
2
2 
Collins C et al 
2000. 
Decentralizing the 
health sector: 
issues in Brazil 
Brazil  Country level case study 
analyzing experience of health 
sector decentralization in the 
country 
Planning 
and 
Budgeting 
 Health Units receive  allocations from decentralized 
manuspalities and from central government transfers 
 The central transfers/allocations is similar for all 
manuspalities thus creating inequalities 
 The manuspalities are recommended to allocate upto 
10% of local revenue to health; but many do not meet 
this percentage as this is not obligatory 
2
3 
Maluka SO et al 
2011. 
Decentralization 
and health care 
prioritization 
process in 
Tanzania: from 
national rhetoric to 
local reality 
Tanzania  Qualitative case study design of 
one district in Tanzania 
 Utilised multiple qualitative 
techniques including document 
reviews, observations, KIIs and 
FGDs 
Planning 
and 
Budgeting 
 Through local priority setting was devolved to district 
health authorities in theory, existence of restrictive 
planning guidelines and budget ceilings provided by 
central government; reduced the ability of district 
managers to plan and allocate funds based on local 
priorities 
  
 
2
4 
Anokbonggo WW 
et al, 2004. 
Impact of 
decentralization on 
health services in 
Uganda: a look at 
facility utilization, 
prescribing and 
availability of 
essential drugs 
Uganda  Case Study of two districts in 
Uganda 
 Mixed Methods:- Quantitative- 
Time series data collection on 
drug availability in health 
facilities 
 Qualitative- KIIs and FGDs on 
district level stakeholders 
EMMS  Health facilities received drug kits whose size and 
contents determined by central level  MoH with 
minimal input from districts 
 Districts/Health facilities supplemented drugs supply 
using user fees and other locally generated  resources 
 Drugs availability at health facilities was erratic and 
always inadequate 
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2
5 
Kivumbi GW et al, 
2004. 
Financial 
management 
systems under 
decentralization 
and their effect on 
malaria control 
 
Uganda  Descriptive case study of four 
districts in Uganda 
  There existed long tedious bureaucratic process for 
utilisation of conditional grants earmarked for PHC 
activities; which affected timely use of financial 
resources for control of communicable diseases 
 Existed lots of vertical disease control programme 
funded centrally 
2
6 
Okorafor O and 
Thomas S, 2007. 
Protecting 
resources for 
primary health 
care under fiscal 
federalism: options 
for resource 
allocation 
South 
Africa 
 A qualitative case study design 
across 3 of the 9 provinces in the 
country 
Priority 
setting, 
planning 
and 
budgeting 
 PHC budgets are determined by province department 
of health with no interference from national MoH 
 Each province does its budgetary allocation totally 
independently 
 Allocation to PHC are done incrementally on 
historical basis and lack a need basis 
2
7 
Mubyazi G et al, 
2004. 
Implications of 
decentralization 
for the control of 
tropical diseases in 
Tanzania: a case 
study of four 
districts 
Tanzania  Exploratory qualitative case 
study of four districts utilizing 
KIIs, FGDsand documents 
reviews 
HRH, 
EMMS, 
Resource 
allocation 
Planning 
and 
budgeting 
 All HRH management function including hiring, 
disciplining and remuneration transferred to the local 
councils 
 Essential drug kits purchased and distributed by 
central MoH t health facilities with no input from 
district on composition of kits 
 Annual district work plans have to be approved by 
central MoH before funds are allocated 
 Less than 5% of health budget was from locally 
mobilised resources 
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2
8 
Mills A et al, 2002. 
The distribution of 
health planning 
and management 
responsibilities 
between centre and 
periphery: 
historical patterns 
and reform trends 
in four Caribbean 
territories 
Trinidad 
and 
Tobago, 
Bahamas, 
Marttinique 
and 
Suriname 
 Country level analysis of the 
historical evolution of the health 
system in the 4 countries 
HRH, 
Resource 
allocation, 
planning 
and 
budgeting 
 Adopted a delegated form of decentralisation through 
creation of  hospital boards in Bahamas, regional 
health authorities in T&T ; and Regional Agency for 
Hospitals in Martinique 
 Revenue raisin role retained centrally in Matrtinuque, 
while delegated units in Bahamas and T&T had 
power to raise local revenue and retain it 
 Personnel in the Bahamas employed by the hospital 
boards, in T&T –regions recruited new staff while 
existing staff given choice of transfer, secondment or 
remaining centrally employed; while in Martinique 
there were no changes in staff management  
2
9 
Gilson L, et al 
1994. 
Local government 
decentralization 
and the health 
sector in Tanzania. 
Tanzania  Qualitative evaluation of health 
system decentralisation as 
experienced by district managers 
HRH, 
EMMS, 
Planning 
and 
budgeting 
 Health staff employed by, and fully responsible to 
district councils 
 Drugs procured and delivered to health facilities 
through a vertically organised programme. Decision 
on kit contents taken by national MoH with not input 
locally.  
 Very low level of local decision space over several 
functions due to limited ability of districts to raise 
significant local resources, non-transparent national 
resource allocation procedures, many vertical donor 
funded health programmes, creation of many layers 
of responsibility, authority and accountability 
confusing technical officers. 
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12.2. Annex 2: Constitution of Kenya 2010 – Schedule Four 
FOURTH SCHEDULE (Article 185 (2), 186 (1) and 187 (2)) 
DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN THE 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE COUNTY 
GOVERNMENTS 
Part 1—National Government 
1. Foreign affairs, foreign policy and international trade. 
2. The use of international waters and water resources. 
3. Immigration and citizenship. 
4. The relationship between religion and state. 
5. Language policy and the promotion of official and local languages. 
6. National defence and the use of the national defence services. 
7. Police services, including— 
(a) the setting of standards of recruitment, training of police and use of police 
services; 
(b) criminal law; and 
(c) correctional services. 
8. Courts. 
9. National economic policy and planning. 
10. Monetary policy, currency, banking (including central banking), the incorporation and 
regulation of banking, insurance and financial corporations. 
11. National statistics and data on population, the economy and society generally. 
12. Intellectual property rights. 
13. Labour standards. 
14. Consumer protection, including standards for social security and professional pension 
plans. 
15. Education policy, standards, curricula, examinations and the granting of university 
charters. 
16. Universities, tertiary educational institutions and other institutions of research and higher 
learning and primary schools , special education, secondary schools and special education 
institutions. 
17. Promotion of sports and sports education. 
18. Transport and communications, including, in particular— 
(a) road traffic; 
(b) the construction and operation of national trunk roads; 
(c) standards for the construction and maintenance of other roads by counties; 
(d) railways; 
(e) pipelines; 
(f) marine navigation; 
(g) civil aviation; 
(h) space travel; 
(i) postal services; 
(j) telecommunications; and 
(k) radio and television broadcasting. 
19. National public works. 
20. Housing policy. 
21. General principles of land planning and the co-ordination of planning by the counties. 
22. Protection of the environment and natural resources with a view to establishing a durable 
and sustainable system of development, including, in particular— 
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(a) fishing, hunting and gathering; 
(b) protection of animals and wildlife; 
(c) water protection, securing sufficient residual water, hydraulic engineering and the 
safety of dams; and 
(d) energy policy. 
23. National referral health facilities. 
24. Disaster management. 
25. Ancient and historical monuments of national importance. 
26. National elections. 
28. Health policy. 
29. Agricultural policy. 
30. Veterinary policy. 
31. Energy policy including electricity and gas reticulation and energy regulation. 
32. Capacity building and technical assistance to the counties. 
33. Public investment. 
34. National betting, casinos and other forms of gambling. 
35. Tourism policy and development. 
 
Part 2—County Governments 
The functions and powers of the county are— 
1. Agriculture, including— 
(a) crop and animal husbandry; 
(b) livestock sale yards; 
(c) county abattoirs; 
(d) plant and animal disease control; and 
(e) fisheries. 
2. County health services, including, in particular— 
(a) county health facilities and pharmacies; 
(b) ambulance services; 
(c) promotion of primary health care; 
(d) licensing and control of undertakings that sell food to the public; 
(e) veterinary services (excluding regulation of the profession); 
(f) cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria; and 
(g) refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal. 
3. Control of air pollution, noise pollution, other public nuisances and outdoor advertising. 
4. Cultural activities, public entertainment and public amenities, including— 
(a) betting, casinos and other forms of gambling; 
(b) racing; 
(c) liquor licensing; 
(d) cinemas; 
(e) video shows and hiring; 
(f) libraries; 
(g) museums; 
(h) sports and cultural activities and facilities; and 
(i) county parks, beaches and recreation facilities. 
5. County transport, including— 
(a) county roads; 
(b) street lighting; 
(c) traffic and parking; 
(d) public road transport; and 
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(e) ferries and harbours, excluding the regulation of international and national 
shipping and matters related thereto. 
6. Animal control and welfare, including— 
(a) licensing of dogs; and 
(b) facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals. 
7. Trade development and regulation, including— 
(a) markets; 
(b) trade licences (excluding regulation of professions); 
(c) fair trading practices; 
(d) local tourism; and 
(e) cooperative societies. 
8. County planning and development, including— 
(a) statistics; 
(b) land survey and mapping; 
(c) boundaries and fencing; 
(d) housing; and 
(e) electricity and gas reticulation and energy regulation. 
9. Pre-primary education, village polytechnics, homecraft centres and childcare facilities. 
10. Implementation of specific national government policies on natural resources and 
environmental conservation, including— 
(a) soil and water conservation; and 
(b) forestry. 
11. County public works and services, including— 
(a) storm water management systems in built-up areas; and 
(b) water and sanitation services. 
12. Fire fighting services and disaster management. 
13. Control of drugs and pornography. 
14. Ensuring and coordinating the participation of communities and locations in governance 
at the local level and assisting communities and locations to develop the administrative 
capacity for the effective exercise of the functions and powers and participation in 
governance at the local level. 
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12.3. Annex 3: Data Collection Tools 
Generic interview guide 
  
Domain Theme Initial questions Additional probes after document reviews and 
observations 
Introduction Individual 
introduction 
What is your position/role in the health sector?  
For how long have you been in that position/role? 
What was your role position prior to this? 
 
Institutional 
introduction 
What is the role of your current management 
position/institution? Is it different from what was 
there prior to the implementation of the 2010 
constitution? How different is it? 
How clear is your role/how does the fit in the 
current national MoH organogram 
  
  
Background Context In your view what led to the country’s adoption of 
devolution in the 2010? 
What was the role of perceived historical injustices 
in managing government affairs and resource 
distribution 
What is the devolution policy intended/expected to 
achieve in the county in general? What is it expected 
to achieve in the health sector specifically? 
How is national resource allocation/distribution 
more equitable compared to the period before 
devolution 
  
Content How are/will the devolved counties be structurally 
and operationally different from the districts and 
provinces that existed prior to the adoption for the 
2010 constitution?  
How much influence does national government 
have on county operations? 
How is/will this structural and operational difference 
be particularly within the health sector? 
How much influence does national MoH have over 
the operations of the County Department of Health 
Is there an official policy and guideline document on 
how the central government will interact/relate with 
How is the linkage between the national and county 
government planning and M&E frameworks? How 
are these coordinated? 
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the devolved governments regarding operational 
planning and budgeting within the health sector? 
What is the role of the recently established “Inter 
governmental relations forum” on the planning and 
M&E process in the sector 
What opportunities/challenges does this bring about?  
  
Actors Who were the main actors that were 
involved/influenced the adoption of the devolved 
county government structure in the 2010 constitution?  
What was the role of politicians? Civil society? 
And Donor organisations? 
Who were the main actors involved in adaptation of 
the devolution within the health sector? 
What has been the role of central MoH? Role of 
County Governments? Role of other 
government/constitutional organs? Health NGOs? 
Donors in the Sector? 
Who are the main actors charged with the 
responsibility of implementing the devolution policy 
from the national level, especially in the health 
sector? How do these actors interact? 
Role of Sr Management at national MoH? Role of 
Health Sector Planning Units? Role of Sector 
Partners and Donors? Role of other 
government/constitutional organs? 
Who are the main actors charged with the 
responsibility of implementing the devolution policy 
at the county level, especially in the health sector? 
How do these actors interact? 
Role of Transition Authority? Role of CECs-
Health? Role of Interim County Directors and 
CHMTs? 
  
Process How is the devolution process being/ How is it to be 
implemented? 
In your view what explains the discrepancy (if any) 
on what is to be done in paper and what is actually 
being done? 
How is the devolution process being/ How will it be 
implemented in in the health sector?  
In your view what explains the discrepancy (if any) 
on what is to be done in paper and what is actually 
being done? 
At what point does full implementation of the 
devolution occur at the county level within the health 
sector? 
How timely will this be achieved? 
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Organizatio
nal Capacity 
Institutional 
Capacity 
What are the new/proposed subnational level 
structures and institutions that are/will be charged 
with managing and coordinating health services? 
Is there an official guideline to counties on the 
composition and roles of these structures? 
How are/will these institutions be structurally and 
operationally different from those that existed prior to 
the adoption of the new constitution? 
 
Are there mechanisms in place to train and orientate 
these new institutions/ structures on their roles of 
managing and coordinating health services at the 
subnational level? 
 
What opportunities/challenges have/will been/be 
brought about by these new institutions in the health 
sector at the subnational level 
 
  
Individual 
Capacity 
What is the profile (training and experience) of the 
actors operating in the subnational level management 
institutions and structures that manage and coordinate 
the health sector at that level? How are these different 
from those that existed prior to the adoption of the 
2010 constitution? 
What formal orientation/training was/will be 
organized for the county health managers? 
What capacity (training and experience) do the actors 
in the sub-national level health sector management 
structures have/expected to have regarding human 
resources planning and management? 
 
What capacity (training and experience) do the actors 
in the sub-national level health sector management 
structures have/expected to have regarding drugs and 
commodities supplies and management? 
 
What opportunities/challenges have/will been/be 
brought about by these actors in the subnational level 
health sector management institutions and structures? 
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Decision 
Space 
General 
operational 
planning and 
budgeting 
How much autonomy do/will the sub-national health 
management structures have regarding operational 
planning and budgeting? How has this changed from 
the period prior to the adoption of the new 
constitution? 
How is this happening during this transition phase? 
Who is approving the operational quarterly 
budgets? Who is issuing the AIEs? 
How is this autonomy exercised/expected to be 
exercised 
 
What opportunities/challenges has this autonomy 
brought/expected to bring? 
 
What sanctions exist with failure to comply with 
directives from ‘above’? 
 
  
Human 
Resource 
Management 
How much autonomy do/will the sub-national health 
management units have regarding planning and 
management of human resources? How is this/will 
this be different from the period prior to the adoption 
of the new constitution? 
Who is responsible for recruitment, deployment, 
disciplining and capacity development of health 
workers? 
How is the health workforce being managed, 
including being remunerated in this transition 
phase? 
How is this autonomy exercised/expected to be 
exercised 
 
What opportunities/challenges has this autonomy 
brought/expected to bring? 
How has been the experience so far in staff 
recruitment, deployment and salary payments? 
  
Drugs and 
Commodities 
Supplies 
Management 
How much autonomy do/will the sub-national health 
management units have regarding planning and 
management of drugs and commodities? How is 
this/will this be different from the period prior to the 
adoption of the new constitution? 
What has been the practice in this transition phase? 
How is this autonomy exercised/expected to be 
exercised? 
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What opportunities/challenges has this autonomy 
brought/expected to bring? 
 
  
  
Accountabil
ity 
Accountability 
to national level 
MoH 
Are there mechanisms of ensuring that the subnational 
level health sector management units factor in 
national level policies, strategic goals and guidelines, 
during their planning and budgeting for the health 
sector within their areas? How are these mechanisms 
different from what existed before the adoption of the 
new 
 
What are these mechanisms?  How are these 
mechanisms different from what existed before the 
adoption of the new constitution? 
 
Are there any sanctions or incentives that the central 
MoH have for reinforcing adherence to national level 
policies and guidelines by subnational level health 
sector management units? What are these 
sanctions/incentives? How are these different from 
what existed prior to the adoption of the 2010 
constitution? 
 
What opportunities/challenges do these bring about?  
  
Accountability 
to local elected 
leaders 
What mechanisms are in place to ensure that 
subnational level health sector management units 
consult local elected leaders during planning and 
budgeting for the health sector within their areas?  
What mechanisms are in place to ensure that 
subnational level health sector management units 
involve local elected leaders during planning and 
budgeting for the health sector within their areas? 
What has been the experience in this transition 
phase? 
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What mechanisms are in place to ensure that 
subnational level health sector management units 
respond to concerns of local elected leaders during 
planning and budgeting for the health sector within 
their areas? 
How are these mechanisms different from what 
existed before the adoption of the new constitution? 
What sanctions or/and incentives exist reinforcing the 
involvement and consultation with local elected 
leaders by subnational level health sector 
management units? How are these different from what 
existed prior to the adoption of the 2010 constitution? 
What has been the experience in this transition 
phase? 
What opportunities/challenges do these bring about?  
Accountability 
to the general 
community 
What mechanisms are in place to ensure that 
subnational level health sector management units 
consult, involve and respond to concerns of local 
community members during planning and budgeting 
for the health sector within their areas? How are these 
mechanisms different from what existed before the 
adoption of the new constitution? 
What has been the experience in this transition 
phase? 
What sanctions or/and incentives exist reinforcing the 
involvement and consultation with local community 
by subnational level health sector management units? 
How are these different from what existed prior to the 
adoption of the 2010 constitution? 
What has been the experience in this transition 
phase? 
What opportunities/challenges do these bring about?  
What do health managers do if the accountability 
requirements to national ministry, to local elected 
leaders and to the community are in conflict with each 
other? 
What has been the experience in this transition 
phase? 
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Generic observation checklist 
National Level Observations 
Context Before the 2013 
general election 
National/political mood regarding devolution 
during drafting and enactment of new constitution 
 
After the 2013 general 
elections 
National/political mood regarding devolution 
during the campaigns and the general elections 
 
Process Before the 2013 
general election 
Preparation for the devolved government units 
Preparation for devolution within the health 
sector. Subsidiary legislation to facilitate 
devolution. Formation of institutions to facilitate 
and manage the transition to devolution.  
Appointment of interim county government 
managers 
 
After the 2013 general 
election 
Outcome of the general election. Which party won 
the national election? Election disputes. 
Appointment of national cabinet and senior MoH 
managers at central level 
Development of the national health policy in line 
with the new constitution 
Development of the national health sector 
strategic plan in line with the new policy 
Discussion and restructuring of central MoH to 
conform with its new role in the devolved 
government system 
 
Actors Before the 2013 
general election 
Role of incumbent government 
Role of opposition parties 
Role of civil society and general population 
Institutions charged with the transition to 
devolved governments and their roles 
 
After the 2013 general 
election 
Role of winning government 
Role of opposition parties 
Institutions charged with the transition to 
devolved governments and their roles 
 
County Level Observations 
Context Before the 2013 
general election 
Local/Kilifi political mood during the drafting and 
enactment of the constitution 
 
After the 2013 general 
election 
Local/Kilifi political mood regarding devolution 
during the campaigns and the general elections 
Local NGOs operating in the county and 
influencing health sector management and 
planning 
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Local NGOs working in the county and 
influencing the decentralization, particularly in 
the health sector 
 
Process Before the 2013 
general election 
Preparation for the devolution 
Appointment and role of interim county 
government managers 
 
 After the 2013 general 
election 
Outcome of elections at the county? Which 
party/candidates won? What’s their relationship 
with the national government? 
Swearing in and orientation of governors and 
County Assembly Representatives 
Appointment of County Cabinet. Induction and 
orientation 
Appointment of county health management team. 
Induction and orientation 
Formation of sub-county health management 
structures 
 
Actors Before the 2013 
general elections 
Role of local political leaders 
Role of interim county health managers 
 
After the 2013 general 
election 
Role of county elected leaders 
Role of county government managers 
Role of County health committee 
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12.4. Annex 4: Thematic Frame 
1.0 Theme 1: Overall and health sector goals of devolutions 
 Sub Themes  Codes Document 
Reviews 
Interviews Observations 
1.1 Goals  1.1.1 Overall     
  1.1.2 Health sector    
2.0 Theme 2: Overall Expectations and Implementation Experiences of Devolution 
2.1 Organizational structure 
and relations 
2.1.1 National Level Structure, Roles and Capacity    
2.1.2 County Level  Structure, Roles and Capacity    
2.1.3 National Vs County level reporting/accountability 
relationship 
   
2.1.4 Community participation and involvement     
2.1.5 Lack of clarity/Understanding, 
disagreements/debates, contests and resistance to 
change 
   
2.2 Resources (financial?) 2.2.1 Overall government resources    
2.2.2 Community involvement/participation     
2.3 The transitional period  2.3.1 Intended and Actual process, timing and roles of 
key actors 
   
     
2.3.2 Broader political influences and public debates    
2.4 Overall outcomes 2.4.1 Business as usual, no real change    
2.4.2 Dialogue, consensus building and agreements    
2.4.3 Things are worse    
2.4.5 (Remaining) Hopes and Expectations    
2.4.6 Fear, anxiety and discomfort about the change    
3.0 Theme 3: Health Sector Financial Resource Availability, Priority Setting, Planning and Budgeting 
3.1 Allocating and accounting 
for resources 
3.1.1 Amounts and sources of funds    
3.1.2 Internal accountability - Central vs County level 
accounting/reporting 
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3.1.3 Community/ Public participation/ voices in health 
sector financial management 
   
3.2 Within county structure and 
relations 
3.2.1 Organization of the county finance management 
system 
   
3.2.2 County treasury vs County Department of Health 
roles in management of health sector finances 
   
3.3 Key issues and experiences 
in  management of health 
finances 
3.3.1 Budgeting process for health sector finances 
2014/15 
   
3.3.2 Confusion and lack of clarity on roles and 
responsibilities in financial management 
   
3.3.3 Delays in access/release of funds    
3.3.4 Coping mechanisms    
4.0 Theme 4: Health Work Force  Management 
4.1 HW management 
structures, roles and 
capacity.  
4.1.1 National/County/sub-county roles and 
accountability  
   
4.1.2 Capacity to perform roles    
4.1.3 Community involvement/accountability    
4.2 Key Issues/Experiences in 
HW management 
4.2.1 Hurried transfer of health workforce management 
into counties and associated debates 
   
4.2.2 Fears, tensions, confusions and industrial disputes    
4.2.3 Absorption of seconded health workers into 
counties 
   
4.2.4 Delayed salaries and payroll discrepancies    
4.2.5 Political interference/influence in health workforce 
management 
   
       
5.0 Theme 5: Essential  Medicine and Medical Supplies 
5.1 Structures, Key actors and 
their roles and capacity 
5.1.1 National/County/Sub-County roles and 
accountability 
   
5.1.2 County treasury    
5.1.3 County department of health/County Pharmacist    
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5.1.4 Health facility managers    
5.1.5 KEMSA composition, structure and its roles/ 
capacity 
   
5.1.6 Public Participation in EMMS Management    
5.1.7 Confusion and Lack of clarity of EMMS roles and 
responsibilities 
   
5.2 Key Issues/Experiences 5.2.1 Procurement and distribution of EMMS     
5.2.2 Availability of EMMS in health facilities    
       
6.0 Free Codes 
6.1  6.1.1 Power and Control    
  6.1.2 CIC Structure, Roles and responsibilities     
  6.1.3 Community participation (cross cutting across 
themes) 
   
  6.1.4 General budgeting and planning (Not specific to 
health) 
   
  6.1.5 Operational challenges (Finances/staff/capacity)    
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12.4. Annex 5: Copy of ethical approval letters 
LSHTM Ethical Approval 
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KEMRI Ethical Approval 
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12.5. Annex 6: Copy of generic informed consent form 
Formal Title:  Examining the effects of political decentralisation in Kenya, on governance and 
accountability structures and practices for sub-national level health sector operational planning 
and budgeting 
Institution  Individuals  
KEMRI-Wellcome Research 
Programme 
Benjamin Tsofa, Sassy Molyneux 
London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine, UK 
Catherine Goodman 
Health Economics Unit, Cape 
Town, SA 
 Lucy Gilson 
 
 
What is KEMRI and what is this research about? 
My name is ________.  I work for KEMRI, which is a government organization under the 
Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation and the Ministry of Medical Services.  KEMRI 
conducts research activities to learn more about health and illnesses in Kenya, including 
health systems research.  
 
We are conducting this research to learn more about how health systems are organised and 
managed at district/sub-county We are particularly interested in if and how you undertake 
operational planning and budgeting and how that has been/will be affected by the 
implementation of the new constitution in Kenya.  
 
We are talking to a range of people at district/sub-county, county and national level. When 
the work is finished we will combine all the information and feedback the findings to local 
and national leaders and health care managers.  We would like to interview you 
individually/in a group [where a group, state who else is included in the group].  
 
[Where taping]:  If you agree, the discussion will be tape-recorded to assist later in fully writing 
up the information.  No-one will be identified by name on the tape.   
 
Voluntary Participation 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you agree to help with this research and later 
change your mind you are free to withdraw at any time. The discussion should take 
approximately one hour.   
 
Confidentiality 
We are not here to inspect or audit the facility. The information will be used for research 
purposes only. No one other than the following research team members [names of the few who 
will actually read the transcripts,] will be allowed to see the record of the interview. We will 
not disclose your identity, or use your name in any reports of this work. The knowledge gained 
from this research will be shared in summary form, without revealing individuals’ identities.   
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[For group discussions]:  We will ask everybody in the discussion to keep what is said in the 
group confidential, but it is important to recognize that we cannot stop participants sharing 
what they have heard. 
 
Approval for and benefits of this work 
The study has been approved by the ethics committee of KEMRI and by national and 
county health managers.  The study will contribute new ideas and insights regarding health 
system management. 
 
What if I have any questions? 
You are free to ask me any question about this research. If you have any further questions about 
the study, you are free to contact the research team using the contacts below:  
 
Benjamin Tsofa or Sassy Molyneux 
P.O.Box. 230, Kilifi   
Telephone: 041 7522 063 (KEMRI-Wellcome Trust), or [insert study mobile number] 
 
If you want to ask someone independent anything about this research please contact 
Community Liaison Manager, KEMRI – Wellcome Trust  
P.O.Box 230, Kilifi.  Telephone: 0723342780 or 041 7522 063 
Or 
The Secretary - KEMRI/National Ethics Review Committee  
P. O. BOX 54840-00200, Nairobi, Tel number: 020 272 2541 Mobile: 0722205901 or 
0733400003 
 
CONSENT FORM - 
I have had the study explained to me. I have understood all that has been read and had my 
questions answered satisfactorily  
  Yes  please tick  I agree to be interviewed [if applicable; on behalf of the group] 
  Yes  please tick  I agree for the interview to be tape-recorded [if applicable; on behalf of the 
group] 
 
I understand that I can change my mind at any stage and it will not affect me in any way. 
Signature:  
 
Date:  
 
Participant  Name:  Time:  
Name (please print name)  
 
I certify that I have followed the study SOP to obtain consent from the [participant].  S/he 
apparently understood the nature and the purpose of the study and consents to the participation  
in the study. S/he has been given opportunity to ask questions which have been answered 
satisfactorily. 
Signature:         Date:  
  
Designee/investigator’s 
name name  Name: 
 Time:  
Na e 
 
 
(please print name) 
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12.7. Annex 7: Map outlining the embeddedness of the KEMRI-WTRP Kenyan Learning Site Researchers 
 
Source: Resilient and Responsive Health Systems - http://resyst.lshtm.ac.uk/resources/KEMRI-policy-map 
